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ABSTRACT 
 
I offer a novel defence of radically externalist theories of perception, via a strikingly spare 
and broadly physicalist metaphysics.  The core, motivating claim is what I call a natural 
view of perception, according to which perception involves direct awareness of our 
environment, such that the phenomenology of experience consists of the worldly things 
perceived, as they appear to the perspective of the subject.  To underpin this natural view, I 
propose a simple metaphysical picture of perception, which identifies the perceptual 
experience with the relation of awareness holding between subject and object, a relation 
that can be described in familiar physical terms as a causal process involving the thing 
perceived and the perceiver.  Distinctively, the simple metaphysical picture has no place 
for the notion of ‘experiences’ understood as distinctively ‘mental’ states or events internal 
or otherwise belonging to the subject.  Although there is some limited precedent for the 
simple metaphysical picture of perception, I offer the first detailed argument for its role in 
underpinning the natural view.   
 
The thesis offers new and detailed arguments to show that the simple metaphysical picture 
can not only account for normal perceptual experiences, but can also accommodate and 
explain other forms of sensory experience that have widely been considered to undermine 
the natural view of perception.  These ‘problem’ cases include perceptual illusion, 
hallucination, and the role of memory and beliefs in influencing how things appear 
perceptually.  In all of these cases, the simple metaphysical picture accounts for the 
phenomenology of the experience purely in terms of awareness of worldly objects, albeit in 
some cases objects that are not currently present in the subject’s environment.  The simple 
metaphysical picture thus promises to explain not just perceptual experience but 
phenomenal consciousness more generally. 
 
The natural view is explicitly a commitment of some varieties of naïve realism, but I argue 
that the two theses come apart.  For one thing, the simple metaphysical picture offers a 
solution to hallucination and other ‘problem’ cases quite different to the (chiefly 
disjunctivist) solutions offered by naïve realists.  However, the most striking and novel 
claim advanced here is that the natural view can be defended without a commitment to 
realism.  In this regard, I cite evidence for the subject-relativity or experience-dependence 
of certain perceived qualities, notably colour, and show the simple metaphysical picture 
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allows us to square this with the natural view that colours are ‘out there’ in the 
environment.   
 
I discuss the metaphysical implications of rejecting realism while adhering to the simple 
metaphysical picture, and outline a radical – and radically simple – metaphysics of the 
world in general that might preserve the natural view and accommodate the simple 
metaphysical picture of phenomenal consciousness more generally.  This metaphysics 
takes the form of a process monism in which the governing metaphysical structuring 
principle is one of top-down determination, such that whole processes determine the nature 
of their constituent parts.  
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CHAPTER 1 – THE NATURAL VIEW OF PERCEPTION 
 
1.1   Introduction 
 
When we perceive is our experience, as it seems, a straightforward confrontation with 
our environment, its objects and qualities?  Many have thought not, including Hume, who 
famously derided the ordinary man for believing “the very images, presented by the senses, 
to be the external objects” (2007: 111).  Hume thought that the notion of an “immediate 
intercourse between the mind and the object” was “destroyed by the slightest philosophy” 
(ibid.), although more recent philosophers have increasingly sought to restore credibility to 
some or other conception of perceptual experience as the direct engagement with the world 
outside our heads. 
 
In this thesis I will explore the viability of what I will call the ‘natural’ view that what 
we call perceptual experience is just an immediate apprehension of our environment, its 
objects and the qualities that inhere in them.1  A view of this sort has recent defenders 
amongst advocates of naïve realism, and I will have much to say about relevant forms of 
naïve realism and their success or otherwise in upholding the natural view.  Insofar as we 
might take it already to be an implicit, default theory about the nature of perceiving, the 
natural view is not just a key motivation for naïve realism but also the intuitive 
metaphysical picture for which naïve realism seeks to provide a more robust theoretical 
underpinning.  By contrast with theories that take a puzzling phenomenon and then 
propose a general theory to explain it, relevant forms of naïve realism start with an 
unproblematic understanding of the world and seek to conserve it in spite of seemingly 
problematic evidence to the contrary.  That said, if naïve realism is more than an exercise 
in conservatism then it is because rejecting the natural view generates philosophical 
puzzles of its own, puzzles which naïve realism promises to resolve or avoid.   
 
Broadly speaking, these puzzles come in two forms.  First is what we might call the 
phenomenological puzzle of what gives rise to the qualitative or ‘phenomenal’ aspects of 
perceptual experience if not simple awareness of the world.  Second are some more or less 
related epistemological puzzles concerning the role of perception in making it possible for 
                                                 
1  By ‘object’ I will mean anything – any worldly entity or event – that can be thought of as bearing 
perceptible qualities.  This might include such diverse things as items of furniture, rainbows, flashes, 
sounds, odours, and so on.  
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us to think about or refer to worldly things.  It is the first sort of puzzle that I will be 
concerned to address in this thesis, although doing so is likely to help bring answers to the 
second sort into view.   
 
As it turns out, my thesis, while defending what I call the natural view, will not prove 
a defence of naïve realism in any of its current forms.  I will criticise existing formulations 
of naïve realism on two fronts.  The first line of criticism has much to do with how naïve 
realism is expressed and in particular its adoption of, or acquiescence in, a philosophical 
lexicon that is ill-suited or even inimical to a proper expression of the natural view.  The 
second line of criticism is more substantial, and concerns the inadequacy of existing naïve 
realist theories to explain some of the central so-called ‘problems’ of perception – puzzling 
features of sensory awareness that have led Hume and countless others to reject the natural 
view in the first place.  These puzzling features notably include such well-known 
phenomena as perceptual illusions and hallucinations, as well as some less familiar 
phenomena like intersubjective perceptual variation. 
 
It is in large part these phenomena that have pointed philosophers towards a view of 
perception as involving the occurrence of some ‘inner’, ‘mental’ states, states of the 
subject’s mind and/or body which are caused to arise as a result of goings-on in the 
‘external’ world.  These states are what are usually called experiences.  It is a central claim 
of my thesis that there are no such things as experiences in the sense just described.  More 
precisely, my aim is to show how we can explain the nature of perception – crucially 
including what it’s like to perceive – solely by appeal to the nature of the environment and 
our relation with it, and without recourse to peculiarly ‘mental’ states or properties in any 
substantial sense. 
 
The widespread adherence to a conception of experiences as more or less ‘inner’ states 
of the subject is inspired in part by the thought that illusions or hallucinations can arise 
despite the subject’s sensory engagement with her environment being tenuous or absent.  
The thought continues that, for all this seeming disengagement, illusions and hallucinations 
nonetheless seem to involve a similar sort of sensory awareness as veridical perceptual 
experience.  Hence, in light of this subjective similarity, it is supposed that we ought to 
treat illusions, hallucinations and veridical perceptions as involving the subject’s being in 
the same kind of state, i.e. enjoying an inner experience.   
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The conception of experience – veridical or otherwise – as ‘inner’ is also bolstered in 
the views of many philosophers and scientists by consideration of what we know about 
perception understood as a physical process.  We know that, to perceive, a subject must be 
linked causally to the object perceived in a certain manner, involving the object’s more or 
less directly stimulating some of the subject’s sensory receptors and thereby causing some 
further neural excitation leading ultimately to a certain pattern of brain activity.  Nothing in 
this picture obviously entails anything about the location of experience, but the ‘inner’ 
conception is again inspired by consideration of non-veridical experiences and especially 
hallucination.  Thus, it is often noted that subjects can be induced to have hallucinatory 
experiences by the direct stimulation of their brain tissue, and this is taken to show that 
such brain activity alone suffices for the having of an experience.  Since we know that 
brain activity is a necessary ingredient in the having of a genuinely perceptual experience, 
the seeming sufficiency of brain activity for experience in the hallucinatory case has led 
many to conclude that the brain activity alone is likewise sufficient for the ‘experiential’ 
aspects in the perceptual case, namely the subjective, qualitative aspects that determine 
‘what it’s like’ to have that experience.  In other words, considering again the relation 
between perceptual experience and the perceptual process, the ‘experience’ part is taken to 
be determined or constituted by just the brain state occurring at the end of the process 
while the experience’s being perceptual is constituted by the obtaining of an appropriate 
causal relation between that brain state and the object perceived.   
 
This claim – that a certain kind of brain state or activity is sufficient for the occurrence 
of an experience, whether perceptual or not – lends credence to what is often called a 
common factor view of experience.  According to this view, any set of subjectively 
indistinguishable experiences, whether veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory, might share a 
common factor, namely the experience itself (e.g. Fish 2010: 3-5; Snowdon 1981: 188 ff.; 
Martin 2004: 40; Child 1992: 299).  This experience is, if you like, the intrinsic core of the 
mental state in each case – the experiences might be exactly similar intrinsically, differing 
only in their causal antecedents.   
 
Further, rather intuitive support for the ‘inner’ conception of experience comes from 
consideration of more everyday phenomena such as dreams, imagination and episodic 
memory.  As with hallucination, in each of these cases the subject seems to enjoy an 
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experience with a more or less rich quasi-sensory phenomenology despite a lack of sensory 
engagement with her perceptible environment.  Since these are experiences that can be 
enjoyed with eyes shut and ears plugged, and irrespective of our location in the world, they 
are conducive to the notion that they occur inside our heads in some more or less literal 
sense.   
 
These, then, are the key observations that have led many philosophers to deride as 
‘naïve’ the natural view that perception involves direct awareness of worldly objects and 
their qualities: first, there are observations to do with what we can know reflectively about 
(the diverse range of) experiences, including the possibility of experiences (illusions, 
hallucinations, dreams, etc.) that fail in some way to ‘match’ how things are in the 
subject’s perceptible environment; and, second, empirical observations about the physical 
processes involved in veridical and non-veridical experiences.  These observations appear 
to be complementary since it seems to many that we can identify a region of the perceptual 
process – that part taking place within the subject’s brain – which is sufficient for the 
occurrence of these various experiences replete with sensory qualities.  The crucial final 
step in the denunciation of the natural view is the suggestion that brain processes might be 
sufficient for the having of any such experience, including perceptual experience.   
 
In fact there are two related ideas here.  First is a general desire for unifying 
explanation: we can have experiences with rich sensory character (full of colours, sounds, 
smells, etc.) both when worldly things are perceived and also when they are not; if brain 
activity suffices to explain the sensory character in the latter case then we might expect it 
to explain it in the former case also.  Second is a more specific focus on the sufficiency 
claim: it is sometimes suggested that the same kind of brain state might be involved in a 
perceptual experience as in a subjectively matching hallucinatory one.  If that is so, and the 
brain state is sufficient for the sensory character of the hallucinatory experience then it 
must also be sufficient for the sensory character of the perceptual experience.  As such, 
there would be no further part for the worldly object perceived to play in determining the 
character of the experience beyond its causing the right kind of brain state.   
 
It is arguable that, until fairly recently, the natural view that was targeted by these 
arguments was a view that no philosopher was expected to hold.  Instead, it was a view 
attributed to untutored common sense and the ‘ordinary man’, and so served as a foil for 
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the sophisticated theories of philosophers.  The view was therefore described as ‘naïve’ in 
the ordinary, derogatory sense of the word.  More recently, however, some philosophers 
have mounted a defence of the natural view of perception from the sophisticated objections 
of others, and have accordingly described themselves as naïve realists, where the naïvety is 
adopted as a mark of their willingness to defend common sense in spite of the 
sophistication of their opponents and not in ignorance of it.  Inevitably, to do so they have 
been obliged to tackle the key questions about non-veridical experience and the physical 
basis of perception, and so their theories have taken on a corresponding sophistication of 
their own.   
 
Naïve realism is typically defended via what is often called a relationalist theory of 
perceptual experience – one which takes perceptual experience to be a relation between the 
subject and the worldly object perceived.  I will describe the relationalist theory in section 
1.3, and in section 1.4 I will offer a straightforward way to flesh it out metaphysically – 
with what I will call a simple metaphysical picture of experience.  In subsequent chapters I 
will show in more detail how this simple metaphysical picture can explain the nature and 
character of a diverse range of sensory experiences.  
 
My purpose is, first and foremost, to defend the natural view of perception and explore 
the prospects of accommodating it to various aspects of our sensory experience that have 
been presented as problems for naïve realism.  Notable among these supposed problem 
cases are experiences in which the way things seem to us sensorily appears not to be 
explicable fully, or even partly, in terms of how things are in the world before us – cases of 
perceptual illusion or hallucination.  I will discuss these cases in detail in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, and conclude that the natural view can be defended in light of these and other 
supposedly problematic features of our sensory experience.  More distinctively, I will 
further claim that these features can be explained using the same metaphysical framework 
applied to perception.  Specifically, these problematic features can be explained by appeal 
to nothing more than worldly objects and the subject’s sensory relation to them, a relation 
explicable in wholly causal, physical terms.  The upshot is that what we might call the 
‘phenomenology’ in all these experiences – the rich sensory character which determines 
what it’s like to perceive, hallucinate, and so on – is wholly attributable to direct awareness 
of objects and qualities ‘out there’ in the world, together with the background conditions 
(illumination, etc.) and the subject’s perspective on those objects.  That this might be true 
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of hallucination as well as perception is likely to seem implausible at first sight, but I hope 
to make this more palatable in due course.   
 
The upshot is that a metaphysical conception of awareness that is intended to deliver 
the natural view of perception will prove capable of accounting for the full variety of what 
we might call sensory experiences or phenomenal consciousness.  With some of these non-
perceptual forms of phenomenal consciousness – like hallucination – the proposed account 
will perhaps inevitably seem less than natural; after all, hallucination is an inherently 
‘unnatural’-seeming phenomenon.  However, what is most distinctive about the current 
thesis is precisely that it draws on a simple, natural view of the ‘good’ case of perception, 
and uses it to explain the seemingly ‘unnatural’ features of the ‘bad’ cases like 
hallucination.  In this respect, it inverts the usual line of argument, which cites 
hallucination etc. in order to show that our natural or ‘naïve’ view of perception cannot be 
correct. 
 
While my defence of the natural view is motivated by the seeming immediacy of 
perceptual engagement with our environment, there is another, perhaps less obvious, 
feature of ordinary perceptual experience that any theory must be able to explain.  This 
feature is experience’s generality: not only do we seem to encounter worldly objects 
immediately, but we also seem to see them as objects of a certain kind or as possessing 
qualities of a certain kind.  In other words perceptual experience, although seemingly 
immediate, is at the same time coloured by the subject’s beliefs and past experiences.  This 
is arguably a ubiquitous feature of ordinary perceptual experience, albeit one that is 
revealed most strikingly in certain cases of illusion involving ‘aspect shifts’, as in those 
figure/ground illusions where we ‘flip’ from seeing a design as a pair of faces in profile to 
seeing it as a vase.   
 
Any theory of perception with a pretence to adequacy must therefore be able to 
account for experience’s seeming immediacy without sacrificing its generality.  To that 
end, I will argue in chapter 5 that the natural view points to a way in which we can 
accommodate the influence that a subject’s past experiences can have on the 
phenomenology of current experience.  Crucially, in doing so it need no more appeal to 
‘internally generated’ phenomenal qualities than it does when explaining such phenomena 
as illusion and hallucination. 
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As far as possible, I will present the natural view as a way to explain the 
phenomenology of a diverse range of experiences by appeal to the antecedent nature and 
qualities of worldly objects.  It is just this explanatory approach to the character of 
experience that I will present as the foremost virtue of naïve realism, a virtue that in turn 
underpins its other claimed virtue of explaining our capacity for knowledge about 
particular objects and their qualities.   
 
Despite this, I will in chapter 6 use examples from colour experience to show that the 
nature of some perceived qualities poses a challenge to the natural view that can only be 
met by denying that those qualities have their nature wholly independently of their being 
perceived.  Such a denial is clearly tantamount to a rejection of realism about those 
qualities, at least on a standard notion of realism, and this is likely to impart to the 
argument the appearance of a reductio against the natural view.  The obvious worry would 
be that positing the subject-dependence of worldly qualities points to a sort of idealism that 
is at odds with my stated aim of explaining perceptual experience in terms of worldly, 
broadly physical goings-on rather than by appeal to peculiarly ‘mental’ states or properties 
in any conventional sense.  I will, however, show that we can resolve the seeming subject-
dependence of qualities into a (controversial but not unprecedented) claim about the nature 
of the physical world, namely that worldly objects and qualities have an essentially 
relational nature. 
 
This and other metaphysical implications of the natural view will be the subject of 
chapter 7.  Meanwhile, in the remaining sections of this chapter I will lay out the core 
elements of the proposed theory of perceptual experience.  These are two: first, a 
motivating claim about the seemingly world-revealing nature of perceptual experience 
(which I call the natural view); and, second, a metaphysical claim about perception which 
is deflationary about the notion of ‘experiences’ qua mental states of the subject.  I will 
give a full account of both claims and explain the intended relationship between them.  In 
so doing, I will also note the similarities between these claims and certain contemporary 
forms of naïve realism. 
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In subsequent chapters I will seek to defend the natural view and establish the 
philosophical implications of defending it.  The remainder of the thesis will attempt to 
answer the following questions: 
  
 Chapter 2: how does the natural view fit with what we know about the physical 
conditions of perception, viz. that perceiving an object requires the instantiation 
of certain kinds of physical-causal processes involving both the object and the 
physical subject?   
 
 Chapters 3 – 6: how can we square the natural view with some features of 
experience accessible from a first-person perspective, and in particular 
seemingly deceptive experiences such as illusions and hallucinations?  And how 
can we square the perceptual immediacy implied by the natural view with the 
seeming generality of experience, i.e. its capacity to present worldly things as 
things of a certain sort? 
 
 Chapter 7: what does the natural view imply about the nature of the worldly 
objects that we perceive, and the metaphysical structure of the world as a whole?  
 
 
1.2   The natural view  
 
The natural view proves surprisingly, and ironically, rather difficult to express.  To 
some extent we can capture it via an account of perception’s directness.  Roughly, it is the 
view that, when we perceive, what we are most directly aware of are just the worldly 
things themselves.  Unfortunately, ‘directness’ proves a decidedly slippery concept in the 
philosophy of perception, taking several meanings, not all of which capture the simplicity 
of the natural view (for a review, see McDermid 2001).  Most weakly, one might claim to 
uphold the directness of perception if one held that our perceiving worldly objects is not 
mediated by awareness of any other objects (including mental objects, like sense-data).  
This might be consistent with claiming that one is nonetheless most directly aware of 
properties of one’s mental state (such as qualia, to be discussed below) rather than worldly 
objects.  However, the sense of ‘direct awareness’ at play in the natural view is as 
straightforward and strong as one can get: it postulates no ‘inner’ objects of awareness 
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mediating perception; nor, as we shall see, does it require appeal to distinctively ‘mental’ 
states or ‘experiences’ in any substantial sense.  Rather, perception is to be understood as a 
straightforward encounter between subjects and the world, with no ‘added ingredients’.  
Quite what this entails will be explained in section 1.4 when I elaborate on a proposed 
simple metaphysical picture of perceptual experience. 
 
For now, we might alternatively frame the natural view as a claim about phenomenal 
character, where this is customarily used to mean the qualitative aspect of awareness – the 
assemblage of sensible qualities (colours, sounds, smells, etc.) that constitute what it’s like 
for the subject to perceive (cf. Chalmers 2002: 248).  The various qualities that go together 
to constitute the overall phenomenal character are typically referred to as phenomenal 
properties or phenomenal qualities.  There are some important subtleties in the 
employment of ‘phenomenal character’ and ‘phenomenal qualities’ to express the natural 
view, and I will say more about these later.  Meanwhile, we can usefully, if crudely, 
capture the essence of the natural view by asserting that the phenomenal qualities of which 
we are aware are ‘out there’, inhering (or suffusing, emanating from, etc.) the worldly 
objects perceived.   
 
The natural view (first pass): in perceptual experience we are directly aware of 
our environment such that the phenomenal qualities that determine what it’s 
like to perceive are ‘out there’ in that environment. 
 
This definition will turn out to need some refinement, but for now it usefully sets the 
natural view against those theories – like sense-datum theory – that take perception to 
involve the awareness of objects that are ‘in the mind’ or mind-dependent, so that the 
phenomenal qualities we are directly aware of are properties of those mind-dependent 
objects rather than the worldly ones we take ourselves to be perceiving.  Certainly, there 
are good grounds for resisting sense-datum theory; not least the puzzling metaphysical 
status of its postulated mind-dependent objects.  Rejecting sense-datum theory’s account of 
perception as indirect does not, however, commit one to the natural view.  One might hold 
that phenomenal qualities are not properties of either worldly objects or mind-dependent 
objects but are instead intrinsic properties of mental states (‘experiences’ in the sense that I 
will reject).  On this construal, phenomenal qualities are often called qualia (Shoemaker 
1991; Block 2003).  Since qualia, thus construed, are qualities rather than particulars, the 
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proponent of qualia might say that there is no object of which we are more directly aware 
than the worldly object, albeit that we are aware of it in virtue of being aware of qualia.  
Again, this position is clearly different from the natural view, which takes phenomenal 
qualities to be ‘out there’, instantiated in the subject’s environment.   
 
Resistance to sense-datum and qualia theories has been motivated by both 
phenomenological and epistemological considerations.  The phenomenological 
considerations centre on the claim that perceptual experience is ‘transparent’ in the sense 
that it seems (typically or inevitably depending on the strength of one’s transparency 
claim) to acquaint us with worldly objects and their qualities and not with some supposed 
qualities of experience itself (Harman 1990).  Relevant epistemological considerations are 
various, but include concerns regarding the capacity of perceptual experience to give us 
knowledge about our environment, to ground our thoughts about particular objects, and 
even to enable us to form the notion of an ‘external’ world in the first place (see e.g. 
Campbell 2002b).  My stated motivation for defending the natural view is 
phenomenological rather than epistemological, although I will remark in the conclusion on 
some obvious prima facie epistemological advantages that it offers. 
 
 
1.3   The natural view, naïve realism and relationalism 
 
It is in part a concern over the problematic phenomenological and epistemological 
implications of postulating sense-data or qualia that has motivated a recent surge of interest 
in refashioning a kind of theory – naïve realism – that was long derided as manifestly 
incompatible with certain observations about experience, and in particular the phenomena 
of illusion and hallucination.2  As I will explain in chapters 3 and 4, recent advocates of 
naïve realism have done much work to undercut the arguments of the theory’s earlier 
opponents and give it some plausibility.   
 
Naïve realism is closely allied to what has been called relationalism about perceptual 
experience.  Relationalism is so named on account of its central claim that perceptual 
experience is a relation between, and involving, the subject and the object(s) perceived.  
                                                 
22 For versions of naïve realism consistent with the natural claim, see e.g. Martin 2004, Fish 2009, Brewer 
2011, Campbell 2002.  See also Weir’s ‘ultra-realism’ (2004). 
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This might seem uncontroversial at first sight, but to see why it isn’t we must note a 
possible, and widely endorsed, distinction between the experience itself – an ‘inner’ state 
that in some sense holds the sensory qualities – and the link (generally taken to be causal) 
between that inner state and an appropriate worldly object that makes that state truly 
perceptual.  On any view, perception is a relation between subject and object, but the 
relationalist’s claim that perceptual experience is such a relation has distinctive 
motivations and consequences.  To get a handle on these, we must first understand what is 
meant by the claim that perceptual experience is a relation.   
 
What, in the first place, is the nature of the relation between subject and object?  The 
appropriately common-sense answer is that it is a relation of awareness (Martin 2006: 
357).  Crucially, as a relation that includes its relata, the occurring of a perceptual 
experience entails the existence of the worldly object perceived.  It is clear that, at least this 
far, relationalism is consistent with the natural view that what we call perceptual 
experience is nothing more or less than the state of affairs that is an object’s being 
perceived by a subject. 
 
Again, the clearest contrast is with theories that adopt a staunchly ‘inner’ conception 
of experience, such as sense-datum or qualia theories.  According to such theories, the 
occurrence of a certain experience involves the instantiation of certain mind-dependent 
objects and/or qualities, but it entails nothing about the existence or otherwise of ‘external’ 
objects or qualities.  Relationalism, by contrast, holds that the occurrence of an experience 
entails the existence of its worldly object, such that one could not have had that very 
experience in the absence of that object (cf. Martin 2006: 357). 
 
The thesis is often expressed via the claim that the worldly object perceived is literally 
a constituent of the perceptual experience:  
 
The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-
independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences as episodes or events, the 
naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-
independent objects.    
Martin 2006: 354 
 
The claims that (a) experience is a relation between (and involving) the subject and 
worldly object, and (b) the worldly object is a constituent of the experience thus have the 
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same force: the occurrence of the experience entails the existence of its worldly object.  
This notion of the worldly object’s being a constituent of the experience is consistent with 
the natural view that the phenomenal character manifest in experience is just the sensory 
character of the worldly scene perceived, with its objects and their qualities.  This literal 
reading of the constituency claim squares with what we might think of as a common-sense 
judgment that when we see something that something is just there in our field of view.   
 
Note, however, that the constituency claim made by Martin and other naïve realists 
does not entail anything about the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience.  
Martin himself says only that “the only sense in which we can account for the role for the 
object of perception as a constituent of the sensory episode is acting as a necessary 
condition on the occurrence of the perceptual event” (2004: 57).  One could, for example, 
allow that perceptual experience somehow takes the worldly object perceived as a 
constituent without one’s thereby taking that constitutive role to have a bearing on 
phenomenal character.3   
 
In this vein, Fish observes that relationalist naïve realism is advanced in two distinct 
ways, one as a claim about phenomenal character (that it is composed of worldly objects 
and their properties as they are arrayed before the subject in the occurrent conditions of 
lighting, etc.) and the other a “more ontological characterization” according to which 
perceived objects and their properties are constituents of the perceptual experience (2009: 
16).  He points out that this ontological characterisation and the one centred around 
phenomenal character make quite distinct claims and need not be bound together (ibid.: 
17).  Nonetheless, he says that the “ontological commitments...are natural concomitants of 
the naïve realist's claims about phenomenal character”, such that the constituency claim 
can be seen as a way of making intelligible the claim about phenomenal character (ibid.). 
 
                                                 
3  For example, Kennedy states that “[t]he concept of phenomenal character does not feature within my 
statement of naïve realism's main claim, that material objects and their perceptible properties are 
constituent-objects of veridical experience” (2009: 590). Despite insisting that the manifest presence of 
particular objects contributes nothing to phenomenal character, Kennedy is anxious to retain a 
'phenomenological' role for it as part of the “core conscious nature” of perceptual experience (ibid.: 600).  
Since phenomenal character, by his own account, “capture[s] or embod[ies] what it's like to have the 
experiences” (ibid.: 577), it is hard to see what 'phenomenological' or 'conscious' role can be played by 
particular objects besides their contribution to phenomenal character.  Kennedy’s motive for detaching 
the constituency claim from claims about phenomenal character is evidently to avoid problems allegedly 
arising from the possibility of hallucination.  Other naïve realists have claimed to be able to account for 
hallucination while preserving what I have called the natural view of perception; I will consider these 
further in chapter 4. 
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Certainly, the ontological and phenomenological characterisations are often run 
together in the accounts of relational naïve realists: the claim that worldly objects are 
constituents of the experience is reflected in the claim that the phenomenal character of 
experience is constituted by the properties of the scene perceived.  As Campbell states,  
 
the qualitative character of the experience is constituted by the qualitative 
character of the scene perceived […] the phenomenal character of your 
experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of 
the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, 
such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another 
and to you. 
Campbell 2002a: 114-116   
 
More concisely, Brewer asserts that it is “the mind-independent direct object itself 
which is constitutive of this subjective character” (2006: 172).  It is also said that these 
mind-independent objects and properties determine the experience's phenomenal character 
or, in Martin's words, “shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience” (2004: 
64).  In elaborating this rather metaphorical statement, Fish reasserts that the (potentially 
weaker) determination claim is to be read as one of constitution: “external objects and their 
properties…shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience by actually being the 
contours of the subject’s conscious experience” (2009: 6).   
 
Such claims by naïve realists for the relational nature of experience are apt to seem 
very strange.  The idea that worldly objects can be constituents of experiences appears, on 
the face of it, positively bizarre.  This appearance of bizarreness reflects the tendency, 
noted earlier, to think of experiences as peculiarly ‘mental’ states that are in some sense 
‘inner’ and private to the subject.  And it is not alleviated by naïve realists’ appropriation 
of terms like ‘experience’ and ‘phenomenal character’ and their use of them in ways that 
are not sufficiently sharply distinguished from their more customary philosophical use.  
What is needed is a clear explanation, avoiding metaphor, of what is meant by saying that 
objects can be ‘constituents of experiences’ or that the ‘mind can reach out to the world’ in 
perception.  Expressing naïve realism or the natural view in this sort of way suggests some 
sort of overlap between two realms of being that ought to be kept apart – the realm of 
worldly, physical stuff and the realm of the mind, of experiences, representations, 
thoughts, etc.  It will be evident that what is needed is nothing less than a metaphysical 
theory of perception that tells us what experience is (what it is ‘made of’) and how it 
relates to the world as we understand it as a realm of physical entities.  Furthermore, if 
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such a metaphysical account is to subserve the natural view or naïve realism then it must 
leave the ordinary qualities of our acquaintance – the colours, sounds, smells and so on – 
firmly ‘out there’ in the world. 
 
It is just such a metaphysical account that I will propose in the following section, one 
which marks no deep (or even particularly shallow) metaphysical distinction between 
worldly objects and our experience of them (between ‘mind’ and ‘world’ more broadly).  
In describing what I will call a simple metaphysical picture of perceptual experience, I will 
say some more about what we ought to mean by ‘phenomenal character’ and ‘phenomenal 
qualities’ when expressing the natural view.  In doing so, I aim to offer a way to cash out, 
in rather straightforward terms, the rather obscure and metaphorical claims of naïve realists 
for the relational structure of experience.  By no means do I claim that the simple 
metaphysical picture expresses what they actually mean by their metaphorical claims; 
rather, it offers one way in which those claims might be cashed out.  Crucially, it is a way 
that offers the explanatory virtues of simplicity and parsimony, and requires appeal to 
nothing more or less than the world of ordinary objects that perception seems to present us 
with. 
 
 
1.4   A simple metaphysical picture of perceptual experience 
 
I have remarked that the natural view of perception has no place for distinctively 
mental states or ‘experiences’ in any substantial sense.  This reflects in part the claimed 
transparency of perception, whereby experience at least seems to acquaint us solely with 
worldly things and not with some ‘experience’ itself (see e.g. Harman 1990).4  We might in 
any case doubt whether it is part of any pre-philosophical view that there are or are not 
mental states or experiences in anything like the senses employed by philosophers; these 
are items in our philosophical and not our natural inventory.  By appealing to such things 
we are precisely departing from the natural view that all we need to account for our 
awareness of the environment is that environment itself, and our place in it. 
 
                                                 
4  One can of course consistently subscribe to perception’s transparency while nonetheless believing that it 
involves the having of experiences qua mental states, and even that we are in fact acquainted with such 
experiences even though we don’t seem to be.     
22 
 
 
 
The natural view therefore requires nothing more than that perceptual experience is the 
relation of awareness holding between subject and object.5  We might thus describe a 
subject S’s perceptual experience of an object O as S’s being aware of O or S’s perceiving 
O.  Note that we here identify the experience in the perceptual case with the act or event of 
perceiving.  I will take it that the event of perceiving is itself describable in purely physical 
terms as a process in which the perceived object causes certain changes in the physiology 
of the subject.  If we assume that this physical description omits nothing of what is 
involved in perception (no special ‘mental’ residue for example), then identifying the 
perceptual experience with the act or event of perception is tantamount to identifying the 
experience with the perceptual process.   
 
This view is expressed in what I will call the simple metaphysical picture of 
experience: 
 
The simple metaphysical picture: what we call perceptual experience is nothing 
more or less than the state of affairs that is the object’s being perceived by the 
subject, or the subject’s perceiving the object; a state of affairs describable in 
physical terms as a causal process involving, inter alia, the perceived object, 
the subject and relevant perceptual intermediaries.  
 
Note that, while it identifies the perceptual experience with the perceptual process or 
state of affairs, the simple metaphysical picture says nothing about what counts as a case of 
perception.  That is, it does not offer a definition of experience – it says nothing about 
precisely which states of affairs would fall within the ordinary concepts of seeing, hearing, 
etc.  In other words, it neither seeks to analyse the concept of perceiving nor offers any 
necessary or sufficient conditions for perception having occurred.  Rather, it assumes an 
intuitive grasp of what it is to perceive and proceeds from there to make a claim about the 
metaphysical structure of the episode of perceiving.  Certainly, there will be a range of 
states of affairs whose status as episodes of perception will be questionable, for one or 
other reason.  For example, must subjects always be conscious to perceive?  Do I perceive 
                                                 
5  I will accordingly use ‘perceptual experience’ to denote the relation of awareness holding between subject 
and object, a relation which on the view proposed does not involve any distinctively ‘mental’ states.  I 
will use ‘experience’ more generally to denote whatever is going on that suffices for our awareness (or 
seeming awareness) across all sorts of cases, including not only episodes of perception but also 
hallucination, dreaming, imagining and so on.  I will indeed go on to argue that the latter, non-perceptual 
episodes can also be explained fully in terms of relations of awareness holding between worldly objects 
and the subject. 
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things when they are presented to me visually but I don’t notice them, as when I look at the 
lichen-covered branch on which a camouflaged moth sits in plain sight?  These and similar 
questions demand a conceptual analysis of perceiving that is orthogonal to my purpose in 
defending the natural view and the simple metaphysical picture.  What matters is that, for 
any episode that is decreed to be one of perception, it can be explained according to the 
simple metaphysical picture and so without recourse to distinctively ‘mental’ notions. 
 
Note also that the relationship between the natural view and the simple metaphysical 
picture is not one of mutual entailment.  The natural view is primarily a claim about the 
phenomenology of awareness – a claim about where we should locate the sensory qualities 
– whereas the simple metaphysical picture is a claim about what perceptual experience 
consists of and says nothing about phenomenology as such.  In this respect, the natural 
view and simple metaphysical picture are closely akin to the phenomenological and 
ontological characterisations of relationalist naïve realism described above, and similarly 
lack mutual entailment.  One might consistently hold that phenomenal qualities are ‘out 
there’ in the environment (the natural view) without subscribing to the simple metaphysical 
picture (those naïve realists who persist with talk of experiences as mental states may fall 
into this category).  Conversely, one could subscribe to the simple metaphysical picture 
without accepting the natural view.  One might subscribe to the simple metaphysical 
picture while disagreeing about where in the whole perceptual process one ought to locate 
the phenomenal qualities.  For example, Manzotti endorses the simple metaphysical picture 
– he calls it a ‘process-oriented view of conscious perception’ – but identifies an object’s 
phenomenal qualities (its colour, say) with the whole perceptual process by which it is 
perceived, rather than locating the colour in the object itself (Manzotti 2008: 179).  
Alternatively, one might conceivably endorse the simple metaphysical picture while 
denying the reality of phenomenal qualities altogether. 
 
All the same, as with the phenomenological and ontological versions of naïve realism 
more generally, the two theses are close bedfellows, and the simple metaphysical picture is 
intended to fall out of the natural view quite naturally, as it were.  In explaining the 
phenomenology of experience, the natural view requires nothing other than the subject, her 
environment and the broadly physical relation between them.  While the natural view 
therefore has no need for anything other than this worldly state of affairs, the simple 
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metaphysical picture turns this into a positive restriction on what perceptual experience 
involves.   
 
 
1.5   Phenomenal qualities and phenomenal character 
 
For all that it is not directly a claim about phenomenal character, the simple 
metaphysical picture helps us to get a handle on how we should use ‘phenomenal 
character’ and ‘phenomenal qualities’ to express the natural view.  It will be worth 
spending a little time clarifying our use of these terms so that we can come up with a more 
adequate definition of the natural view.  
 
By ‘phenomenal quality’ is usually meant a more or less discrete and uniform 
qualitative element (coloured region, sound, odour, etc.) amongst those that collectively 
compose the overall phenomenal character of an experience.  So it might be said, for 
example, that a visual experience of a tomato involves one’s awareness of the phenomenal 
qualities of roundness and redness.   
 
In my first pass definition of the natural view, I framed it as the view that phenomenal 
qualities are ‘out there’ in the environment.  We might therefore be tempted to treat 
‘phenomenal’ as synonymous with ‘sensible’ such that seeing a tomato involves awareness 
of the redness and roundness that are the very sensible qualities of the tomato itself.  
However, there are cases that complicate the proposed definition.  We must allow – as 
must any theory – a potential mismatch between how objects appear and how they are.  An 
apple might be green, but it will look grey under red light.  If ‘phenomenal quality’ is used 
to denote how the apple appears, then the apple here has the phenomenal quality of 
greyness.  Nonetheless, there is no actual instance of greyness here – the greyness is not 
‘out there’ in any straightforward sense.  If, on the natural view, phenomenal qualities are 
‘out there’ in the environment, we need to be able to account for this mismatch between 
how things are and how they appear, and we must account for it without locating the 
merely apparent qualities ‘in the mind’.  The crucial requirement, given the refusal to 
locate phenomenal qualities ‘in the mind’, is that how things appear cannot be attributed to 
anything other than the environment and our perspective on it.  In some cases – as in the 
apple case above – the appearance will not be simply attributable to the sensible qualities 
possessed by the object, but will be a function also of prevailing background conditions; 
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ambient lighting, in the case described.  This allows that certain phenomenal qualities are 
merely apparent – the seeming greyness of the apple for example – while nonetheless 
being wholly attributable to how things are ‘out there’ in the environment.  As we shall see 
in chapter 3, this enables us to account for many cases of perceptual illusion consistently 
with the natural view.   
 
‘Phenomenal character’, meanwhile, is used typically to denote the property of an 
experience that determines what it is like to have that experience (cf. Chalmers 2002: 248).  
Clearly, since I am using ‘experience’ in a non-standard sense there is likely to be some 
corresponding adjustment required to the meaning of ‘phenomenal character’.6  For one 
thing, any talk of ‘having an experience’ sits awkwardly with the definition of experience 
presented in the simple metaphysical picture.  A worldly state of affairs involving both the 
subject and her perceived environment is not well described as something the subject ‘has’.  
An experience is better understood as something that involves the subject – something that 
she participates in.  What, then, might we mean by ‘phenomenal character’ in this context?  
First of all, it is difficult to make sense of the claim that an episode of perception – an 
object’s looking some way to a subject – might have a character, phenomenal or 
otherwise.  We might talk of something – an object or a scene – as having a certain 
character, but less comfortably the seeing of something.  The ordinary use of ‘character’ in 
respect of perception is to describe the overall appearance of a scene.  In this use, character 
is a relational property of a scene – how it appears to a subject.  Or perhaps we should say 
that it is in part a relational property of the subject’s environment, for a scene is arguably 
best understood as a portion of the world characterised in relation to the perspective 
provided by the perceiving subject.  The notion of a scene already has the relationality built 
in, we might say.   
 
Character, understood as the property of a perceived environment, is thus a matter of 
how that environment appears or manifests itself to a subject.  We can treat the adjective 
‘phenomenal’ as supplying a contrast with other things we denote with ‘character’ but 
                                                 
6  The formulation ‘what it’s like’ needs some adjustment, too.  It is in any case somewhat opaque, largely 
because it is difficult to discern what is denoted by ‘it’.  Since the concern is typically said to be what it’s 
like for us to have an experience, we might think that ‘it’ is the experience, but then why not ask simply 
what the experience is like?  Compare the question ‘What is it like to see the red tomato?’  This might be 
paraphrased as ‘What is the red tomato like visually?”  This suggests that the ‘it’ in what it’s like denotes 
the object of the experience and not the experience itself.  This accords with my claim that there are no 
such things as ‘experiences’ in any substantial sense, so that talk of what it’s like to experience really 
latches onto what is experienced rather than ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’. 
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which are not so essentially tied to their sensible qualities; for example, a person’s 
character (personality), which we discover not by mere contemplation but by long 
acquaintance with his behaviour.  While the term ‘phenomenal’ might not find much use in 
ordinary discourse, we can take it to be roughly synonymous with ‘sensory’ in this context, 
and as denoting more abstractly something we can specify with terms like ‘visual’, 
‘auditory’, and so on.  This enables us to align our philosophical use of ‘phenomenal 
character’ with an ordinary use, where ‘visual character’ might be a fancy way of denoting 
how something looks, and likewise, mutatis mutandis, for ‘auditory character’, and similar 
locutions.   
 
Strictly, then, a proponent of the natural view should avoid talking about the 
phenomenal character of experiences.  This formulation might make sense in respect of a 
theory according to which, for example, we are most directly aware not of worldly objects 
but of properties of ‘experiences’ (qualia in the sense of intrinsic, non-representational 
properties of experiential mental states – see e.g. Block 1990).  Equally, it might make 
sense in respect of representational theories, where what it is like to perceive some worldly 
object is determined by the representational properties of the experience, again construed 
as a mental state of the subject.  In such theories it is typically held that perception involves 
the subject’s being in some mental state or enjoying a mental episode or event (the 
‘experience’), whose properties, intrinsic or representational, are what determine what it is 
like to undergo that mental state or event – determine, in other words, its phenomenal 
character.  It should be clear that this use of ‘phenomenal character’ is very different from 
the one that I have suggested falls out of the natural view.  I will use ‘phenomenal 
character’ sparingly and only to denote the sensory character of perceived objects or 
scenes.  Where I wish to refer, neutrally, to what it’s like to have an experience – 
perceptual, hallucinatory or otherwise – I will use the term ‘phenomenology’, as I have 
above.  On my account, the phenomenology of a perceptual or hallucinatory episode is 
constituted by the phenomenal (sensory) character of the objects or scenes 
perceived/hallucinated, etc.   
 
At a second pass we may therefore offer a more robust definition of the natural view, 
as follows: 
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The natural view: in perceptual experience we are directly aware of our 
environment such that it is the environment itself that is the bearer of 
phenomenal character. 
 
This revised definition allows that a scene or object possesses phenomenal character 
without being committed to the claim that any or all of the phenomenal qualities that 
appear to contribute to that character are actually instantiated in the scene.  In many ‘good’ 
cases of veridical perception, how an object appears is indeed an accurate guide to how it 
is – the relevant phenomenal qualities are actually the sensible qualities instantiated in the 
object itself.  When seen in broad daylight, the apple looks green because it is green.  
However, the natural view, as amended, allows that phenomenal qualities are sometimes 
merely apparent while nonetheless accounting for that appearance wholly in terms of how 
things are in the environment and our perspective on them. 
 
As we have seen, the explicit use of ‘phenomenal character’ to denote a property of 
experiences (and not, as I have advocated, a relational property of worldly objects) leads 
naïve realists to claim that objects constitute this character rather than possessing or 
bearing it.  Campbell comes closer to my refined definition of the natural view when he 
says in the quotation above that “the qualitative character of the experience is constituted 
by the qualitative character of the scene perceived” (2002a: 114-116).  However, he puts 
out of reach the more straightforward claim of identity rather than constitution by referring 
first to the qualitative character of the experience.  After all, he cannot be predicating 
‘qualitative character’ of the same thing in both cases since, clearly, the experience and the 
scene are not identical.  That being so, ‘qualitative character’ must be being used of an 
experience in a different way to how it is used of a scene; in the latter use, it denotes how a 
scene looks (sounds, etc.), whereas it would be odd, to say the least, to talk of how an 
experience looks.   
 
My purpose in redefining ‘experience’ and ‘phenomenal character’ in light of the 
natural view is precisely to spare that view some of the superficial implausibility that 
attends recent formulations of naïve realism.  This implausibility results from importing 
key items of terminology from an area of philosophy where they have been used to express 
rather opposed conceptions of experience, namely conceptions of experience as somehow 
‘inner’ and as involving objects or properties (sense data, qualia, representations, and so 
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on) distinct from the worldly properties perceived.7  The problem for naïve realism is less 
the terms themselves than the failure adequately to strip them of their resulting 
philosophical baggage.  The natural view and the simple metaphysical picture are an 
attempt to achieve just this baggage-stripping and so make naïve realism’s 
phenomenological and ontological claims not just intelligible but also plausible. 
 
I should warn that the natural view, even in its revised form, will ultimately fall short 
of total adequacy as an account even of veridical perception, or at least it does if we take it 
to require that phenomenal character is wholly attributable to the subject’s current 
environment, i.e. to what is presently before the subject.  In chapter 5 I will consider 
evidence that the phenomenal character of a scene can be influenced by cognitive factors 
such as memory and belief, an influence that may be all but ubiquitous in normal 
perception.  I will argue, however, that this does not undermine the claim for perception’s 
directness, but instead highlights that even in perception we are often aware of more than 
what is immediately before us in our environment.  Crucially, I will use the simple 
metaphysical picture to show that this ‘extra’ element of phenomenal character is 
nonetheless borne by worldly objects, albeit not those immediately present before the 
subject.  Before getting to that surprising claim, we should look a bit more closely at the 
simple metaphysical picture. 
 
 
1.6   Experience as a process 
 
Recall that I expressed the simple metaphysical picture in two ways: firstly, by 
describing the episode of perceiving as a state of affairs, consistently with our ordinary talk 
of such episodes; and, second, by describing it in physical terms as a causal relation or 
process linking the object and subject in the appropriate way.  This second part of this 
definition should not be seen as an ad hoc imposition of physicalism.  Rather, it too should 
be seen as falling out of the natural view itself.  That is, if we take perception at face value 
it presents us with nothing more or less than ourselves and the worldly scene or objects as 
they are arranged before us.  Nothing in this state of affairs – this awareness – gives us 
                                                 
7  Witness, for example, Campbell’s claim that “experience of objects…reaches all the way to the objects 
themselves” (2002b: 136).  This usefully exemplifies the bizarre-sounding statements that naïve realists’ 
use of philosophically-loaded terminology can lead to.  Presumably, claims like these should be 
understood as metaphors but, absent clear admission of this or the provision of more literal alternatives, 
naïve realists must accept some of the blame for the incredulous stares that their claims sometimes elicit. 
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cause to posit any third thing or state coming between us and the objects we perceive – no 
mental state or experience in that sense.   
 
If we therefore reject as superfluous any talk of experiences or mental states in this 
substantial sense, then we have what amounts to a form of eliminativism about mental 
states, and about experiences in particular.  That is, our talk of ‘experiences’ does not pick 
out a class of objects, events or states, except in the sense that it denotes states of the world 
in which subjects are aware of objects.  However, the simple metaphysical picture is 
certainly not eliminativist about sensible qualities – in other words, it does not deny the 
rich qualitative aspect of awareness, which is a crucial aspect of what we take ourselves to 
be talking about when we refer to experiences.  What is distinctive about the natural view 
and the simple metaphysical picture is that they locate this rich qualitative aspect 
straightforwardly out in the world where it seems to be.8 
 
That there is scope for a view that denies the existence of experiences qua distinctively 
mental states while admitting the reality of sensible qualities has been defended by 
Stoneham in support of direct or naïve realism (Stoneham 2008).  According to his ‘purely 
relational theory of perception’, perceptual experience is just the obtaining of an 
appropriate (awareness) relation between an object and a subject (ibid.: 313).  If there is a 
difference between this theory and my defence of the natural view it is that Stoneham 
describes the awareness relation as holding between “a minded thing and a physical 
object” (ibid.) whereas I will describe it as holding between a physical subject and a 
physical object, with no need to posit ‘mindedness’.   
 
A rejection of the notion of experiences as ‘inner’ states is also found in other naïve 
realists (e.g. Snowdon 1990: 124) although, as Stoneham notes, they more often suggest 
that perceptual experiences are ‘non-inner’ mental states that somehow ‘reach out’ to 
embrace their worldly objects (Stoneham 2008: 317).  On the natural view, such talk of 
‘mental states’ here is quite superfluous if our purpose is to explain the nature and 
                                                 
8  For a discussion of eliminative materialism, see Ramsey 2013.  As he notes, eliminative materialism – the 
view that there is just physical stuff and that mental states do not exist – has sometimes been conflated 
with reductive physicalism – the view that mental states are just physical states of the brain (ibid.: s.1).  
On the view I will propose, ‘mental states’ – experiences in particular – are just states of the world, 
understood as broadly physical. This is no reduction, however: my experience when I see an object is, on 
this account, nothing more or less than the whole state of affairs that is my seeing the object.  I describe 
this below as the simple metaphysical picture of experience. 
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character of awareness since we can account for this purely by reference to the nature of 
our environment and our (spatial, physical) perspective upon it. 
 
A more explicitly deflationary account of the ‘mental’ aspect of perception is found in 
Weir’s ‘ultra-realist’ theory of perception (Weir 2004).  For Weir, the ‘mental’ state of 
perceptual experience consists of nothing more than the perfectly ‘external’, worldly state 
of affairs or ‘situation’ that is the subject’s perceiving an object to be some way F (ibid: 
107).  The perceived objects and properties are ‘bound together’ in the perceptual situation 
by the subject’s perceptual brain state, which acts as a sort of nexus for that worldly state 
of affairs, which otherwise would not exist (ibid.: 109).  What we call ‘the mind’, on this 
view, is just a “network of situations” successively arising in this way (ibid.: 106-7).   
 
Explicit statements of the simple metaphysical picture can be found in the writings of 
naïve realists such as William Child and Mark Johnston.  Child suggests the following 
metaphysical account of perceptual experience precisely as a way that the naïve realist 
might reconcile the relationalist thesis with the empirical facts about perception understood 
as a process: 
 
The mental state of affairs, o's looking F to S, is not a state or event at the end 
of a causal chain of events initiated by o; it is, rather, a (larger-sized) event or 
state of affairs which itself consists in the whole chain of physical events (not 
merely events within S) by which o causally affects S.  The experience is the 
complete state of affairs, o causally affecting S.  The ultimate effect in this 
causal state of affairs – the state or event which lies at the end of the causal 
chain which starts with o – is something physical in S; but that ultimate effect 
is neither identical with nor constitutive of the experience itself. 
 
Child 1992: 309 
 
Notwithstanding the reference to a ‘mental state of affairs’ (which we might interpret 
along the lines of Weir’s perceptual situations), this looks much like the simple 
metaphysical picture as I have expressed it.  Mark Johnston similarly proposes something 
like the simple metaphysical picture to underpin his version of naïve realism: 
 
[T]he relation between seeing an object and the long physical process involving 
first the light coming from the object and then the operation of the visual system 
is not the relation between a first mental effect and a prior physical process that 
causes it. Seeing the object is not the next event after the visual system operates. 
Seeing the object is an event materially constituted by the long physical process 
connecting the object seen to the final state of the visual system. Seeing the 
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object is an event that is (as it actually turns out) constituted by a physical 
process that goes all the way out to the object seen. 
 
       Johnston 2004: 138-9 
 
Johnston’s description here makes no mention of ‘visual experiences’ as such but 
merely of seeing.  As it stands, the claim that seeing – visual perception – is as a matter of 
fact constituted by a certain kind of process might seem fairly innocuous, and as it stands 
this claim is compatible with the notion that seeing nonetheless involves the occurrence of 
a mental state (the ‘experience’) at the end of this process.  Johnston, however, explicitly 
resists the appeal to such a picture and clearly has something like the simple metaphysical 
picture in mind – the experience just is the seeing. 
 
Johnston’s account usefully applies a contrast with the more conventional picture of 
experience as a more or less inner mental state caused by the worldly objects perceived.  
This view of perceptual experience as an effect of its object I will call the effect view.  In 
chapter 2 I will explore why the effect view is so widely seen as compelling and even 
incontrovertible and consider claims for the effect view that appeal variously to matters 
conceptual, empirical and phenomenological.  Refuting these claims is clearly crucial to a 
defence of the natural view.   
 
A distinctive feature of Child’s and Johnston’s statements, and which I have 
incorporated into my definition of the simple metaphysical picture, is the way in which 
experience is recast in terms of a physical process.  This identification of perceptual 
experience with the physical process involved in perception appears in a more fully 
worked-out form in the work of Manzotti, who calls it a ‘process-oriented’ view of 
perception (Manzotti 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2011).  However, as noted above, Manzotti 
presses this metaphysical view into the service of a theory which holds phenomenal 
qualities to be identical to the relevant perceptual processes themselves, rather than 
locating them within the parts of those processes where they seem to reside – for example, 
on the surfaces of objects.  From the perspective of the natural view, Manzotti’s theory 
therefore mislocates phenomenal qualities.   
 
In any case, if the aim of the natural view is to explain how things appear perceptually, 
we might wonder what purpose is served by highlighting a physical construal of the 
perceptual relation.  After all, the perceptual process will include all sorts of elements that 
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don’t obviously contribute constitutively to the phenomenal character of what is perceived.  
For example, the light reflected from an apple, and the retinal excitation it subsequently 
causes in my eye, are not themselves seen, even if they are necessary conditions on my 
seeing the apple.  If the purpose of the theory is just to explain why the apple looks red 
then an appeal to the redness of the apple, my vantage point, and the daylight conditions 
would seem to suffice.   
 
One reason to offer the physical construal alongside the statement acknowledging the 
obtaining of a perceptual state of affairs is that it explicitly reconciles these two forms of 
description.  This reconciliation is of a piece with the natural view’s avowed purpose of 
explaining perceptual experience by appeal to nothing more than what we know about the 
physical world.  As I will describe in chapter 2, there are good empirical and perhaps even 
conceptual grounds for thinking that an appropriate causal link between subject and object 
is necessary for perception to occur, so it is clear that causation plays a key role in enabling 
objects to play their constitutive role in experience.  More generally, the physical 
description of the awareness relation is intended to signal that what appears to us most 
directly in perception are just the very same worldly objects that we measure and describe 
using the methods and language of science.  This needn’t imply that our scientific 
descriptions of those objects are privileged or exhaustive.  There may be perceptible 
features of the world that are not described in a narrowly physical or scientific account of 
the world.  For example, our use of colour language to describe objects may not align 
closely with a narrowly physical description of those objects (in terms of physico-chemical 
structure or surface spectral reflectance) but the natural view assumes that colours as 
ordinarily understood are nonetheless just as much out there, inhering in the objects 
themselves.9  I will for this reason develop the natural view within the context of what I 
will call a broadly physicalist ontology – where the use of ‘broadly’ is not to make room 
for anything not quite physical but to acknowledge that a narrowly physical description of 
the world may not adequately encompass all of the features of the worldly things that we 
can know through perception.  
 
A second virtue of the physical construal is that it points to a route by which we can 
explain seemingly anomalous or ‘unworldly’ phenomena, such as illusion and 
                                                 
9  The failure, in some cases, of our ordinary perceptual descriptions and our narrowly physical descriptions 
to line up has far-reaching implications for how we must understand the world if the natural view is 
correct.  I will explore this in some detail in chapter 7. 
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hallucination, experiences in which the connection of awareness to the world seems to be 
awry or absent.  As I will explain in chapters 3 to 6, these and other seeming problem cases 
can be explained as more or less ‘deviant’ forms of awareness of worldly objects, a 
‘deviance’ that can be made comprehensible by recasting it in terms of the physical 
relation between objects and subject.   
 
It is in such ‘unworldly’ experiences that we might otherwise find the motivation for 
our customary talk of ‘mental states’ as somehow ‘inner’ phenomena.  The same may be 
said of thoughts, memories and dreams, phenomena that we might take to be ‘inner’ 
inasmuch as they appear more or less independent of what is happening in our 
environment.  Since they involve what is currently ‘out there’ in our environment only 
loosely if at all, and since they follow us around instead, we tend to think of them as 
happening ‘in here’ in some sense – as goings-on within our skin.10  
 
I will argue in chapters 4 and 5, however, that memories, dreams and perhaps even 
thoughts – or at least their subjective, phenomenal aspects – can after all be explained 
without recourse to mental states or properties in any substantial sense.  Just as with 
perceptual awareness, a full account of what it is like to imagine or remember can be given 
purely by reference to worldly things.  If this already seems counter-intuitive and therefore 
‘unnatural’, it is worth pointing out that what is supposed to be ‘natural’ is the account of 
ordinary perception and not necessarily the related account of our other psychological 
relations to worldly things.  What sets hallucinations, dreams, recollections and imaginings 
apart from perceptions is that they do not seem to involve an encounter with things that we 
can literally grasp.  It is the very tangibility of perceived objects that makes it natural to 
take perceptual experience at face value, as an immediate sensory encounter with those 
objects.  By contrast, the intangibility of things hallucinated, dreamed, recalled, etc., seems 
to put them at one remove from us as subjects.  Nonetheless, I will show how we can 
account for the ‘subjective’ aspects of these experiences in the same way that we can 
account for the qualitative character of perceptual experience, namely by identifying those 
experiences as (broadly physical) states of affairs involving worldly objects and subjects.  
My approach here will be essentially the same as that proposed by Manzotti in his 
                                                 
10  It is the phenomenology of these supposedly ‘inner’ episodes – the fact that there is often something it is 
like to think, remember or imagine – that generates the pressure to treat them as having special ‘mental’ 
properties or as inhabiting some special inner realm.  We needn’t think of thoughts, memories or 
imaginings as essentially exhibiting some phenomenology; even allowing that phenomenology is a mere 
accompaniment to (some) thoughts, memories and imaginings is enough to make the point. 
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‘process-oriented view’ (notwithstanding our differences over where to locate phenomenal 
qualities).  In this way we can account for the seeming ‘distance’ between the subject and 
the objects hallucinated, dreamed, etc., in terms of the nature of the relevant states of 
affairs and without recourse to talk of distinctively ‘mental’ states or properties.  
Accordingly, I will argue that the ostensibly ‘inner’ character of these phenomena is quite 
misleading and that they can be accommodated to the natural view in essentially the same 
way as perceptual awareness. 
 
Ostensibly ‘unworldly’ experiences like illusions, hallucinations, and so on, have 
therefore been seen as presenting the most glaring challenge to a natural view of 
perception.  However, even in ordinary perceptual awareness there is good reason to 
believe that the phenomenology is not always attributable simply to the qualities borne by 
things currently before us in our environment, but can at least sometimes be influenced by 
our beliefs, memories and imagination.  This is true notably in cases of perceptual learning 
and cognitive penetration of perceptual experience.  Although in my characterisation of the 
natural view the emphasis has been on accounting for the seeming directness or immediacy 
of our perceptual encounters with our environment, we should therefore acknowledge the 
importance of accounting also for the element of generality that enters into perception – the 
way in which we perceive particular objects as instances of certain kinds of objects.  This 
feature of experience we might take to underlie the evident intelligibility of the world as 
we perceive it – the way that it appears as an assemblage of more or less familiar objects, 
objects that perceptibly instantiate certain kinds and afford certain possibilities.  While 
these features of experience – its immediacy and generality – might seem somewhat in 
conflict, I will show in chapter 5 that the natural view, and the simple metaphysical picture 
that falls from it, offer a way to account for them compatibly and, again, without appealing 
to any ‘internal’ aspects of phenomenology.  As such, I will suggest that we might see the 
simple metaphysical picture as offering a novel way to understand the claim – typically 
eschewed by naïve realists – that experience represents the world as being a certain way.  It 
might, in this way, offer a bridge between the relationalists’ notion of simple awareness 
and the representationalists’ appeal to perceptual content. 
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1.7   The limits of naïve realism 
 
I have presented the natural view as an expression of the core claim of naïve realism, 
at least insofar as the latter theory is motivated by phenomenological concerns.  And I have 
proposed the simple metaphysical picture as a way of cashing out naïve realists’ rather 
metaphorical claims about the relational structure of perceptual experience and the role of 
objects as ‘constituents’ of our awareness.  As noted earlier, some self-avowed naïve 
realists may not endorse the natural view, being concerned more with epistemological than 
phenomenological concerns.  Nonetheless, if naïve realism does not entail the natural view, 
then we might at least think that the natural view entails a form of naïve realism.  
However, we will have cause to question this posited entailment, and indeed to hold that 
naïve realism is false even while the natural view might yet be true. 
 
Before getting to the reasons for this surprising claim, we can see that even a form of 
naïve realism that endorses the natural view goes a step beyond it.  As its name suggests, 
what is distinctive about naïve realism is that it combines the natural view with a further 
claim that I will call the realism claim, namely the claim that the objects and qualities of 
which we are aware exist and have their nature independently of their being perceived.11  
Let us then define the relevant form of naïve realism as the conjunction of these two 
claims: 
 
The natural view: in perceptual experience we are directly aware of our 
environment such that it is the environment itself that is the bearer of 
phenomenal character.  
 
and 
 
The realism claim: worldly objects exist and have their perceptible qualities 
independently of their being perceived. 
 
                                                 
11  Different forms of realism are formulated for different kinds of subject matter, e.g. mathematical objects 
and moral properties, but all take a similar general form, namely that the existence and nature of the 
relevant entities are independent of their relations to subjects.  See e.g. Miller 2010 for a synopsis and 
discussion.  The realism relevant to the current thesis concerns perceptible objects and qualities. 
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Taken together, the natural view and the realism claim deliver what we might see as a 
key explanatory virtue of naïve realism, namely its ability to explain how things appear 
perceptually to the subject.  The explanation proposed is simple: how things appear – their 
phenomenal character – is determined exhaustively by the experience-independent nature 
of the worldly objects and qualities perceived as they are arrayed in the scene before the 
subject.   
 
Let us call this the explanatory virtue of naïve realism: 
 
The explanatory virtue: naïve realism explains what it’s like to perceive solely 
by reference to objects and qualities in the subject’s environment as they are 
arranged to the subject’s perspective. 
 
I take it that the realism claim is implicit in the explanatory virtue inasmuch as the 
direction of explanation is supposed to run from the existence and nature of the perceived 
objects/qualities to the phenomenology of experience.  That is to say that any explanatory 
value is dependent on the explanans being independent of the explanandum. 
 
The chief objections to naïve realism can be understood as attempts to show that for 
certain experiential phenomena – classically, perceptual illusion and hallucination - the 
explanatory virtue does not hold.  In other words, these are supposed to be cases in which 
the phenomenology of experience cannot be explained solely by reference to the objects 
and qualities perceived by the subject.  It is therefore widely claimed that the phenomenal 
character manifested in our awareness cannot simply be identified with the sensory 
character of the worldly scene itself in the way that the natural view requires.  It is the 
alleged mismatch between how things are before the subject and how things seem 
perceptually that encourages some to treat phenomenal character not as a (relational) 
property of the perceived environment but as a (possibly intrinsic) property of an 
experiential mental state.  The challenge to the naïve realist is thus to preserve the 
explanatory virtue in the face of these seemingly problematic kinds of experience and so to 
keep phenomenal character ‘out there’, as it were. 
 
I will show in chapter 3 that naïve realists have no difficulty squaring the explanatory 
virtue with at least some well-known kinds of illusory experience, since these are cases in 
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which the phenomenal character, misleading though it may be, is nonetheless 
demonstrably explicable purely in terms of the scene before the subject and its constituent 
objects and qualities.  Hallucination poses more of a challenge, since by definition it is a 
kind of experience in which some of the phenomenal qualities of which the subject seems 
to be aware need not be instantiated in the subject’s perceptible environment.  As a result, 
the possibility of hallucination has driven some of the central arguments for and against 
naïve realism.  I will argue in chapter 4 that available naïve realist accounts of 
hallucination leave something to be desired, and show that the natural view points to an 
alternative account that, surprisingly, brings it within the scope of the explanatory virtue. 
 
My reason for highlighting the explanatory virtue is thus to emphasise an essential 
feature of naïve realism, but also as a prelude to showing that it is difficult if not 
impossible to reconcile with certain features of perceptual experience.  I will cite some key 
features of colour experience which cause problems for the realism claim: first, intra- and 
intersubjective variation in hue perception; and, second, the structure of phenomenal 
colour space.  Each of these cases presents a challenge to any attempt to account for the 
phenomenal qualities of experience – their nature and variability – by reference to the 
qualities that worldly objects possess independently of their being perceived.  It seems 
from such cases that we cannot identify the phenomenal qualities with subject-independent 
qualities borne by the worldly objects perceived, and so the explanatory virtue cannot hold. 
 
A corollary of this is that we cannot hold true both the natural view and the realism 
claim, such that we must reject naïve realism as I have defined it.  Given the above-noted 
problematic features of colour experience, such naïve realism would entail the following 
inconsistent triad: 
 
1. Perceived (phenomenal) colours inhere, in at least some cases, in the very 
worldly objects perceived (the natural view). 
 
2. Colours have their nature, and qualify worldly objects, independently of their 
being perceived (the realism claim). 
 
3. Perceived (phenomenal) colour qualities are subject-relative (call this ‘subject 
relativity’). 
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This effectively recapitulates a familiar form of argument against naïve realism, 
deployed in times where it was largely invoked as a foil for what were felt to be genuinely 
philosophical views of perception.  As I will explain in chapters 3 and 4, the argument is 
more commonly constructed around the phenomena of illusion and hallucination, although 
there are plausible accounts of these that the naïve realist can offer without obviously 
endangering the realism claim.  The same cannot be said for the subject relativity of colour 
experience. 
 
Although I will conclude from this that naïve realism is an unstable and untenable 
position, I will persist in defending the natural view while rejecting the realism claim.  At 
first blush, this might seem an absurd way to resolve the inconsistent triad, and the 
alternative route of abandoning the natural view might seem preferable.  Certainly, it has 
been preferred by most philosophers when confronted by a similarly-structured problem 
based on the possibility of illusion or hallucination.  Nonetheless, I think that the natural 
view remains worth defending precisely because it is such a statement of the obvious, by 
which I mean it is so well grounded in a compelling pre-philosophical grasp of what 
perception involves.  One might object that the realism claim is likewise a statement of 
what seems obvious, so that there is an inconsistency in denying a corresponding defence 
of that claim.  However, while the realism claim might seem to capture a common-sense 
view (albeit one not always endorsed by philosophers, notably including some idealists), it 
is arguably a more philosophical claim than the pre-philosophical insight I have tried to 
express in the natural view.  No doubt there are common-sense insights in the vicinity of 
the realism claim, although these arguably have more to do with notions of causal 
independence, namely that we cannot change things merely by perceiving them.  The 
notion of constitutive independence is less easily discerned in what we might imagine is a 
common-sense, pre-philosophical view of perception.   
 
In any case, while the realism claim and subject relativity are clearly incompatible (the 
latter is the denial of the former, at least in respect of certain perceptible qualities), no such 
logical incompatibility comes between subject relativity and the natural view.  Of course, 
to hold both of these claims would be to commit oneself to the claim that the inherent 
qualities of worldly objects (colours, etc.) are subject-relative.  This, for one thing, requires 
a rather loose reading of ‘inherent’; specifically one that does not treat it as a synonym for 
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‘intrinsic’.  More worryingly perhaps, it looks very like a kind of idealism, namely the 
claim that worldly objects are mind-dependent.  However, I will argue in chapter 7 that the 
natural view opens the way to a metaphysical picture that can account for the falsity of the 
realism claim without succumbing to what have been seen as the more unacceptable 
implications of idealism.  Most obviously, my denial of ‘mental states’ or ‘experiences’ 
construed as distinct entities, states or events occurring within the subject means that the 
relevant notion of subject-dependence is not to be read as mind-dependence or understood 
in terms of the ontological priority of the mental over the physical.  Instead, I will argue in 
chapter 7 that it can be cashed out in terms of a certain kind of top-down metaphysical 
priority relation holding between wholes and their parts.  The crucial example of this 
metaphysical priority for my purposes is the priority of the whole perceptual process 
(involving and linking object and subject) over the particular worldly objects and qualities 
that form parts of that process. 
 
Notwithstanding the metaphysical contortions necessitated by subject relativity, I will 
show that the simple metaphysical picture allows us to explain many hallucinatory and 
other non-perceptual experiences in a way that preserves realism and hence naïve realism’s 
explanatory virtue.  As such, I will argue that the natural view and simple metaphysical 
picture offer an advance on some existing naïve realist attempts to account for the 
phenomenology of non-perceptual experience.  Ultimately, however, we will be left with 
some aspects of sensory experience that are also explicable in terms of the simple 
metaphysical picture, but only at the cost of abandoning realism.  Quite what this 
abandonment amounts to will be discussed in chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION AND THE 
NATURAL VIEW 
 
I have argued that the natural view is suggestive of a simple metaphysical picture of 
perceptual experience, namely that what we call ‘experience’ is nothing other than the state 
of affairs that is the object’s being perceived by the subject.  In this chapter I will make an 
initial survey of the prospects for the simple metaphysical picture.  To that end, I will 
critically appraise some prima facie reasons for thinking that perception must involve some 
sort of more or less inner ‘experience’ – a distinctively ‘mental’ state or event that is 
caused to arise in the subject by the object perceived. 
 
 
2.1   The effect view and the causal theory of perception 
 
I have suggested that the natural view and the simple metaphysical picture might make 
intelligible the relationalist claim offered by naïve realists to explain the directness of 
perception, namely the claim that the worldly objects perceived are literally constituents of 
the perceptual experience.  The simple metaphysical picture makes good this claim by 
identifying what we call ‘experience’ with just the worldly process or state of affairs that is 
the object’s being perceived by the subject.  Nothing metaphysically extravagant is 
intended by this claim.  Quite the reverse: it is intended to be deflationary about 
‘experiences’ insofar as it denies that talk of ‘having a perceptual experience’ is to be 
understood as entailing the occurrence of something – an experience – that is in some way 
distinctively mental and separate from the thing perceived.  ‘Having a perceptual 
experience’ is, given the simple metaphysical picture, taken instead to be a convoluted 
synonym of ‘perceiving’.12  Otherwise, the claim that perceptual experience takes the 
worldly object as a constituent might strike one as implausible or bizarre insofar as it 
contradicts a commitment that is, explicitly or not, common to the vast majority of theories 
of perceptual experience.  The commitment in question is a broad claim about the 
relationship between perceptual experience and the physical process involved in 
perception, namely that perceptual experience is an event or state within the subject which 
occurs at the end of a causal chain originating externally to the mind, such that the 
                                                 
12  One might think that it is possible to perceive unconsciously, while having a perceptual experience 
expressly implicates conscious perceiving.  In that case, we might prefer to treat ‘having a perceptual 
experience’ as synonymous with ‘consciously perceiving’, but without taking this to require that the 
conscious aspect of it involves the occurrence of an ‘experience’ in the substantial sense that I reject.   
41 
 
 
 
experience itself is an effect of the worldly thing perceived.  I will call this the effect view 
of perceptual experience: 
 
The effect view: perceptual experience is a state of, or event within, the subject 
which is caused by the worldly object perceived.13 
 
The effect view is widely seen as uncontroversial and indeed obviously true.  As a 
result, it is rarely defended as a philosophical claim in its own right.14  A philosophical 
claim it is, nonetheless.  Doubtless what has obscured its contestable status as a 
philosophical claim is a failure to conceive of any plausible alternatives.  And the likely 
worry is that a rejection of the effect view would entail detaching experience from the 
realm of causes altogether, an outcome with unfortunate consequences for all of the 
philosophical projects, metaphysical and epistemological alike, that centre on reconciling 
mind and the physical world.   
 
It should be clear, however, that it is just this reconciliation between mind and world 
that the natural view is intended to bring about.  More precisely, it follows from the natural 
view that the felt need for reconciliation is really an artefact of the effect view’s conception 
of ‘mind’ as something more or less distinct from the world.  As such, we can go further 
than the weak requirement that the physical facts about the perceptual process do not rule 
out the natural view or otherwise favour the effect view, and assert more strongly that the 
natural view is more obviously consistent with a broadly physical ontology.  The purpose 
of the current chapter is to show that the weaker requirement is met – that the natural view 
                                                 
13  Most theories of perceptual experience will draw a distinction between the experience itself and its 
‘content’ – what the experience is about, the state of affairs that would make the experience accurate or 
true.  This distinction is often cashed out as holding between an inner state of the subject and what that 
state represents; between a representational ‘vehicle’ and the representational content (e.g. Dretske 2003: 
68).  Clearly, on this view, where the content of the experience refers to an object in the subject’s 
environment the experience’s content is not a state of or event within the subject caused by that object.  In 
respect of such theories the effect view therefore concerns the experience itself – the vehicle rather than 
the content.  On the view that I will defend there is no such distinction: the objects that a perceptual 
experience is about are constituents of the experience itself. 
14  For example, Valberg states that what he calls ‘the causal picture of experience’ – crucially incorporating 
the claim that experience is the ‘upshot’, ‘result’ or ‘culmination’ of the familiar causal process of vision 
involving light, eyes, nervous excitation, etc. – is “not in any sense a ‘philosophical’ view or theory” 
(1992: 24).  A little more circumspectly, Strawson remarks that “with the distinction between 
independently existing objects and perceptual awareness of objects we already have the general notion of 
causal dependence of the latter on the former, even if this is not a matter to which we give much 
reflective attention in our pre-theoretical days” (2011: 136).  We might think the latter caveat somewhat 
undermines his earlier claim that the stated distinction “is as firmly a part of our pre-theoretical scheme as 
is our taking ourselves, in general, to be immediately aware of those objects” (ibid.: 135). 
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is consistent with the physical facts about perception.  The wider metaphysical 
implications of the simple metaphysical picture will be the subject of chapter 7. 
 
I will argue that we can reject the effect view by denying the need to postulate a 
perceptual experience that is taken to be a more or less discrete, datable event or entity 
occupying a particular place within the physical-causal perceptual process.  As we will see 
later, however, this denial requires that the burden of explaining any peculiar features of 
perception, and of sensory experience more generally, falls back on to the world.  In other 
words, any seemingly anomalous features of how things appear to us sensorily must, after 
all, prove explicable in terms of the nature of the physical world.  Accordingly, in chapters 
3 to 6, I will argue that the natural view is consistent with what we know about experience 
from the first-person perspective, and in particular that it can accommodate phenomena 
like perceptual illusion and hallucination which have widely been seen as problematic for 
naïve realism. 
 
In the meantime, it might be thought that the effect view is supported by empirical 
findings regarding the perceptual process.  One might furthermore hold it to be a 
requirement of our ordinary concept of perception.  In other words, the effect view might 
be considered as either or both an empirical and a conceptual truth.  In this section I will 
argue that it is neither.  Clearly, the claim that the effect view is a conceptual truth is a 
stronger claim than the empirical claim, as the former would entail the latter but not vice 
versa.  For that reason it is the conceptual claim that I will assess first.   
 
 
2.2   Is the effect view a conceptual truth? 
 
One reason that might be offered for endorsing the effect view is that the very concept 
of perception is a causal concept, and specifically that it is part of our ordinary concept of 
perception that perceiving involves the having of an experience that is caused by the 
worldly object perceived.  This widely-held view has been called the causal theory of 
perception (hereafter, ‘the causal theory’) (see e.g. Grice 1961, Pears 1976).   
 
The natural view plainly conflicts with the causal theory.  This is a consequence of the 
natural view’s deflationary interpretation of talk of ‘having experiences’, namely that such 
talk is a misleadingly complicated and metaphorical way of referring to experiencing 
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(perceiving, etc.).  Certainly, the natural view allows that perception is a causal process – 
something made explicit in the simple metaphysical picture – but not that the causal relata 
are the object perceived and an experience.  Rather, the relevant relata are the object 
perceived and some physical state of the subject.  The experience, according to the simple 
metaphysical picture, is just the perceiving, otherwise describable as the whole perceptual 
process involving object and subject. 
 
In this section I will argue that claims for the conceptual truth of the causal theory (and 
thereby the effect view) are unfounded.  It will not be necessary to my defence of the 
natural view to show that the effect view is conceptually false, or that the natural view is 
conceptually true; rather, it will suffice to show that the effect view is not conceptually 
true.  Equally, note that the causal theory is a specific form of argument for the effect view 
– one which seeks to establish the truth of the effect view on conceptual grounds alone.  
The failure of the causal theory does not, in itself, entail the falsity of the effect view.  I 
will address alternative, empirical arguments for the effect view later in this chapter. 
 
The causal theory can be stated as follows, where 'S' denotes a subject and 'o' an object 
(cf. Snowdon 1990: 123): 
 
The causal theory: It is a conceptual truth that if S perceives o, S is undergoing a 
perceptual experience caused by o. 
 
Crucially, ‘perceptual experience’ is not being used here to denote the state of affairs 
that is o’s being perceived by S, as the natural view would claim.  Two considerations 
make this clear: firstly, the experience is said to be caused by o, which plausibly makes 
sense only if o is distinct from the experience; second, even if we could make sense of o’s 
causing a state of affairs of which it is a constituent, that would reduce the claim to 
tautology rather than a conceptual truth.  The notion of perceptual experience being 
employed by causal theorists is evidently one that treats it as a more or less ‘inner’ state of 
or event within the subject.   
 
What distinguishes the causal theory from the effect view is its presentation as a 
conceptual truth – a requirement of our ordinary concept of perception – rather than as a 
mere empirical claim or statement of fact.  The causal theory is, to that extent, intended as 
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a form of conceptual analysis.  Quite what is meant by 'conceptual analysis' in this kind of 
context requires some elucidation, however.  In the broadest terms, we may take it to be a 
process by which we uncover the ways in which a concept is used, the scope and limits of 
its application.  Insofar as it is intended to reveal something of our ordinary concepts, it is 
reasonable to suppose that this analysis should not rely on matters of fact that are likely to 
outstrip the knowledge possessed by ordinary users of the concept.  Seeing, for example, is 
a concept applied in everyday situations by subjects with little or no knowledge of the 
physical processes involved in our visually apprehending worldly objects, so such 
knowledge cannot play a role in explicating the conditions and constraints on our use of 
the concept. 
 
As such, when Snowdon says that “it is wrong to incorporate as an element in the 
analysis of a concept C any condition F which can be revealed as a necessary and essential 
condition for the correct application of C only by arguments relying on what are, broadly, 
empirical considerations”, he means that we must only incorporate conditions that can be 
inferred from the judgments of ordinary subjects in respect of the scope of applicability of 
the concept concerned (Snowdon 1990: 121-2).  That said, perception is of its very nature a 
process of interaction with the world and the source of much of our knowledge, and our 
mastery of the concept of perception or seeing is likewise the outcome of such interactions, 
so what is intended is far from an a priori analysis of the meaning of terms like 'perceiving' 
or 'seeing'.   
 
Snowdon finds in the causal theory (as applied to visual perception) three distinct 
claims (Snowdon 1981: 175-6):  
 
1. necessarily, if a subject S sees an object O, then O causally affects S (“the 
causal thesis”); 
 
2. the effect of O on S is a state of S which can be reported by a looks-statement, 
i.e. one of the form 'It looks to S as if...' (“the effect thesis”); and 
 
3. the causal thesis and the effect thesis are essential to our ordinary concept of 
visual perception (“the conceptual thesis”). 
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In what follows, it will be important to bear in mind the difference between the causal 
theory and the causal thesis.  The causal thesis (being one component of the overall causal 
theory) describes a necessary condition of S’s perceiving O – namely that O affects S.  It 
should be obvious that it does not describe a sufficient condition of S’s perceiving O, since 
the object may affect the subject by some route other than via her sensory apparatus, and in 
a manner that does not render the object perceptible.  To address this insufficiency, the 
effect thesis claims that the effect of O on S is to bring about a state that can be 
characterized in terms of how things look to S; in other words a perceptual experience.  
The conceptual thesis simply adds that the causal and effect theses are true by virtue of the 
very concept of seeing. 
 
For my purposes, this analysis of the causal theory usefully teases apart elements that 
are inimical to the simple metaphysical picture from those that are not.  Specifically, the 
simple metaphysical picture is at odds with the effect thesis, inasmuch as the latter takes 
the state of S in question to be the perceptual experience.  The causal thesis, meanwhile, is 
something that both the effect view and the simple metaphysical picture explicitly endorse.  
It will therefore be quite consistent with the simple metaphysical picture should the causal 
thesis prove to be a conceptual truth.  Of course the conceptual truth of the causal thesis 
would not favour one of the effect view and the simple metaphysical picture over the other, 
for what is at issue is the relationship between the relevant effect on the subject and the 
perceptual experience.  By the same token, neither the effect view nor the simple 
metaphysical picture would be disproved if the causal thesis turned out not to be 
conceptually true, for there might be empirical evidence in its favour instead.  (Both 
theories would be in trouble if the causal thesis proved either conceptually or empirically 
false, but this does not appear likely.) 
 
Crucially, the principal arguments raised in favour of the causal theory are ones that 
support only the causal thesis.  The causal thesis is typically brought out by consideration 
of the kinds of 'problem' cases noted above, involving various hypothetical disruptions to 
the causal process that, in straightforward cases of veridical perception, hold between 
object and subject.  Taking vision as the paradigmatic mode of perception, a non-
contentious case of veridical visual perception (a case of seeing) would be one where the 
following three circumstances obtain: (i) it looks to the subject as if there is an object of 
type F at location L; (ii) there is an object of type F at location L; and (iii) the object at L 
46 
 
 
 
causally affects the subject in the appropriate manner via the subject's visual system.  The 
kinds of problem cases that are typically used to defend the causal theory are what we 
might call veridical illusions or veridical hallucinations – cases in which circumstances (i) 
and (ii) obtain but (iii) does not – there is an F at L, it looks as though there is an F at L, 
but the F at L is not causally affecting the subject (Snowdon 1981: 180-1).   
 
Broadly two kinds of case might be contrived, differing from each other in the 
deviance (or seeming non-existence) of the causal chain leading to an effect on the subject 
(cf. Snowdon 1981: 181): 
 
1. Veridical illusion.  Here a subject is standing in front of, say, a stuffed parrot 
and it is to her as she were seeing a stuffed parrot.  Unbeknownst to her, 
however, there is a mirror between her and the stuffed parrot and the mirror is 
reflecting a matching cardboard cut-out of a parrot situated off to the side.  
 
2. Veridical hallucination.  In this kind of case the subject might again be 
standing in front of the stuffed parrot and it is to her as she were seeing a 
stuffed parrot.  But now the parrot is unobstructed in her line of sight, yet she 
is having a hallucination that prevents her sensory apparatus registering the 
actual parrot but which just happens to match the character of the experience 
she would otherwise have of the actual parrot. 
 
The conceptual truth of the causal thesis depends on our intuition that neither of these 
cases is one in which the subject sees the target object (the real stuffed parrot) despite the 
fact that conditions (i) and (ii) above hold, i.e. the target object is present and the subject 
appears to see something appropriate to the target object's being there.  What is missing 
from each case is of course the appropriate causal connection between the stuffed parrot 
and the subject. 
 
The hypothetical problem cases are the main source of justification for the causal 
theory.  However, it should be obvious that they support only the causal thesis and not the 
effect thesis.  What they show is that we ordinarily consider a case to be one of perception 
only if a causal connection holds between the subject and the object purportedly perceived.  
But of course the causal thesis omits any claim regarding the nature of the effect induced in 
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the subject.  This specification is the role of the effect thesis, which effectively claims that 
O causes a perceptual experience in S.   
 
That the causal thesis is in fact true is not challenged by Snowdon, although he 
questions whether its truth follows also from the very concept of vision (1981: 176 ff.).15  
As noted above, whether the causal thesis is conceptually true in addition to being 
empirically true is of no consequence for the debate between the effect view and the simple 
metaphysical picture.  This debate hangs entirely on the truth or otherwise of the effect 
thesis. 
 
Unfortunately, in his (1981) Snowdon offers little explicit criticism of the effect thesis 
nor any explanation of why someone might hold it to be true.  Indeed, having defined it, 
Snowdon gives it scarcely another mention.16  His position on the effect thesis is clearer 
from his (1990) despite the fact that here he addresses the causal theory in its entirety 
without dividing it into its constituent theses, as follows: “it is a conceptual requirement 
that, necessarily, if P (a subject) sees O (an object) then O is causally responsible for an 
experience (call it E) undergone by (or had by) P” (1990: 123).  It is clear, however, that 
the chief target is now the alleged conceptual truth of the effect thesis: the claim that it is a 
conceptual truth that P’s seeing O involves P’s having an experience (1990: 124).  
Specifically, he seeks to undermine the claim that, conceptually, seeing something involves 
a subject’s having an ‘inner’ experience, i.e. “an occurrence in P which is an experience 
and which is quite separate from O” (1990: 127). 
 
                                                 
15  As I will note below, Snowdon argues that if perception were a causal concept there would have to be a 
manifest effect end in perceptual experience, and this manifest effect end is at least not obvious given the 
familiar transparency of normal experience (1990: 136-7).  Hyman offers an alternative objection to the 
causal thesis, suggesting that the illustrative 'problem' cases (i.e. veridical illusion and veridical 
hallucination) show not that causation is involved in seeing, but merely that it is possible causally to 
prevent one from seeing (Hyman 1992: 280).  In this regard he is at odds with Child, who claims that the 
causal thesis is supported by our intuitive grasp of the possible ways in which our vision of an object can 
be blocked (as by having our eyes closed, or by some other object obstructing our line of sight), blocking 
being a causal notion (Child 1992: 311).  Hyman suggests instead that X's blocking our view of Y 
involves the denial of an opportunity to see Y rather than X's causing us not to see Y (Hyman 1994: 374-
5).  To which Child retorts that opportunity conditions (and their denial) can be either causal or non-
causal (where the latter involves merely logical entailment, such as one's being an only child prevents one 
from being an uncle, to use Child's own example) and that the kind invoked by Hyman is plainly the 
former (Child 1994: 363-4). 
16  It reappears briefly as the ‘looks-thesis’, “namely, the claim that if S sees O then S is in an L-state”, where 
he clarifies that his admission of such L-states is not intended to imply any ontological commitment but 
merely stands in for the claim that “if S sees O then it is true to say of S that it looks to him to be some 
way” (1981: 180 & fn. 8).  However, such admission of L-states remains at least misleading insofar as 
they are allowed to be caused by perceived worldly objects.  
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Snowdon acknowledges why someone might hold the effect thesis, namely because of 
the possibility of ‘total hallucination’ – experiences that are wholly hallucinated.  Here, he 
accepts that such hallucinations must be ‘inner’ experiences for which the intrinsic state of 
the subject suffices, since they can be had in the absence of an appropriate object (1990: 
128).  The effect thesis then follows via the assumption that the same kind of experience is 
had in the perceptual case as in the hallucinatory case, i.e. both are inner experiences in the 
sense defined (1990: 129).  (We have here the outlines of the ‘argument from 
hallucination’ against naïve realism, an argument that I will discuss later in chapter 4, 
where I will there dispute the assumption that hallucinations are inner experiences in 
Snowdon’s sense.  However, this has no bearing on my purpose in this section, namely to 
show that the effect thesis – and so the effect view – is not a conceptual truth.)  The picture 
being assumed is made clearer by considering a pair of possible experiences – one 
perceptual, the other hallucinatory – which appear the same to the subject.  It is claimed 
that both experiences are intrinsically the same – it is the same kind of experience 
happening in both cases – and that what makes one perceptual is merely the appropriate 
causal relation to the object perceived.   
 
As Snowdon argues, however, the assumption that perception and hallucination must 
involve the same kind of experience is in need of considerable support.  Even if it has a 
marked explanatory virtue, it does not have the status of a conceptual truth.  Snowdon 
demonstrates this by considering a ‘radical alternative’ to the picture assumed by the 
causal theory.  According to this alternative picture, a statement about how things look to 
the subject could be made true by different kinds of experiences in the perceptual and 
hallucinatory cases.  In the perceptual case, the experience has the object as an ‘ingredient’ 
(i.e. the object is a constituent as per the relationalist picture described in chapter 1), while 
in the hallucinatory case the experience has some other metaphysical structure in virtue of 
which the looks-statement is true (Snowdon 1990: 129).  This claim – that the same looks-
statement could be made true by different kinds of experience in the perceptual and 
hallucinatory cases – amounts to what is known as disjunctivism about perceptual 
experience; ‘disjunctivism’ because it posits a potentially disjunctive analysis of the looks-
statement.  In Snowdon’s formulation this disjunctive analysis has it that a statement of the 
sort “It looks to S as if there is something which is F” might be made true of either of two 
states of affairs: (a) there actually being something which looks to S to be F, or (b) its 
merely looking to S as if there were something that is F (Snowdon 1981: 185).  In other 
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words, an experience in which it seems as though things are some way might actually 
involve a genuine perceptual encounter with an object (might be ‘object-involving’) or it 
might not. 
 
The crux of Snowdon’s argument is that the disjunctive analysis, while it might not in 
fact be true, is at least not conceptually false – there is nothing in our ordinary concept of 
perception that rules it out (Snowdon 1990: 130-1; see also Snowdon 1981: 191).  What 
underpins the effect thesis is an explanatory hypothesis concerning the possibility of 
subjectively indistinguishable perceptual and hallucinatory experiences; namely, that this 
indistinguishability is explained by these experiences’ being metaphysically of the same 
kind.  This urge towards a single, unified explanation of experiences in general is 
understandable but it cannot offer conceptual grounds for endorsing the effect thesis (and 
so the effect view).  The most it can offer is an inference to the best explanation.   
 
It is interesting to note that Snowdon’s argument against the conceptual truth of the 
causal thesis appeals to a feature of experience that is even more obviously damaging for 
the effect thesis.  He argues that when we perceive something “there is nothing in the 
occurrence which is both manifest to us and can count as an effect induced by, and hence 
separate from, the item seen” (1990: 136).  That being so, he finds it implausible that the 
concept of seeing “is a causal concept with a separable experience required as the effect 
end” (ibid.).  Snowdon is here appealing to the transparency of experience, i.e. the claim 
that in visual experience all we are aware of are properties of the object seen and not 
properties of the experience itself (ibid.: 136-7).  As he puts it,  
 
in perception there is nothing to latch on to other than the world; in 
particular, there is no such thing as a state produced in us, and which is 
manifestly distinct from the world, to which we can attend.  This…is 
precisely how experience strikes us.  
Snowdon 1990: 137 
 
The suggestion here is that transparency deprives us of introspective evidence for the 
occurrence of experiences, insofar as these are taken to be distinct from the worldly objects 
experienced.  As it stands, this is most directly a challenge to the conceptual truth of the 
effect thesis, and as such it provides a positive argument to bolster his conclusion that an 
alternative disjunctive account is not conceptually false.  Thus, if the effect thesis were 
conceptually true, we might expect that we should be aware of the experience itself as 
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distinct from what it is an experience of.  This is at least not obviously the case, and 
commitment to a strong transparency claim rules it out altogether.  Even if we allow a 
weaker transparency claim, such as that we are normally only aware of properties of 
experienced objects (although we can with some effort introspect the experience itself), 
this would leave awareness of the experience as 'effect end' absent from most ordinary 
cases of perceiving.  
 
 
2.3   Is the effect view an empirical truth? 
 
If the truth of the effect view – and so the falsity of the simple metaphysical picture – 
cannot be established on conceptual grounds, we might nonetheless look for empirical 
evidence in favour of the effect view over the simple metaphysical picture.  Given how the 
effect view and the simple metaphysical picture differ – namely, in the relation between 
experience and the worldly process involved in perception – the proponent of the effect 
view ought therefore to look for evidence that experiences are distinct from and caused by 
their objects.  In this regard, we can envisage broadly three kinds of evidence that might be 
sought by the proponent of the effect view: 
 
1. Evidence that experiences occur later than their objects (the temporal stage of 
the object seen or, where the object is a momentary event, the event itself). 
 
2. Evidence that a given kind of experience (as of a red tomato perhaps) can 
occur (or be made to occur) despite the absence of an appropriate physical 
relation between the subject and an appropriate object (a red tomato). 
 
3. Evidence that the phenomenology of experience is better correlated with, and 
explained by, the nature of the physical subject (by the workings of her 
perceptual systems) than by the physical properties of the experience’s worldly 
objects. 
 
The first and second kinds might be considered direct evidence for the role of 
experience as an effect of the object, inasmuch as we are treating the experience the same 
way as we would any physical object whose role as an effect in some process we were 
trying to establish: we are looking for the tell-tale signs of temporal separation between 
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cause and effect, and for the obtaining of an appropriate counterfactual relation between 
them. 
 
To find the first kind of evidence – evidence for a certain temporal relation between 
experience and its object – we would first need to establish a way of settling the temporal 
location of experience.  We must of course distinguish between the timing of the event 
seen and the timing of the seeing of the event.  Establishing the temporal location of the 
object is no problem, at least in principle: armed with appropriate measuring equipment 
and knowledge of the speed of sound and light, etc., we should have little difficulty 
working out the temporal stage of the object seen or the time at which the seen event 
occurred.   
 
We can similarly narrow down the time at which the object is seen – the temporal 
location of the seeing rather than the seen.  Doing so requires that we specify what we 
mean by ‘seeing’ (or ‘perceiving’ more generally).  In setting out the natural view and the 
simple metaphysical picture that accompanies it, I claimed that what we call a subject’s 
‘perceptual experience’ of an object is nothing more than the state of affairs that is the 
subject’s perceiving the object or the object’s being perceived by the subject, a state of 
affairs describable in physical terms as a causal process relating object and subject in the 
appropriate way.  If that is how we define an episode of perceiving then it is not obvious 
that the perceiving (the perceptual experience) can be pinpointed to a precise moment in 
time.  It is after all describable as a process which is itself temporally extended.  
Nonetheless, we do ordinarily talk of seeing objects at a certain time, where the relevant 
time is that of the successful achievement of the subject in visually apprehending the 
objects.  ‘To see’, after all, is a success verb and so denotes an achievement of the seeing 
subject, something the subject does.  Clearly, the subject cannot do anything purposeful in 
respect of the object seen until and unless the object affects her, so we might say that it is 
the time of this physical effect on the subject that is – roughly – the time of the seeing in 
this sense.  (I say ‘roughly’ because it might be debated which of various physical effects 
within the subject’s visual system must occur for us to grant that seeing has occurred – not 
the mere stimulation of the retina, certainly, but there may be disputes about the extent to 
which certain physical upshots involved in recognition must have occurred in order for 
something truly to have been seen.)   
 
52 
 
 
 
Thus, although in one sense a subject’s perceiving an object is a temporally-extended 
state of affairs involving the object itself, there is a time at which the state of affairs (qua 
process) as a whole comes into being, and that is with the occurrence of whichever later 
part of the process makes the whole process describable as one of perception.  Since the 
causal process between object and subject takes time (negligibly in the case of seeing very 
close objects but hugely in the case of seeing distant celestial object) the seeing and the 
seen occupy different temporal locations in all cases.  Consider viewing the Andromeda 
galaxy through a telescope – you see the galaxy now, but what you are seeing is the galaxy 
as it was two-and-a-half million years ago.  Indeed, certain celestial objects may no longer 
even exist by the time they are seen.   
 
Now, if we think – as per the effect view – that the seeing here involves the having of 
an experience in some substantial sense, i.e. some state or event within or otherwise 
‘belonging to’ the subject, then it would seem obvious that a supernova which ceased to 
exist thousands of years before I was born cannot be a constituent of my current 
experience.  However, once we reject the effect view and its substantial conception of 
experience, there remains no problem about how we can see some distant and now non-
existent object – it is simply a matter of our being appropriately causally related to that 
object.17   
 
How we respond to the supposed problem arising from perceptual time delay thus 
depends entirely on our prior theory of perception and the nature of ‘experience’.  If we 
think, perhaps on other grounds, that experience is realised by or identical to some state of 
the brain then we will find further support for the effect view; if, however, we favour the 
simple metaphysical picture then the (direct) perception of distant and even no-longer-
existent objects proves no more problematic in principle than perception of things currently 
in front of us.  Theory thus drives our interpretation of the physical evidence, rather than 
vice versa.  (Direct perception of the past has implications for our metaphysical picture of 
the world’s temporal structure, implications I will consider in chapter 7.) 
 
                                                 
17  For the same reason, we needn’t be put off the natural view by any suggestion that one’s experience, in 
the case of seeing the Andromeda galaxy, must therefore ‘reach back’ into the past.  This way of talking – 
reminiscent of Campbell’s claim that “experience…reaches all the way to the objects themselves” 
(2002b: 136) – is misleadingly metaphorical: nothing is ‘reaching back’ in any literal sense, and 
perceptual experience is not a something that stretches backwards in time to embrace its object. 
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The first line of possible empirical evidence is therefore unpromising.  What about the 
second?  Is there evidence that a certain kind of experience can be had in the absence of an 
appropriate causal link between the subject and an appropriate worldly object?  Thus, it is 
often claimed that whatever brain state a hallucinating subject is in must be sufficient for 
the occurrence of the relevant experience since, after all, the experience is taken to lack a 
worldly object.  If that is so, and we assume that the subject’s brain might be in a similar, 
indeed exactly similar, brain state when she perceives, then it would seem that we should 
extend the sufficiency claim to perceptual experience too  (see e.g. Sollberger 2008: 4).  
The argument assumes that, since the same brain state occurs in the relevant case of 
genuine perception, it must be sufficient for the experience in that case too, such that 
appeals to the constitutive role of worldly objects are not required to explain the 
occurrence of the experience.  The conclusion of this argument is that hallucinations and 
perceptions that share a brain state type must therefore share what we might call the 
experiential element – the experience itself with its phenomenology.18   
 
Lowe offers what he calls a ‘cut-off argument’ for the same conclusion.  Here, the 
subject is allowed to look at some object, and has her brain state held fixed while the object 
is removed (Lowe 2008: 97).  The causal connection between the object and subject is 
thereby cut off, but it is taken that the subject continues to enjoy an experience as of the 
object.  Lowe presents this as providing intuitive support for a causal theory of perception 
rather than a deductive argument for the sufficiency of a brain state for the having of an 
experience.  Indeed the sufficiency claim is assumed rather than demonstrated.  All that the 
opponent of the causal theory need do here, to ward of the arguments of Sollberger and 
Lowe, is provide reasons to doubt that a brain state should be considered sufficient for a 
hallucinatory experience.   
 
My own explanation of hallucination, using the simple metaphysical picture, will seek 
to do just that.  I will show in chapter 4 that we can explain hallucination consistently with 
the natural view as awareness of worldly objects and their qualities, albeit objects that are 
not currently present before the subject.  In the meantime, therefore, I will defer 
consideration of this second line of evidence, with a promise to tackle it later. 
 
                                                 
18  This appeal to sameness of brain states between hallucinations and perceptions plays an important role in 
Martin’s defence of naïve realism, as we shall see later (section 4.5).   
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Let us turn, then, to the third kind of possible evidence for the effect view, namely 
evidence for a correlation between the phenomenology of experience and internal states of 
the subject.  Of course, we would expect such a correlation to obtain even on the natural 
view.  Given that our senses enable us to respond purposefully to a wide range of 
environmental stimuli, we should not be surprised that there is a correlation between the 
worldly qualities presented to us in perception and what goes on inside our brains when we 
see those qualities.  The distinctive claim that might be thought to favour the effect view is 
that the phenomenal qualities of experience are better correlated with goings-on in the 
subject’s brain than with the scientifically discoverable properties of the worldly objects in 
which those phenomenal qualities seem to inhere. 
 
Whereas the first and second kinds of evidence would be considered direct evidence 
for the effect view, the third kind of evidence is more indirect.  Rather than seeking to 
demonstrate that there is ‘an experience’ occupying the effect-end of the perceptual 
process, the third kind of evidence would consist of a correlation between some properties 
of experience and internal states or events within the subject that might be considered to 
constitute or realise that experience.  The evidence that is being sought is therefore for an 
identity (or, more weakly, supervenience) between experiences and brain states, or perhaps 
a causal link. 19   
 
In fact, there is considerable and compelling evidence for this sort of special 
correlation between phenomenology and brain states.  For example, it is well known that 
the nature of perceived colour – captured in terms of the structure of similarity relations 
among colours – is not correlated with any physical properties of ostensibly coloured 
surfaces or light.  Rather, it seems that this structure of similarity relations among colours 
reflects (is correlated with) the way in which the human visual system processes visual 
stimulation by light of different wavelengths.  Even more strikingly perhaps, a correlation 
between perceived (‘phenomenal’) colour and these inner workings of subjects’ physiology 
is adduced to explain the observation that different normal subjects will often see the same 
objects as being differently coloured.   
 
                                                 
19  One might thus claim that brain states cause experiences as the next step in the causal process, although 
this is at odds with physicalism and raises the puzzle of how something physical could cause something 
that is not itself physical but ‘mental’. 
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These features of colour experience will be the focus of much discussion in the 
following chapters (see especially chapter 6 and chapter 7), so I will defer consideration of 
it until then.  However, I will argue there that the evidence for what I will call the subject-
relativity of certain phenomenal qualities need not be taken as evidence for the effect view 
or, more generally, for the claim that those phenomenal qualities are themselves internal to 
the subject in some way.  However, resisting the effect view and upholding the natural 
view in the face of the manifest subject-relativity of colour (not to mention certain other 
perceptible qualities) will force us to commit to some surprising and far-reaching 
conclusions about the nature of the world and our place in it as subjects. 
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CHAPTER 3 – PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (I): ILLUSION 
 
3.1   Introduction: the arguments from illusion and hallucination 
 
The natural view is, above all, a claim about the phenomenology of perception, 
namely that what we call the phenomenal character of experience is really just the sensory 
character of the worldly scene perceived.  I have presented this claim as a philosophical 
gloss on a common-sense or pre-philosophical intuition about perception, namely that 
perception is just a straightforward and immediate confrontation with objects in our 
environment.  Nonetheless, the fact that such a view has been so rarely defended is due to 
certain experiences whose phenomenology does not appear attributable, in whole or part, 
to how things are before the subject.  In this and subsequent chapters I will describe such 
experiences and the problems they seem to present for a proponent of the natural view.  
Notably, these experiences include those that we call perceptual illusions and 
hallucinations, although there are aspects of the phenomenology of ostensibly veridical 
experiences that also present problems for the natural view. 
 
Traditionally, objections to the sort of perceptual immediacy postulated by the natural 
view have rested on two observations: first, that the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience sometimes fails in some sense to 'match up with' how things are in the subject's 
environment; and, second, that a genuinely perceptual (and hence ostensibly world-
presenting) experience could have the same phenomenology as an experience in which 
nothing worldly is presented.  The first observation concerns of course the possibility of 
illusion, while the second concerns the possibility of hallucination.  Note that perceptual 
illusions are clearly cases of genuine (if not veridical) perceptual experience, since these 
are cases in which an object is perceived, albeit misleadingly.  Hallucinations, by contrast, 
are by definition cases in which there is the appearance of an object despite there being no 
corresponding object that is perceived. 
 
These then are the two broad classes of experience that are widely held to undermine 
naïve realism:  
 
Perceptual illusion: the phenomenal qualities manifest in experience sometimes fail 
to match up with or correspond to the way the perceived objects really are.   
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Hallucination: some experiences seem to present phenomenal qualities even although 
those experiences lack a worldly object; in such cases the hallucinatory 
phenomenology cannot be attributed to the objects 'out there' in the subject's 
environment. 
 
Experiences belonging to one or other class become problematic for the natural view 
once we use them as the basis of a certain kind of argument, one which draws a conclusion 
about the nature of specifically illusory or hallucinatory experience and applies it to 
ordinary, veridical perceptual experience.  This kind of argument comes in two versions, 
often called the 'argument from illusion' and the 'argument from hallucination' respectively.  
These arguments have the same overall structure, allowing them to be expressed in 
amalgamated form as follows: 
 
The Argument from Illusion/Hallucination  
 
1. For every veridical perceptual experience there could be an illusory or 
hallucinatory experience that seems the same to the subject.   
 
2. The best explanation for the fact that two experiences seem the same is that they 
have the same metaphysical nature. 
 
3. All illusory and hallucinatory experiences involve awareness of phenomenal 
qualities that are not instantiations in worldly objects; those qualities are not ‘out 
there’, inhering in worldly objects. 
 
Therefore 
 
4. All veridical perceptual experiences involve awareness of phenomenal qualities 
that are not instantiations in worldly objects; those qualities are not ‘out there’, 
inhering in worldly objects. 
 
Premise 1 derives from a plausible claim about the possibility of illusory or 
hallucinatory experiences that subjectively ‘match’ any veridical perceptual experience.  A 
subjectively matching experience we can take to be one that the subject could not tell apart 
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from a veridical perception by reflection alone, even assuming she had ideal powers of 
reflection on her own experiences.20  Premise 2 is an abductive inference from a certain 
phenomenological equivalence of experiences (their subjective indiscriminability) to their 
metaphysical equivalence.  That is, given a triad of matching experiences – one a veridical 
perception, one an illusion and one a hallucination – we might expect a single explanation 
to account for their common appearance.  From here, one only needs to assume that 
illusory and hallucinatory experiences involve awareness of phenomenal qualities that are 
not ‘out there’ in the environment (premise 3) to derive the conclusion that they must not 
be 'out there' in the veridical perceptual case either.   
 
The overall thrust of the argument is towards a generalising or unifying explanation 
for the similarities among diverse experiences, a unifying strategy that is made explicit in 
the abductive inference that forms premise 2.  We might find support for this unifying 
strategy in the fact that some non-veridical experiences may be only partial, so that we 
perceive an object's shape accurately but not its colour (Smith 2002: 44), or hallucinate an 
object against a veridically perceived background.  That veridical and illusory qualities can 
seemingly coexist within a single experience might be taken to reinforce the idea that they 
have the same metaphysical nature.  Just as compelling in this regard is the possibility of 
experiencing a smooth transition from a veridical perceptual experience to an illusory 
experience (ibid.).  In his sense-datum version of the argument from illusion, Robinson 
makes the generalising step as follows: “There is such continuity between those cases in 
which objects appear other than they actually are and cases of veridical perception that the 
same analysis of perception must apply to both” (Robinson 1994: 58). 
 
Having thus denied the natural view, the proponent of the arguments from illusion and 
hallucination must offer an alternative explanation of the phenomenology that is shared by 
matching experiences of each kind, whether veridical, illusory or hallucinatory.  One 
approach has been to suggest that the phenomenal qualities manifest in illusory and/or 
hallucinatory experiences, not being 'out there', must instead be 'in here', qualifying some 
mental or mind-dependent objects ('ideas' or 'sense data'), or qualifying experience itself 
(i.e. ‘qualia’).21  Since the awareness of such mind-dependent objects or qualities suffices, 
                                                 
20  This appeal to indiscriminability by reflection alone is a central feature of Martin’s (2004) account of 
hallucination, as we shall see in chapter 4.5. 
21  For a recent defence of sense-datum theory, see Robinson (1994).  For defences of qualia as intrinsic 
nonrepresentational properties of experience, see e.g. Block (2003) and Shoemaker (1991). 
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in the case of illusion or hallucination, for the subject's having an experience with a certain 
phenomenology, it is inferred (in the pursuit of a unified explanation) that their occurrence 
might also explain the phenomenology of the matching veridical experience.  On this view, 
the phenomenology of a perceptual experience must be constituted not by worldly objects 
and their qualities but by some mind-dependent objects or qualities.  What makes the 
experience genuinely perceptual is then likely to be attributed to the obtaining of an 
appropriate causal relationship between the occurrence of the sense data or qualia and the 
worldly object perceived. 
 
An alternative way to accept the conclusion of the arguments from illusion or 
hallucination rejects the notion that we are aware of inner objects of awareness (sense-
data) or intrinsic qualities of experience (qualia).  On this alternative view, known as 
representationalism, we are aware of worldly objects by dint of representing the 
instantiation of certain qualities.  What’s more, the representationalist might further argue 
that when we represent the instantiation of these qualities it is the qualities themselves that 
constitute the phenomenology of our experiences (Dretske 1995, Lycan 2001, Byrne & 
Tye 2006).  Our awareness is thus taken to be ‘direct’ in the limited sense that it is not 
mediated by awareness of anything else (sense-data, qualia, etc.).  Crucially, however, the 
representationalist can allow that a subjectively matching triad of veridical perception, 
illusion and hallucination involves experiences that have the same metaphysical nature.  In 
each case the experience represents the instantiation of certain qualities, and it is this 
representation that determines the experience’s phenomenology.  The difference between 
the veridical and the non-veridical experiences is just that only in the former case are all 
the represented qualities are actually instantiated as they appear (Fish 2010: 66, 79).  It 
remains that the actual instantiation or otherwise of the properties is extrinsic to the 
experiences’ being as they are, so a common metaphysical explanation is available for their 
mutual indiscriminability. 
 
Although the arguments from illusion and hallucination turn on the desirability of a 
unifying explanation for the phenomenology of diverse experiences – some veridical and 
some non-veridical, and some of the latter not even genuinely perceptual – it is 
questionable whether the arguments’ proponents can truly be said to offer a genuine 
explanation for even the non-veridical or non-perceptual cases.  As Putnam points out with 
respect to sense datum theories, the purported explanations appeal to entities or processes – 
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sense data or representations – that are either quite mysterious or difficult to square with 
our ordinary and indeed scientific picture of the world and our place in it (Putnam 1999: 
29).  To that extent, then, the pivotal step in the arguments relies more on the negative 
assumption that the phenomenology of non-veridical and/or non-perceptual experiences 
cannot be explained as relations of awareness holding between subjects and worldly 
objects.  It is this negative assumption that I will seek to overturn, with the help of the 
simple metaphysical picture.  That is, I will argue, rather counterintuitively, that illusory 
and even hallucinatory phenomenology can be explained wholly in terms of relations of 
awareness holding between subjects and worldly objects. 
 
To that end I will, in this chapter and the one that follows, assess the prospects for 
reconciling the natural view with illusion and hallucination, respectively.  As we shall see, 
one way naïve realists have accounted for illusion is by rejecting premise 3 of the 
argument from illusion, namely the claim that illusory phenomenal qualities must not be 
‘out there’ inhering in worldly objects.  According to this counter-argument, the illusory 
aspect of the experience resides not in the sensory qualities presented in perception but 
instead in some associated cognitive functioning, including our inclination to form 
judgments based on what is presented.  Favourably for the natural view, this allows us to 
defend the claim that, even in perceptual illusion, the phenomenology is constituted by 
worldly objects and their qualities.  Although I will indeed endorse this counter-argument 
as a way to preserve the natural view in the face of certain kinds of perceptual illusion, I 
will note that certain other kinds of illusion may not be so easily accommodated.  Certain 
optical illusions, for example, seem to involve genuinely phenomenal features of 
experience that cannot be explained without appealing in some measure to what goes in 
within the subject’s perceptual system.  These therefore threaten what we might call a 
‘retreat inwards’ – an abandonment of the natural view’s commitment to explaining the 
phenomenology of experience by reference to worldly objects and qualities.  The reason 
that this threatens abandonment of the natural view and not just its supplementation is the 
thought that if goings-on internal to the subject can be shown to be sufficient for some 
aspects of phenomenology then we might as well treat it as sufficient for all of it. 
 
Having acknowledged this residual problem posed by illusion, I will then turn (in 
chapter 4) to the even more obviously troublesome phenomenon of hallucination.  On the 
face of it, hallucination presents the starkest challenge to the natural view, since here we 
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seem to have a class of experiences that possess phenomenology while lacking the worldly 
objects and qualities that would, in the perceptual case, account for that character.  The 
standard naïve realist response to the argument from hallucination is to reject premise 2 of 
the revised argument, i.e. the claim that subjectively matching perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences are best explained by appeal to a shared metaphysical nature.  This leads the 
naïve realist to one or other form of disjunctivism about perceptual experience, as I will 
explain.  Disjunctivist accounts therefore eschew a unified explanation of ostensibly 
similar experiences, a strategy that brings some serious shortcomings.  Here, I will argue 
that the simple metaphysical picture points to an account of hallucination that avoids these 
shortcomings and, more positively, gives a unified account of perception and hallucination.  
The strategy is to reject premise 3 of the revised argument while endorsing premise 2 – that 
is, to argue that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have the same metaphysical nature 
insofar as both are object-involving.  This of course is the precise opposite of the standard 
disjunctivist defence of naïve realism.  Defending the natural view by claiming that the 
phenomenology of hallucinations is constituted by worldly objects and their properties 
might seem a thoroughly perverse strategy.  My task will be to show how the simple 
metaphysical picture can be used to make the strategy intelligible and even plausible.   
 
It is important to acknowledge that, besides illusion and hallucination, there are certain 
phenomenal features of veridical perceptual experience that seem to challenge the natural 
view.  In chapter 5 I will show how the simple metaphysical picture-based explanation of 
hallucination points to an explanation of what is plausibly a ubiquitous feature of veridical 
perception, namely the influence of past perception on the phenomenology of current 
perceptual experience via perceptual learning and belief.  In particular, the role of 
perceptual learning and beliefs in determining the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience – including the phenomenon known as cognitive penetration – is increasingly 
recognised, and any philosophical account of perceptual experience will be the stronger for 
explaining it.  As I noted in chapter 1, doing so compatibly with the natural view might 
appear especially challenging since it requires us to reconcile two features of perception – 
its immediacy and its generality – that might seem at first sight to be somewhat in tension.   
Nonetheless, I will argue that the object-involving account of hallucination paves the way 
for an explanation of perceptual learning and cognitive penetration that similarly appeals to 
nothing other than worldly objects and qualities as the bearers of phenomenal character. 
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Finally, in chapter 6, I will turn to certain features of colour experience that seem to 
pose further difficulties for the natural view.  In particular, I will consider cases in which 
the colour component of an experience’s phenomenology cannot easily be explained as the 
presentation of qualities inhering in the subject’s environment.  Such cases suggest that the 
subject plays a constitutive role in the nature of the phenomenology of experience in a way 
that conflicts with the supposed explanatory virtue of naïve realism, i.e. that qualities 
inhering in the environment play a constitutive role in the phenomenology of experience 
but not vice versa.  Again, I will suggest that the simple metaphysical picture points to a 
possible way to accommodate this, although in doing so it radically overturns orthodox 
assumptions about the metaphysical priority relation holding between processes and their 
constituent parts.  The implications of this will become the subject of chapter 7. 
 
 
3.2   Illusion and the natural view 
 
It is tempting to begin with illusion, if only because it appears at first sight to present a 
less stark challenge to the natural view than hallucination.  After all, perceptual illusion 
remains a case of perception, since there is still a worldly object of which one is aware.  It 
therefore remains true that there is something ‘out there’ to which we might attribute 
phenomenal character.  What illusion does, however, is throw back into question the nature 
of this correspondence between what is out there and this phenomenal character.  
According to the natural view the object or scene perceived is what possesses the 
phenomenal character.  However, the troubling feature of illusory experience is that the 
scene’s phenomenal character is in some way misleading about the nature of its bearer.  In 
the argument from illusion as I presented it above, the driving force is the observation that 
in illusory experience worldly objects appear to have qualities they do not in fact possess.  
It is this mismatch between objects’ actual qualities and the qualities they appear to have 
that is supposed to refute naïve realism. 
 
More specifically, what is of interest here is whether the misleading character of 
illusory experience is problematic for the natural view.  We might have good reason to 
think so if the phenomenology of illusory experience is in some cases not attributable to 
the objects and qualities inhering in the subject’s environment.  The natural view allows us 
to explain how things appear solely by reference to the nature of those things themselves, 
the conditions of perceiving and the subject’s perspective.  If, for example, we have to 
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appeal to internal goings-on in the subject to account for some aspects of phenomenology, 
whose remainder is attributable (as per the natural view) simply to worldly objects and 
their qualities, then we seem to have two very different factors jointly constituting what 
appears on reflection to be a seamlessly unified phenomenon.  This is where the pressure to 
generalise arises – to give a unified explanation of an ostensibly unified phenomenon.  As 
such, if illusion proves that phenomenology is at least in part not attributable to worldly 
objects and their qualities then the defender of the natural view has more work to do to 
resist that urge to unified explanation.   
 
We might therefore envisage two broad strategies for explaining perceptual illusion 
consistently with the natural view.  The first would keep phenomenology and illusion 
apart, explaining the former exhaustively in terms of how things are perceptibly before the 
subject, and explaining the latter by appeal to non-phenomenal factors.  The second 
strategy would acknowledge that the illusory aspect of experience makes a real difference 
to phenomenology, but explain it in a way that does not threaten the natural view.  The 
second strategy looks unpromising at first sight, since any putative illusory aspects of 
phenomenology are assumed to be generated internally, an assumption that invites one to 
generalise to an internalist explanation for all phenomenology, illusory or otherwise.  
Consequently, naïve realists tend to favour the first strategy, as we shall see.  
 
To some extent, whether we locate the illusory aspect of experience within its 
phenomenology depends on what kind of illusion is involved.  The category of perceptual 
illusion includes a diverse range of experiences, not all of which operate via the same 
mechanism.  In some the illusory aspect is less to do with how things appear than with the 
way we respond to how they appear – these cases are amenable to the first explanatory 
strategy described above.  In other cases it is harder to deny that the illusion is a genuinely 
phenomenal matter, and here some form of the second strategy will be required.  In the 
following sections I will make use of a simple taxonomy of perceptual illusion offered by 
Fish (2009: ch. 6), and show how different kinds of illusion demand different kinds of 
explanation.   
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3.3   Physical illusions 
 
Fish calls ‘physical illusions’ those that can be explained purely by reference to the 
object perceived, its perceptible qualities and its location relative to the subject (2009: 150 
ff.).  These are cases, in other words, that are consistent with what I have called naïve 
realism’s explanatory virtue.  To cite a classic example of visual illusion, a straight stick 
partly submerged in water looks crooked.  Experience is thus potentially misleading, if it 
leads us to think that the stick is, in itself, crooked.  Nonetheless, the fact that the stick 
appears crooked under these circumstances is perfectly explicable in terms of the relative 
refractive indices of air and water, coupled with the spatial relation of the stick and water 
to the perceiving subject.  Everything that we need to explain the appearance of 
crookedness is ‘out there’ in the environment, compatibly with the natural view (cf. Austin 
1962: 26).  Or consider the case of seeing a white cube illuminated by red light.  It might 
appear as though the cube is actually red, in which case one’s experience has proved 
misleading.  All the same, we can perfectly well explain how this misleading appearance 
has come about, purely by reference to the qualities of the incident light and the cube’s 
surface. 
 
The argument from illusion could exploit such physical illusions only if the natural 
view insisted that things must always appear to be the way they actually are – that straight 
sticks must always appear straight, red things always red, and so on.  But the natural view 
makes a weaker demand: just that the overall phenomenal character is borne by the worldly 
things themselves.  This leaves room for the phenomenal character of our environment to 
mislead us in some way.  As such, one appealing way to defend the natural view against 
the argument from illusion is to reject as illegitimate the inference that, because 
phenomenal character can sometimes mislead us about the true nature of worldly things, 
that phenomenal character must not be 'out there' in the way the natural view requires.  If 
phenomenal character sometimes misleads, then it misleads by presenting the worldly 
objects as possessing some qualities they really lack.  This was why, in section 1.5, I 
expressed doubts about my first pass definition of the natural view as the claim that 
phenomenal qualities are ‘out there’, inhering in the worldly objects perceived.   
 
In physical illusion, then, the illusion properly resides in some misjudgment about how 
individual elements of a scene must be in order for the overall (phenomenal) character to 
be that way.  This has led some to suggest that there is a sense in which the 
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phenomenology, in the examples cited, is not illusory at all – rather, it perfectly well 
presents the scene as it is (see e.g. Travis 2004).  That is just how a straight-stick-in-water 
should look (somewhat like a crooked stick), and that is how a white-cube-in-red-light 
should look (much like a red cube in white light).  The phenomenology itself is not illusory 
– for that, ex hypothesi, is just a matter of how the scene is within the subject’s perspective.  
That being so, no unifying explanation of phenomenology is required because what is 
illusory in certain experiences is not to be found in their phenomenology at all.   
 
But where else could it be found?  I suggested above that the illusion results from their 
tendency to mislead us.  Specifically, we are misled into making erroneous judgments 
about how things must be for things to appear as they do.  One plausible option is thus to 
say that the illusion properly resides in the thoughts that we are inspired to form on the 
basis of what is presented to us perceptually.  This view recognises that it is perfectly 
possible that an experience may accurately exhibit the phenomenal character of a subject’s 
perceptible surroundings and yet, at the same time, should mislead us about the true nature 
of the objects and qualities occupying those surroundings.  For example, we might say the 
appearance of a stick in water is illusory if it inclines us to think that the stick really is 
crooked, or that the appearance of the penny is illusory if, seeing it from an oblique angle, 
we take it to be elliptical rather than circular.  (Of course, we see circular things from 
oblique angles all the time and rarely misjudge them to be anything other than circular, 
testament to the power of our cognitive faculties to lead us in the right direction more often 
than not.) 
 
The claim that phenomenology is not inherently illusory is defended by naïve realists 
as a corollary of their more general insistence that perceptual experience is not essentially 
representational.  Phenomenal character is thus nothing more or less than the sensible 
appearance of worldly objects and qualities and entails no commitment to how things must 
be for them to appear the way they do.  Travis quotes Austin approvingly in making this 
point: “our senses are dumb […they] do not tell us anything, true or false” (Austin 1962: 
11; quoted in Travis 2004: 64).   Perception “merely bring[s] our surroundings into view”, 
leaving us free to judge how things are in those surroundings; the experience itself does not 
commit us to a certain judgment about how things are, but simply presents the things 
themselves and thereby makes it possible for us to judge one way or the other (Travis 
2004: 64).   
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What emerges is what I will call a two-faculty view of illusion, namely the view that 
illusion results from the interplay of these two more or less distinct faculties:   
  
1. A faculty of awareness which acquaints the subject directly with the 
worldly objects and their qualities. 
 
2. A cognitive faculty that inclines the subject to judge (mistakenly) that the 
objects or their qualities are some way. 
 
Brewer thus asserts that there are “two levels in the subjective character of 
experience” (2006: 172).  The first level is the presentation of the mind-independent object 
that plays a constitutive role in the phenomenology of the experience.  This yields what 
Brewer calls the ‘core subjective character’ of the experience.  The second level is a 
cognitive or conceptual one in which the mind-independent object is recognised or 
categorised by virtue of its “visually relevant similarities with paradigms of various kinds 
of such things” (Brewer 2007: 91).  Brewer states that such paradigms are “instances of the 
kinds in question, whose association with the terms for those kinds partially constitutes our 
understanding of them, given our training in the acquisition of the relevant concepts” 
(ibid.: 92).  Travis similarly separates the mere presentation of the mind-independent 
object from some contingently connected tendency to judge which state of affairs obtains 
given the phenomenology of the experience constituted by the presentation of that object.  
He allows that there is mental representation, albeit that representation or judgment is a 
cognitive act distinct from the perceptual experience itself (Travis 2007: 233 ff.).   
 
It is important to note that, to give rise to illusion, the misleading object of awareness 
need not actually issue in a false judgment.  Rather, it need only incline the subject towards 
such a judgment.  Thus, Brewer’s account requires only that the object, presented a certain 
way, “has the evident power to mislead her, whether or not this error is actualized in any 
false judgment” (2006: 169).  This allows us to acknowledge that some illusions retain 
their illusory appearance even when we know that it is an illusion; the workings of our 
cognitive faculty may incline us to believe that one line of the Müller-Lyer illusion is 
longer than the other even though, as seasoned philosophers of perception, we know better 
than to acquiesce in the judgment that it is so.   
67 
 
 
 
 
Crucially, the two-faculty view allows the naïve realist to separate the illusory aspect 
of experience from the mere awareness of worldly particulars and their qualities, i.e. to 
hold that the illusion is properly attributable to flaws in the act of recognition or judgment 
rather than the awareness on which that recognition or judgment is based.  It therefore 
accords with the first strategy mentioned above by which we might defend the natural view 
from the argument from illusion.  As such, it fits well cases of physical illusion, in which 
the phenomenology is wholly explicable in terms of the worldly objects perceived, their 
qualities and their spatial arrangement in respect of the subject.  Here, the subject’s 
surroundings are simply presented to the subject perceptually and it is in virtue of this 
perceptual presentation that the constituents of those surroundings are available as the 
objects of recognition and judgment. 
 
As we shall see, this ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, in appealing to two kinds or 
‘levels’ of mental state to account for the illusory character of experience, is key to naïve 
realists’ explanation of other illusions besides physical illusions.  There is a potentially 
problematic difference, however, in how the two-level approach accounts for the different 
kinds of illusion.  In physical illusions the two levels – the mere awareness and the 
tendency to judge – seem readily distinguishable: the phenomenology is readily explicable 
in terms of the layout of the scene perceived or the conditions of perceiving, while any 
‘illusion’ can be understood as a subsequent misjudgment based on that phenomenology.  
In certain other kinds of illusion the distinction appears less sharp: in these cases there 
appears to be a role for the (ostensibly inner) cognitive states in actually influencing the 
phenomenology of the illusory experience, a role which threatens the natural view by 
resurrecting the unifying explanatory strategy that is key to the argument from illusion. 
  
3.4   Cognitive illusions 
 
On the face of it, the two-faculty view seems tailor-made to account for Fish’s second 
class of perceptual illusions – those he calls cognitive illusions (2009: 165 ff.).  These are 
cases in which the illusion arises because of miscategorisation, in other words the 
erroneous application of what I have called the subject’s cognitive faculty and Fish more 
precisely calls a subject’s conceptual-recognitional capacity.  A conceptual-recognitional 
capacity is taken to be the subject’s ability to recognise some F as an F, and cognitive 
illusion results from deploying a conceptual-recognitional capacity for Fs when perceiving 
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a non-F.  To use his example, a subject is prey to a cognitive illusion when he sees a coil of 
rope and mistakenly judges it to be a snake.  In other words, the subject sees the rope but 
sees it as a snake.  As Fish points out, in order to misperceive the rope in this way, the 
subject must possess the concept of a snake, hence the term ‘conceptual-recognitional 
capacity’ (2009: 167).  It is some degree of similarity between the perceptible qualities of 
the rope and those of paradigmatic snakes that induces the subject to deploy the 
inappropriate conceptual-recognitional capacity (perhaps encouraged, as Fish suggests, by 
some priming – a prior warning to look out for snakes, say).  The resemblance to Brewer’s 
account is obvious: Brewer talks of illusion as arising from the subject’s recognition of an 
object’s visually relevant similarities with paradigms of some other kind of object (Brewer 
2007: 91).   
 
Now, insofar as a rope might look as though it were a snake, we might seem to be 
imputing a ‘snake-ish’ element in the experience’s phenomenology.  If there were indeed 
such an element, it would seem that it must be explained by the two faculty view as the 
product of the cognitive faculty and not the faculty of direct awareness.  A role for the 
cognitive faculty in determining the phenomenology of illusion is admitted by Brewer: 
although he claims that direct awareness of the object delivers the experience’s ‘core’ 
phenomenology, he does allow that a subject’s cognitive engagement with the object can 
have a bearing on how that object looks, and therefore on the experience’s (wider) 
phenomenology.  He says that “[t]his is the phenomenology of conceptual categorization, 
or recognition, not that of basic experiential presentation…[but] it is aptly titled 
phenomenology, all the same” (Brewer 2007: 93).   
 
Brewer’s admission that the cognitive component of the illusory experience 
contributes some phenomenology leaves us with both a puzzle and a worry.  The puzzle is 
how the cognitive phenomenology relates to that yielded by mere awareness.  If they are 
different kinds of phenomenology, how do they interact?  Does the former somehow alter 
or skew the latter, or does it positively add some extra phenomenology (some extra colour 
perhaps)?  Either way, we need some explanation of how an ostensibly internal faculty of 
cognition can interact with the core subjective character consisting just of the worldly 
objects perceived.  If this expresses the puzzle then the worry, as noted earlier, is that an 
account which allows internal processes to positively contribute to phenomenology 
threatens to resurrect the argument from illusion and its unifying explanatory principle.  In 
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other words, if internal goings-on can generate some phenomenology then why not all of 
it? 
 
Fish likewise holds that the application of a conceptual-recognitional capacity 
influences the phenomenology of experience, but argues that it does so by influencing what 
in the world a subject perceives.  On this view, the cognitive faculty is not itself a 
determinant of phenomenology, but makes available certain worldly features which do 
contribute to a scene’s phenomenal character.  He explains the role of the conceptual-
recognitional capacity in terms of perceiving facts, where by ‘fact’ he means a structured 
complex of objects and properties (i.e. that which is sometimes called a state of affairs) 
(Fish 2009: 52-3).  This, for Fish, captures our most basic way of perceiving the world, 
namely as objects bearing qualities.22  To see a rope as a rope is, on this view, to recognise 
the obtaining of the fact that is a rope’s being present.  Succeeding in this way to perceive 
the fact of the rope’s being present results when the various qualities of the rope 
appropriately trigger the subject’s conceptual-recognitional capacity for ropes.  
Meanwhile, when the subject falls prey to a cognitive illusion and misperceives the rope as 
a snake, she clearly does not perceive any snake-ish fact, for there is none to be perceived; 
rather, she erroneously applies her conceptual-recognitional capacity for snakes instead 
(Fish 2009: 168). 
 
This shift in the application of conceptual-recognitional capacities is supposed, on 
Fish’s view, to account for what we might loosely call a phenomenological difference 
between the illusory and veridical experiences.  As he explains it, all the difference is 
accounted for by the subject’s being aware of something extra in the veridical case, namely 
the fact of the object’s being a rope.  Perceiving this fact imparts to the experience the 
“further phenomenal property” of acquainting one with that fact (2009: 167).  This does 
not, however, amount to the claim that there is a change to the qualities of which the 
subject is aware.  We need to be aware here of Fish’s distinction between what he calls 
presentational character, which is constituted by the perceived scene itself (and so is close 
to my ‘phenomenal character’) and what he calls phenomenal character, namely “the 
                                                 
22  In stating that facts, so defined, are the “basic constituents of presentational character” Fish emphasises 
that the claim is phenomenological rather than ontological; that is, it is a claim about how things seem to 
us when we perceive – first and foremost as whole states of affairs – and makes no claims about the 
ontological order of priority between facts and their constituent objects and properties (Fish 2009: 53).  
He nonetheless insists that facts are “pieces of reality” that can be perceived, a claim that causes problems 
for his account, as I will explain. 
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property [of an experience] of acquainting the subject with such-and-such a presentational 
character” (2009: 15).  Thus, when he talks of experience “acquir[ing] a further 
phenomenal property” he does not imply that there are any additional phenomenal qualities 
(in my sense) of which the subject is aware.   
 
We might thus find in Fish’s fact-based account a way to understand Brewer’s claim 
about cognitive ‘phenomenology’.  If we think of phenomenology in terms of the way 
things appear or (in the visual case) look to the subject, then we can understand Fish as 
claiming that the rope looks different to the person who sees it as a rope from how it looks 
to the person who sees it as a snake, not because either is aware of any different objects or 
qualities, but because one recognises the obtaining of the relevant fact and the other does 
not.23  This point about what one is aware of is crucial: in neither the illusory nor the 
veridical perception does the cognitive faculty add any phenomenal qualities to the 
experience; one is aware of just the same qualities (and objects) in each case.  Instead, the 
cognitive faculty contributes to the experience by enabling us to see how the various 
phenomenally presented elements of a scene – the various perceptible objects with their 
qualities – fit together as constituents of one or more facts.  In the veridical case the subject 
correctly recognises them as constituting the actually obtaining facts, such that she 
becomes aware of those facts as facts.  In the illusory case, meanwhile, the subject 
erroneously applies some other conceptual-recognitional capacity and so comes to 
misperceive the presented objects and qualities as constituting some non-obtaining fact(s).  
Fish’s account thus succeeds in attributing the illusory aspect of the experience to the 
(incorrect) application of a certain cognitive faculty, and not to any change in what objects 
or qualities the subject is aware (in other words, without altering what Brewer would call 
the ‘core subjective character’).    
 
There are some difficulties with Fish’s account, however.  For one thing, it seems to 
deny any distinctive phenomenology to illusory, as opposed to veridical perceptual 
experiences.  I said above that all of the phenomenological difference between the veridical 
and illusory experiences is, on Fish’s view, accounted for by the extra awareness in the 
veridical case of the relevant fact.  This is because there is no distinctive fact of which the 
subject can be aware in the illusory case – the object is a rope and not a snake, so the 
                                                 
23  As I will explain below, Fish sees the same mechanism at play in veridical perception, arguing that it 
shows up in the difference between the experiences of an expert subject and a naïve subject when 
confronted perceptually with some object (Fish 2009: 68). 
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subject’s conceptual-recognitional capacity for snakes fails to latch onto any actual fact.  
There is therefore nothing extra in the illusory case for the subject to be aware of – no fact 
of the object’s being a snake.  This misperception, or deployment of the wrong conceptual-
recognitional capacity, does not in itself have any phenomenological implications.   
 
We can see why a naïve realist like Fish should wish to promote this view and to 
attribute all cognitive phenomenology to the apprehension of genuine worldly objects, 
qualities or states of affairs (facts).  The alternative would be to grant that ostensibly 
internal processes of cognition are sufficient for some elements of phenomenology, an 
admission that would threaten to revive the argument from illusion and the unifying 
strategy of attributing all phenomenology to internal goings-on.  All the same, a refusal to 
allow that the illusory aspect of experience brings any distinctive phenomenology risks 
looking counterintuitive.  Consider that Fish uses his fact-based account to explain the 
plausible phenomenological difference between the perceptual experiences of two subjects 
viewing the same object under the same conditions: one subject is an expert who 
recognises the object as being of a certain kind, while the other is a novice who does not 
recognise the object; Fish uses the example of a scientist and a child looking at a cathode 
ray tube (2009: 68).  The difference between the two experiences is due to the expert’s 
possessing a conceptual-recognitional capacity for the object in question, such that she is 
able to be aware of or recognise a fact (the object’s being a cathode ray tube) that is 
inaccessible to the novice.  Now imagine that we have two subjects looking at some object 
– a rope, say.  The first subject is a real novice – a baby perhaps – and fails to recognise the 
rope as a rope but is nonetheless able to attend to its visible qualities.  The second subject 
has a peculiar fascination for snakes and is always on the lookout for them; on seeing the 
rope she mistakenly judges it to be a snake.  She thus erroneously deploys a conceptual-
recognitional capacity for snakes, and thereby fails to acquaint herself with any facts, in 
Fish’s sense.  The first subject, meanwhile, has signally failed to deploy any conceptual-
recognitional capacities at all, but has at least avoided illusion as a result.  Since both are 
aware of the same object, and neither is aware of a pertinent fact that is hidden from the 
other, it seems we have no grounds for supposing that the two subjects’ experiences differ 
in any phenomenological respect.  But this seems implausible.  Or, at least, it posits an 
intuitively unconvincing asymmetry between two pairs of experiences: expert perception 
and novice perception on the one hand; and, on the other, illusory perception and novice 
perception.  If we think there is some phenomenological difference between the 
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experiences enjoyed by novice and expert perceivers, does it not seem as though there 
should be some difference between those enjoyed by the novice perceiver and the 
perceiver subject to illusion?  Fish’s fact-based account generates the asymmetry, but we 
lack any independent reason for supposing the asymmetry to hold, and indeed our 
intuitions might not support it.  Surely things just look different to the deceived snake-
fancier in virtue of (erroneously) deploying her conceptual-recognitional capacity for 
snakes. 
 
The asymmetry is, in any case, an artefact of a more fundamental problem in Fish’s 
account, one which relates to an ambiguity in his claim that expert subjects, and experts 
only, can perceive certain facts.  Specifically, the ambiguity is in his use of ‘perceive’ as 
applied to facts.  According to Fish, for a subject to perceive a fact she must deploy the 
appropriate conceptual-recognitional capacity when confronted by relevant object and 
qualities.  She needn’t know that the fact obtains; deploying the appropriate conceptual-
recognitional capacity is sufficient (2009: 54).  The fact thereby comes to constitute part of 
what Fish calls the presentational character of the experience.  The appeal to facts is, as 
noted above, intended to capture how things seem when we experience: we perceive the 
world as a collection of facts, as “things bearing properties” (ibid.: 53).  However, given 
Fish’s stipulation that facts in this sense are not to be understood as true propositions but as 
“pieces of reality” (ibid.), we might wonder whether he is entitled to claim that perceiving 
a fact requires that one possess the relevant conceptual-recognitional capacity.  Surely if 
facts are pieces of reality then they can be perceived irrespective of whether they are 
thereby recognised.   
 
On the face of it, Fish’s claim that the successful expert perceiver is acquainted with 
something in the world – a fact – that is inaccessible to the novice or deceived subject 
looks like an attractive way to account for the intuitively appealing notion that the same 
scene might look different to each of these subjects.  Importantly for the proponent of the 
natural view, the difference would be explained by a difference in what in the world is 
seen.  However, once we acknowledge that the difference between the subjects is not in 
what is seen but what is recognised, we are left instead in the position we started with, 
namely that the difference is somehow explained by a cognitive faculty that is presumably 
internal to the subject.  This means that Fish’s appeal to perception of facts amounts to 
little more than a restatement of the claim that our cognitive faculty plays some role in 
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shaping the way things appear.  And this doesn’t bring us any closer to an understanding of 
how this cognitive ‘shaping’ of experience comes about, especially if we are inclined to 
think that how things look is simply a matter of what things we see (and the physical and 
perspectival circumstances in which we see them).   
 
We have, in fact, good empirical reasons to think that our cognitive faculties can have 
a significant determinative influence on how things appear, even to the extent of altering 
the apparent (phenomenal) qualities of the worldly objects of awareness.  In other words, 
there are good grounds for thinking that the ostensibly ‘inner’ conceptual-recognitional 
capacity can influence what Brewer would call the core subjective character of the 
experience.  This is apparent in cases of perceptual learning as well as what is called 
cognitive penetration of perceptual experience, where it seems that our past experiences 
and beliefs can help to shape the phenomenology of perceptual experience.  That being so, 
the defender of the natural view is again challenged to explain, first, how the faculties of 
cognition and awareness interact to yield a unified experience, and, second, why admitting 
a role for ostensibly inner states (of memory and cognition) in shaping phenomenology 
does not resurrect the argument from illusion. 
 
I will argue later (chapter 5) that the simple metaphysical picture offers an explanation 
of perceptual learning and cognitive penetration, and one which avoids the argument from 
illusion by claiming that the elements of phenomenology that they deliver are not internal 
after all.  The explanation of how this might be so relies heavily on the account of 
hallucination which I will offer in chapter 4, so I will defer it until later. 
 
As it is, there are other, more familiar forms of illusory perception that also put 
pressure on the claim that cognitive phenomenology can be distinguished sharply from the 
core subjective character delivered by direct awareness.  These include what Fish call 
optical illusions. 
 
 
3.5   Optical illusions 
 
Optical illusions comprise another class of illusion in which, like cognitive illusions, 
the inappropriate application of a conceptual-recognitional capacity is supposed to play the 
decisive role (Fish 2009: 172-181).  Fish notes that optical illusions share with physical 
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illusions the fact that they are likely to be shared by any normal subject confronted with the 
same scene, and that they are, in this sense, predictable.  Cognitive illusions, by contrast, 
are dependent on the background knowledge, beliefs and expectations of the subject, such 
that two subjects confronted by the same scene may not share an illusory experience, nor 
indeed might the same subject have the same illusory experience on two occasions of 
viewing the same scene (2009: 172-3).  What optical illusions share with cognitive 
illusions, however, is that they cannot be explained solely by reference to the nature of the 
scene before the subject – its constituent objects, their qualities, arrangement in the 
subject’s perspective, and so on.  
 
Fish sees the Müller-Lyer illusion as an example of an optical illusion: it has the 
intersubjective and predictable features of a physical illusion, but the seeming difference in 
length between the two lines is not explicable in terms solely of what is presented to the 
subject.  Rather, to explain the illusion it seems we need to appeal to how the lines affect 
the subject.  As Fish puts it, “[t]he reason optical illusions lead to a nonveridical 
experience is that the relevant features of the perceived scene function so as to trick or 
mislead our perceptual mechanisms” (2009: 172).  It seems in these cases that our 
perceptual mechanisms – the workings of our sensory organs and subsequent neural 
activity – do not merely provide the enabling conditions for awareness but play some role 
in influencing or determining at least some aspects of the phenomenology of our conscious 
awareness. 
 
Brewer too cites the Müller-Lyer illusion to illustrate his two-faculty account of 
illusion.  Although the two lines appear to be of different lengths, Brewer insists that the 
apparent difference is not presented to us as an aspect of the ‘core subjective character’.  
Instead, what are presented to us are just the lines themselves, and the illusion of disparate 
lengths arises from the operation of some other cognitive faculty that inclines the subject 
towards a mistaken judgment.  The cognitive act in question is a recognition that the two 
lines presented bear some 'visually relevant similarities' to a possible veridical perception 
that presents lines of different length – in Brewer's example, a set-up in which the longer 
line is further from the subject than the shorter line, such that their ends subtend the same 
angle on the subject's eye (2007: 91).  Figure 1 below illustrates one such set-up, in which 
the lines of the Müller-Lyer illusion are conceived as elements in a three-dimensional array 
of objects: the upper line (bold) becomes the near edge of a box attached to a wall above 
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the bottom corner of a room, where the lower line becomes the intersection of the wall and 
the floor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – three-dimensional interpretation of the Müller-Lyer illusion 
 
Brewer’s two-faculty solution here proposes that, when we view the two parallel lines 
of the Müller-Lyer illusion, there is nowhere any actual difference between the 
phenomenal qualities of which we are aware and which correspond to the length of the 
lines themselves.  This is of course because the correspondence here is identity: the 
phenomenal qualities just are the lines’ lengths, ‘out there’.  The appearance of a 
difference in length is not constituted by what we are aware of, but by some further 
cognitive act in which the lines are misinterpreted as belonging to three-dimensional, right-
angled objects.  This explanation finds support from cross-cultural studies in which 
subjects living in ‘noncarpentered’ visual environments lacking abundant right-angled 
joins between surfaces (chiefly those not living in ‘boxy’ houses) are less susceptible to the 
illusion (Kitayama & Cohen 2007: 576).   
 
This cross-cultural difference might incline us to assimilate the Müller-Lyer to a 
cognitive rather than an optical illusion.  However, as Fish notes, what is distinctive about 
optical illusions as opposed to cognitive illusions is that the illusion persists even once the 
subject is informed about the nature of the illusion.  And the lines of the Müller-Lyer 
illusion continue to look of different lengths even once we know they are not.  This may 
indicate that the effects elicited by optical illusions – the inappropriate deployment of 
conceptual-recognitional capacities – occur at what would be called a ‘low’ or 
‘subpersonal’ level within the subjects’ perceptual systems, i.e. via mechanisms more or 
less impervious to conscious thought or belief (Fish 2009: 176).  The conceptual-
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recognitional capacities here may indeed scarcely involve the application of anything we 
would call ‘concepts’, and may even involve innate mechanisms rather than learned facts 
or associations (ibid.).24 
 
There are more clear-cut cases of optical illusion in which the illusion seems less 
easily attributable to cognitive factors, whether at a ‘low’ or ‘high’ level.  These include 
the checkerboard illusion (figure 2): 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – the checkerboard illusion. The squares labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
the same shade (luminance) but B looks lighter because it appears to be in 
shadow. (Image copyright Edward Adelson: 
http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html) 
 
We might try to explain this illusion using the two-faculty account, by claiming that 
our experience has as its 'core' the simple presentation of the squares with their respective 
shades, while the illusion arises with some further operations of our visual or cognitive 
                                                 
24  Note that, as Fish acknowledges, his fact-based account of cognitive illusion would not explain the 
illusory appearance in this case, since the cognitive-recognitional capacity would fail to latch onto any 
actual facts – the lines are, after all, not actually the corners of three-dimensional, right-angled objects 
(Fish 2009: 174).  As I argued in the previous section, using the example of misperceiving a rope as a 
snake, the same consideration undermines his explanation of other cases of illusion too.  It is unclear 
whether Fish’s appeal to some ‘low-level’ and possibly innate mechanisms gets round this difficulty. 
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system, which yield a mistaken judgment about similarity of shades.  If this is intended to 
effect the desired division of phenomenological labour then it comes up hard against our 
intuitive response to how the drawing looks.  Here is a case where ascribing the illusory 
appearance to some sort of judgment or inclination to judge proves rather unconvincing.  
In other words, there really seems to be a different quality inhering in the image where it 
depicts square A than there is where it depicts square B.  Certainly we are inclined to judge 
that A is darker than B, and indeed find it very difficult to resist that inclination, but this 
inclination to judge accordingly is quite compellingly grounded in a more fundamental 
sense in which it just looks darker.  Perhaps what makes this illusion more compelling than 
the Müller-Lyer illusion is that it is easier to attend to the illusory aspect of the figure; the 
loci of the illusory qualities are more clearly delineated in the checkerboard case and more 
able to withstand close and prolonged scrutiny. 
 
The attempt to separate ‘core subjective character’ from ‘cognitive phenomenology’ 
seems especially strained once we consider a chromatic relative of the checkerboard 
illusion (figure 3): 
 
Figure 3 – the Rubik’s cube illusion. What appear to be depicted as blue 
squares on the upper surface of a cube in the left-hand image are objectively 
the same colour (grey) as what appear to be yellow squares on the upper 
surface of the cube in the right-hand image. (Image copyright R. Beau Lotto: 
http://www.lottolab.org/illusiondemos/Demo%2012.html).   
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Certainly, the illusory aspects of these images are in some sense attributable to goings-
on internal to the subject.  With both the checkerboard and Rubik’s cube illusions, the 
illusion can be understood as the result of an adaptive response of our visual system to 
local and global variations in illumination.  Both illusions depict real-world scenarios 
involving variation in illumination.  The checkerboard illusion depicts the changing 
appearance of a surface given local variation in background illumination, while the 
Rubik’s cube illusion depicts differences in the appearance of the same object resulting 
from changes in the colour of illumination (or perhaps from viewing the object through 
differently-coloured lenses).  The illusions exploit our ability to compensate for changes in 
viewing conditions – that is, to disregard local variations in illumination due to shading 
when assessing the real lightness of objects, or to compensate for the colour of background 
illumination when assessing the real colour of objects (where, without committing 
ourselves to any particular ontological view of colour, ‘real colour’ can be taken to mean 
the colour as seen in broad daylight).  Some or all of the illusory effect in these cases may 
reflect what is known as simultaneous contrast, a phenomenon in which a given patch of 
colour appears to be a different shade or hue depending on the colour of surrounding 
regions.  It has been suggested that simultaneous contrast effects result precisely from an 
evolved capacity to track objects’ colours through changes in environmental viewing 
conditions (Lotto & Purves 2000: 12836-7).25 
 
The adaptive value of these illusion-generating cognitive processes undermines one 
possible defence of the natural view from these sorts of optical illusion.  Such a defence 
might claim that the internal goings-on in these cases do not make a positive contribution 
to phenomenology, but merely impose a negative constraint.  Rather than altering or 
adding any phenomenal qualities they simply distort our awareness of the objects and 
qualities that are wholly ‘out there’.  One might therefore be tempted to posit a similar 
constraining role for the subject’s physiology in optical illusions as has been suggested for 
cases where a subject’s perceptual acuity is limited, e.g. blurry vision.  While blurry vision 
might be presented as a problem for the natural view – where is the blurriness if not out 
                                                 
25  The illusory aspect of simultaneous colour contrast examples has been attributed by some authors to a 
misjudgment: as Hamlyn notes, it might be supposed that in such cases “the perceiver makes an inference 
about the colour of the inset patch.  That is to say that there is a tendency to infer that the inset colour 
must be opposed to the colour of the surrounding area, and this inference sometimes overrides the given 
facts of sensory experience” (Hamlyn 1983: 13).  Here again we can find a version of the two faculty 
view: “the given facts of sensory experience” are what is supposed to be delivered by the faculty of 
(direct) awareness, while the ‘inference’ is clearly an operation of the cognitive faculty.  
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there? – the plausible rejoinder is that blurriness is not some extra quality of which we are 
aware but a limit or indeterminacy in respect of some quality of which we are aware (see 
Fish 2009: 54-8 for a version of this defence).  A similar approach to optical illusions 
might be to say that some shortcomings in our visual system are such that we cannot 
accurately perceive certain qualities under certain conditions; for example, we cannot 
accurately see spatial relations such as two lines’ being parallel or of equal length when 
they are presented in a certain confounding context.  Whether or not this ‘distortion 
defence’ is plausible even for cases like the Müller-Lyer illusion, it looks highly 
implausible for cases like the checkerboard or Rubik’s cube illusions.  In part, this 
implausibility is intuitive: these cases just don’t look as though they involve distortions or 
indeterminacies.  This intuition is supported by the fact, noted above, that the illusory 
aspect in these cases is readily pinned down to a defined locus that can be the focus of 
scrutiny without dispelling the illusion.  More importantly, however, the distortion defence 
is rendered implausible by the observation that at least some optical illusions arise from 
compensatory mechanisms in the visual system that have adaptive value.  Indeed, the 
illusions are side-effects of cognitive processes that, in normal environments, enhance the 
acuity of vision in respect of the subject’s ability to identify and discriminate objective 
surface qualities of objects despite potentially confounding variations in illumination, etc. 
 
What we have then are cases of optical illusion in which the illusory aspect seems to 
involve genuine aspects of phenomenology that are not attributable to the worldly objects 
or scenes perceived, or to the subject’s (spatial) perspective on them.  Further evidence for 
the positive role of internal processes in determining phenomenology comes from a 
different sort of illusion, in which one is aware of phenomenal qualities of a kind that is not 
exemplified in the object perceived.  The illusions concerned involve motion-induced 
colour, in which an object lacking hue (being black and white) appears, under a certain 
motion, to exhibit hues.  A classic example is Benham’s disk, in which a patterned black 
and white disk is spun rapidly while being viewed.  The subject as a result sees flickering 
colours in the rotating disk.  This phenomenon clearly meets the criteria for being an 
optical illusion, being both predictable and repeatable, and not reliant on the subject’s 
background beliefs.  What’s more, the colours are clearly perceived as qualities of the 
object seen – as located on the surface of the disk – and so would not be aptly described as 
hallucinatory phenomena somehow induced by the disk but ‘floating free’ of it, as it were. 
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Thus, with motion-induced colour we have an illusory phenomenon in which 
phenomenal qualities appear to be positively added to the experience and not merely 
altered in some way (as we find in the checkerboard and Müller-Lyer illusions for 
example).  This therefore poses the starkest challenge yet to the natural view (with 
hallucination waiting in the wings, as the subject of the next chapter).   
 
We might nonetheless find a role for the simple metaphysical picture in explaining 
these more intractable cases of illusion.  After all, the simple metaphysical picture is 
explicit that experience is constituted by the whole causal perceptual process in which the 
object affects the subject, a process that is partly constituted by events internal to the 
subject.  Why is the problem, then, with allowing that these internal events are partial 
determinants of phenomenology?  The problem is that this risks neglecting the simple 
metaphysical picture’s role in underpinning the natural view.  We could just assert that the 
experience is identical to the process and that the phenomenology is itself the whole 
process or an aspect of the process, in which case it is not unreasonable that altering one 
part of the process, even if physically internal to the subject, might change the overall 
phenomenology.  This, recall, is precisely the account offered by Manzotti in his ‘process-
oriented view’.26  But recall also that Manzotti’s account was rejected precisely because it 
conflicts with the natural view since, even in cases of veridical perception, it fails to locate 
perceived qualities where they seem to be, namely out in the subject’s environment. 
 
There are further features of ostensibly veridical perception that put similar pressure 
on the natural view.  These include variability in colour perception among different normal 
subjects, and even the nature of colour itself.  I will consider these seeming problem cases 
in chapter 6 below, before suggesting how the simple metaphysical picture might offer a 
solution after all.   
 
 
  
                                                 
26  See Manzotti (2006a: 29-30) and (2008: 186-7) for his explanation of illusion.  His (2006a) and (2008) 
address optical and physical illusions respectively. 
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3.6   Conclusion – the argument(s) from illusion 
 
From our survey of illusion we are left with the following conclusions:  
 
1. Physical illusions present no difficulties for the natural view, being wholly 
explicable by reference to the nature and qualities of the objects perceived, 
their spatial relation to the subject and the background conditions of 
perception (illumination etc.). 
 
2. Cognitive illusions may in some instances be explicable via the two faculty 
view, leaving the phenomenology accounted for by the objects and qualities 
perceived, and the illusion explained in terms of a tendency towards 
misjudgment about the nature of those objects or qualities.  There are other 
cases, however, in which the cognitive faculty appears to play a genuine role 
in influencing experiences’ phenomenology (Brewer’s ‘core subjective 
character’); these include cases of cognitive penetration of perceptual 
experience, which I will discuss in chapter 5 below. 
 
3. Optical illusions may also in some instances be explicable via the two faculty 
view.  Again, however, there are cases in which the illusion seems to reside 
not in a judgment but in the very qualities of which we are aware.  These 
included cases in which we seem to be aware of certain qualities (hues) that 
seem not to be objectively present in the appropriate part of our environment 
(the Rubik’s cube illusion, motion-induced colour). 
 
At the end of this chapter we are therefore left with a number of cases that are not 
readily assimilated to naïve realism and its explanatory virtue of accounting for the 
phenomenology of experience by simple appeal to the antecedent nature of the objects 
perceived.  I suggested that Fish’s fact-based account of cognitive illusions fails to account 
for our intuitions in some cases, leaving us with a residual worry that our conceptual-
recognitional capacities might play a positive role in influencing the phenomenology of 
experience even when they are deployed erroneously.  As it is, I will describe in chapter 5 
cases of perceptual learning and cognitive penetration of perceptual experience which 
provide strong evidence for the role of memory and belief in positively influencing the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience.  I will show, however, that the natural view, and 
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naïve realism more specifically, can accommodate such cases using a mechanism made 
possible by the simple metaphysical picture of experience. 
 
Some cases of optical illusion, such as the Rubik’s cube illusion, will prove more 
intractable.  There appears to be no solution to these cases that can be accommodated to 
naïve realism.  In chapter 6 I will describe other features of perceptual experience that pose 
a similar challenge.  I will argue that, again with the help of the simple metaphysical 
picture, we can account for these consistently with the natural view, but only at the cost of 
rejecting the realism claim that is essential to naïve realism.  In other words, such features 
of experience demonstrate that the worldly objects and qualities of which we are aware are 
in some respects not constitutively independent of the subject or her experience.  This will 
seem a high price to pay to preserve the natural view, but I will in chapter 7 argue that it 
can be accommodated within a broadly physicalist metaphysics and so avoid the charge of 
idealism. 
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CHAPTER 4 – PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (II): HALLUCINATION 
 
4.1   Introduction: hallucination and the natural view 
 
We have seen that at least some illusions can be accommodated to the natural view 
and its insistence that phenomenal character is to be found 'out there', borne by worldly 
objects.  That is as well, since the natural view is a claim about perception and illusions are 
perceptual even if they are misleading.  A different sort of sensory (or quasi-sensory) 
experience has widely been seen to present even greater challenges to naïve realism and, 
by extension, the natural view.  That is hallucination.  Since hallucination is, by definition, 
not a form of perception, it is not directly a challenge to the natural view.  Instead, as I 
explained in chapter 3, the challenge comes indirectly via the thought that whatever 
accounts for the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience ought equally to account for 
the phenomenology of perceptual experience.  I will examine this ‘argument from 
hallucination’ in more detail in the following section. 
 
As we shall see, naïve realists have typically responded to the argument from 
hallucination by denying that the phenomenology of perceptual experience and that of 
hallucination need to be explained in the same way.  I will take a quite different approach, 
arguing that the simple metaphysical picture of perception allows us to accept that the 
phenomenology of perception and hallucination is best given a single kind of explanation, 
but that this need not undermine the natural view of perception.  Specifically, we will be 
able to offer this unified account by attributing the hallucinatory phenomenology to 
awareness of worldly objects.  Accepting this admittedly perverse-sounding claim will 
require a reworking of our definition of hallucination in order to allow that hallucinations 
too can have worldly objects in a certain fashion. 
 
Before reaching such a counter-intuitive conclusion, I will consider some alternative 
strategies proposed by naïve realists to defend their theory against hallucination.  I will 
argue that these alternatives either fail to account positively for the phenomenology of 
hallucination (some even denying that hallucinatory experience has phenomenology) or 
fail to account for what is distinctive about the phenomenology of perceptual experience 
that makes it uniquely world-presenting.   
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The account offered here, and based on application of the simple metaphysical picture, 
acknowledges that hallucinatory experiences involve genuine awareness of the same sorts 
of qualities that we can become aware of through perception.  Furthermore, it explains that 
the phenomenology of hallucination is had by virtue of the subject’s standing in an 
awareness or acquaintance relation to worldly objects previously perceived.  Counter-
intuitive as this account might seem, I hope to show that it can be made plausible by a 
four-stage argument which, firstly, treats hallucinations as dependent on the subject’s 
memory of things previously perceived; second, takes such perceptual memories to involve 
a kind of ‘delayed’ awareness; third, appeals to intermediate cases to persuade that a sharp 
distinction between perception and memory is not defensible; and, fourth, takes this as 
justification for extending the simple metaphysical picture of perception to cases of 
perceptual memory and, thereby, hallucination..  Crucially, the result is an account with 
much greater explanatory power than those existing naïve realist theories which either 
deny that hallucinations possess genuine phenomenology or attribute it to awareness of 
entities other than worldly objects. 
 
 
4.2   The argument from hallucination 
 
Recall the argument from hallucination: 
 
The argument from hallucination: 
 
1. For every perceptual experience there could be a hallucinatory experience that 
seems the same to the subject.   
 
2. The best explanation for the fact that two experiences seem the same is that 
they have the same metaphysical nature. 
 
3. All hallucinatory experiences involve awareness of phenomenal qualities that 
are not instantiations in worldly objects; those qualities are not ‘out there’, 
inhering in worldly objects. 
 
Therefore 
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4. All veridical perceptual experiences involve awareness of phenomenal qualities 
that are not instantiations in worldly objects; those qualities are not ‘out there’, 
inhering in worldly objects.  
 
As noted earlier, this key step in this argument is premise 2, an inference to the best 
explanation, such that two experiences that seem the same ought to share a metaphysical 
nature.  The argument thus explains a phenomenological equivalence between possible 
perceptual and hallucinatory experiences – their subjective indistinguishability – as being 
the upshot of a metaphysical equivalence; they seem the same because they are the same.  
If we further accept that hallucinatory experience is not a relation of awareness to worldly 
objects, a claim (premise 3) which is apt to seem uncontroversial, it follows that perceptual 
experience is also not a relation to worldly objects.  A key feature of the argument from 
hallucination is thus its satisfaction of an underlying urge towards explanatory unity: 
whatever explains the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience should also explain the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience, and if it’s not the constitutive role of worldly 
objects in one case it should not be in the other case either.   
 
As we shall see, standard naïve realist counter-arguments attack precisely the move 
from phenomenological to metaphysical equivalence and so leave open the possibility that 
perceptual and hallucinatory experiences, even though they might seem the same, are in 
fact quite different kinds of experiences in some metaphysical sense.  This in turn allows 
the naïve realist to hold onto the claim that perceptual experience is genuinely relational 
and involves direct awareness of worldly objects and their qualities, even if the same is not 
true of hallucinatory experience.  Rejecting the move from phenomenological to 
metaphysical equivalence does, however, leave those forms of naïve realism without the 
benefit of the explanatory unity that is claimed by the proponents of the argument from 
hallucination.  In other words, the naïve realist is left having to explain how two 
experiences – one involving awareness of worldly objects and the other not – might come 
to seem the same despite their radically different metaphysical natures. 
 
Thus, while one could reject the argument from hallucination, and so defend the 
natural view, by denying any or all of premises 1, 2 or 3, the standard naïve realist counter-
arguments have focused on the denial of premise 2.  All agree that hallucinations lack 
worldly objects (premise 3) while denying that matching hallucinatory and perceptual 
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experiences share a metaphysical nature.  Premise 3 is apt to seem incontrovertible – it is 
often taken to be definitional of hallucinations that they lack worldly objects – so it is no 
surprise that naïve realists have almost invariably attacked premise 2 instead.   
 
By sharp contrast, I will take the opposite course to defend the natural view, by 
offering an alternative account, based on the simple metaphysical picture, which accepts 
premise 2 while accepting the truth of premise 3.  The key claim is, counter-intuitively, 
that the phenomenology of hallucinatory experiences is wholly attributable to awareness of 
worldly objects and their properties, a claim which can be rescued from absurdity by 
careful application of the simple metaphysical picture.  It follows from this view that 
premise 2 is true by virtue of a restricted range of possible cases in which awareness of the 
same scene yields the phenomenology of both perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.27 
 
Before considering this and the other counter-arguments to the argument from 
hallucination, let us look in more detail at the argument itself.  Premise 1 makes the 
plausible claim that, for any given perceptual experience, there could be a hallucinatory 
experience which is exactly matching subjectively, so that the subject could not tell by 
reflection alone that the experience was hallucinatory rather than perceptual. 28  The move 
from phenomenological sameness to metaphysical sameness is made explicit in the move 
from premise 1 to premise 2, and shown to be an inference to the best explanation.  What it 
is for two experiences to be matching is their possessing the same phenomenology, and 
this matching phenomenology is attributable to a ‘match’ in the metaphysical structure of 
experience across the perceptual and hallucinatory cases, namely that in each case the 
subject stands in some awareness relation to worldly objects and their qualities.29 
                                                 
27  Given the account I am about to offer, the obvious kind of case would be one in which a subject 
hallucinates the same scene that she perceived at some earlier time (where its being a hallucination of the 
same scene I take to mean that it involves awareness of the same scene, with its constituent objects and 
qualities). 
28  As noted earlier, the requirement that subjects be unable to distinguish experiences ‘by reflection alone’ is 
introduced by Martin to avoid the possibility that subjects could tell that they were perceiving and not 
hallucination (or vice versa) because they were told as much or in virtue of their having some pertinent 
background beliefs (Martin 2006: 364-5).  For example, a subject might deduce that she was merely 
hallucinating her best friend before her if she knew that the friend was currently on vacation on the other 
side of the world.  
29  This is often expressed as the claim that matching hallucinatory and perceptual experiences share the 
same phenomenal character, although this typically operates within an understanding of ‘phenomenal 
character’ as something possessed by experiences potentially independently of what the experiences are 
of, i.e. a ‘common factor’ shared by indistinguishable experiences.  As noted earlier, naïve realists often 
offer a metaphysical construal of ‘phenomenal character’ which takes it to be constituted by the worldly 
objects perceived and their qualities.  On my use of ‘phenomenal character’, meanwhile, it means that 
relational property of scenes which is how they appear to a subject, which allows that different scenes can 
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It now looks as though what makes an experience perceptual cannot be its 
phenomenology – for this is shared with the matching hallucination – but some other factor 
that connects the phenomenology with the worldly object perceived.  Generally, this extra 
factor is understood to be causal.  Perceptual experience is thus taken to be analysable into 
two elements: first, the experience itself with its phenomenology; and, second, a causal 
link that makes the experience an effect of the object(s) perceived.  This amounts to an 
endorsement of the causal theory of perception and the existence of a common factor 
amongst matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences (see chapter 2).  
 
Central to most defences of naïve realism is a rejection of the inference from a 
phenomenological sameness among experiences to their metaphysical sameness.  Since 
this inference is merely abductive, rejecting is not in itself too difficult – the metaphysical 
and phenomenological construals of ‘matching’ are neither equivalent nor mutually 
entailing.  There is an entailment in one direction – experiences that are matching in the 
metaphysical sense will be matching in the phenomenological sense – but it does not 
follow from the fact that two experiences are matching in the phenomenological sense that 
they have the same metaphysical nature.   
 
Even lacking this latter entailment, the explanation of phenomenological sameness via 
metaphysical sameness might seem compelling as an inference to the best explanation.  
Note that the inference does not rely on assuming that the phenomenological sameness is 
due to a sameness in the arrangement of objects and qualities of which the subject is aware.  
As Austin points out, two objects might be quite different and yet look the same – a lemon 
and a yellow, lemon-shaped bar of soap, for example (Austin 1962: 50).  The posited 
metaphysical sameness instead claims that the perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
have, more broadly, the same metaphysical structure, e.g. involve a relation of awareness 
between subjects and the same kinds of objects or properties, whether these are considered 
to be ‘out there’ or ‘in here’. 
 
If we accept that the phenomenology of hallucination is not attributable to awareness 
of worldly objects and qualities (as per premise 3), then the natural view forces us to 
                                                 
bear the same phenomenal character.  I will therefore allow that experiences of different scenes can 
present or exhibit (not possess) the same phenomenal character. 
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conclude that perceptions and hallucinations can be subjectively matching despite some 
profound difference in the nature of the objects of awareness (if any) and so a 
corresponding difference in the overall metaphysical structure of the respective 
experiences. 
 
A naïve realist who rejects the move from epistemic sameness to metaphysical 
sameness therefore takes on the burden of explaining how two very different kinds of 
phenomenon could nonetheless seem the same.  The first step is to be clear about the 
metaphysical difference that is required.  According to the natural view, the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience consists of worldly objects with their perceptible 
qualities, and not merely the qualities alone.  Accordingly, naïve realists have typically 
responded to the argument from hallucination by denying that perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences could share the same phenomenology.  The denial is made precisely on the 
grounds that the phenomenology in perception is attributable to worldly object, while in 
hallucinatory experience there is no corresponding worldly object.  It is sometimes said, on 
this basis, that the perceptual experience is ‘object-involving’, unlike its hallucinatory 
counterpart (Snowdon 1990: 130). 
 
As noted in chapter 2, proponents of this defence of naïve realism are termed 
‘disjunctivists’ because they advocate a disjunctive analysis of the notion of sensory 
experience.  Thus, its appearing to me that there is a red tomato might be made true by one 
of two possible states of affairs: (a) there being something that looks to me to be a red 
tomato; or (b) its merely seeming to me as if there is something that looks to me to be a red 
tomato (cf. Snowdon 1981: 185).  Note that in the first, perceptual, disjunct, it need not be 
the case that there is in fact a red tomato before me for this to count as a case of perception 
– what matters is that there is an object that I am seeing and which I take to be a red 
tomato.  This allows that illusory experiences are also cases of perceiving, albeit 
misleading ones.30 
 
                                                 
30  This form of disjunctive analysis thus places veridical and illusory perceptual experiences together, a 
version of disjunctivism that Byrne and Logue call ‘VI v. H disjunctivism’ (2008: 69).  As they note, an 
alternative form of disjunctivism has been proposed which places veridical perception in one disjunct and 
illusion and hallucination in the other (‘V v IH disjunctivism’).  A clear example of this is the 
disjunctivism proposed by John McDowell, but which has different motivations from those claimed in the 
current thesis, namely a concern to defend the special epistemic value of veridical as opposed to 
subjectively indistinguishable but non-veridical experiences (i.e. illusions and hallucinations) (see e.g. 
McDowell 1994). 
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The disjunctive analysis is intended as an alternative to what has historically been the 
standard view, namely that a given statement of how things seem sensorily to a subject will 
be made true in all cases by the occurrence of a certain experience, where this is conceived 
as, in some sense, an inner state or event within the subject.  This standard view is one in 
which experiences are individuated by their phenomenology, and phenomenology is in turn 
identified with what it’s like to undergo that experience.  What, on the standard view, 
distinguishes perceptual from non-perceptual experiences is not the experience itself but 
the aetiology of the experience – its being appropriately caused by a worldly object, or not.  
Since it posits a factor common to both perceptual and non-perceptual experiences – 
namely the experience itself – this is sometimes called the ‘common factor view’ of 
experience (Fish 2009: 3-5).  And since it analyses perception into two independent 
conditions – the occurrence of an experience plus the obtaining of an appropriate worldly 
cause – it is also described as ‘conjunctivism’ (Johnston 2004: 114). 
 
We can therefore see disjunctivism as the rejection of one line of thought that leads 
from a phenomenological equivalence between experiences to a metaphysical equivalence 
– the idea that two sensory experiences that seem alike must thereby be alike.  By 
incorporating the worldly object within the experience itself (in the perceptual but not the 
hallucinatory case) disjunctivists undermine this distinction and so undo the entailment 
from phenomenological to metaphysical sameness. 
 
Having abjured the explanatory unity offered by the argument from hallucination, the 
disjunctivist is left seeking an explanation of how perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
might seem the same despite their profound metaphysical differences.  There might be 
broadly two routes for the disjunctivist to follow here, which we can bring out with the 
following observation: it seems to the perceiving subject that she is aware of worldly 
objects and their qualities, and it seems that way because she is so aware; it likewise seems 
to the hallucinating subject that she is aware of worldly objects and their qualities, but in 
this case there are grounds for thinking she is not so aware.  If we therefore say that, in the 
hallucinatory case, the subject merely seems to be aware of worldly objects and qualities, 
we leave some ambiguity in what this seeming amounts to.  Does it mean that the subject is 
not really aware of objects and/or qualities at all, or just that the subject is not aware 
specifically of worldly objects and/or qualities?  This question points to two broad 
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approaches to a disjunctivist account of hallucination, both of which are represented in the 
literature: 
 
1. Hallucinatory experience involves awareness of qualities, but these 
qualities are not instantiated in worldly objects of which the subject is 
aware.31 
 
2. Hallucinatory experience does not in fact involve awareness of 
qualities at all, but merely seems to do so. 
 
As stated, option 1 leaves open the question of where the hallucinated qualities are 
instantiated, and so potentially paves the way for different versions of disjunctivist naïve 
realism.  In fact, as we shall see, it leaves room for the claim that hallucinated qualities are 
not instantiated in any objects, worldly or otherwise.  Option 1 can therefore be subdivided 
as follows: 
 
1a Hallucinatory experience involves awareness of qualities but these qualities are 
instantiated in something other than worldly objects 
 
1b Hallucinatory experience involves awareness of qualities, but these qualities 
are not instantiated in any objects, worldly or otherwise, of which the subject is 
aware. 
 
I will discuss each of these options in turn, assessing their coherence and their capacity 
to explain how hallucinations and perceptions can seem the same while having a different 
metaphysical structure.  I will conclude that none offers a satisfactory explanation in this 
regard, leaving us with either a glaringly disunified explanation of the subjective 
similarities among different experiences (option 1a), an appeal to metaphysical oddities 
(options 1b and, in some forms, 1a), or an unsatisfying denial that hallucinations even 
involve awareness of qualities in the first place (option 2). 
 
                                                 
31  When referring to hallucinatory experiences I assume for the sake of exposition that they are ‘total’ 
hallucinations i.e. the experiences are entirely hallucinated and involve no perceptual element.   
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With these shortcomings in mind, I will go on to propose a further option, one that 
takes the unusual step of denying premise 3 of the argument from hallucination rather than 
premise 2.  In other words, it claims that hallucination does in fact involve the awareness 
of qualities instantiated in worldly objects, just as perception does: 
 
3. Hallucinatory experience involves awareness of qualities that are 
instantiated by worldly objects, just as they are in genuinely perceptual 
experience. 
 
I will argue that option 3, although seemingly absurd, can be made intelligible by 
appeal to the simple metaphysical picture and in light of a plausible account of the 
aetiology of hallucination.  Allowing that hallucination is object-involving in the relevant 
sense – being capable of description as a process relating the subject and worldly objects – 
has the great advantage over the other options of yielding a unified explanation of 
phenomenology across both perceptual and hallucinatory cases.  Otherwise, the choice 
between options 1a and 1b, on the one hand, and option 2 on the other, presents something 
of a dilemma: either we explain hallucination as awareness of qualities not instantiated in 
worldly objects, or we deny the ‘felt reality’ of hallucination in the first place.  The first 
horn of the dilemma threatens to undermine the natural view and its privileging experience 
as a way of directly encountering the world; while the second calls into question our 
intuitive grasp of the subjective, quasi-sensory character of hallucination.   
 
Option 3 rescues us from this dilemma by claiming that in hallucinatory experience we 
are aware of actual qualities, and that these qualities are instantiated in worldly objects.  
Implausible as this seems, the simple metaphysical picture offers a way to make it 
intelligible.  The account has great explanatory virtues.  By holding that hallucinations, like 
perceptual experiences, are object-involving, it offers to explain the phenomenology of 
hallucination in terms of things we already understand (worldly objects and processes).  
What’s more, it offers a single, unified account to cover both perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences. 
 
Before laying out option 3 in more detail, let us consider each of options 1a, 1b and 2 
in turn, noting their advantages and, more importantly, disadvantages. 
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4.3   Option 1a – awareness of non-worldly qualities 
 
The first option might, for example, involve the claim that the phenomenal qualities of 
hallucinatory experience are qualities of the experience itself, i.e. something like the qualia 
described earlier.  Or it might involve the claim that the phenomenal qualities are 
instantiated in mind-dependent objects – sense-data, ideas or impressions.   
 
It is not easy to find clear examples of such a ‘mixed’ theory of phenomenology – one 
in which the phenomenology of perceptual experience is determined or constituted by 
worldly objects and their qualities, while the phenomenology of hallucination is 
determined or constituted by non-worldly objects or qualities.  One example might be 
recent defences of the ‘theory of appearing’ (Alston 1999; Langsam 1997).  According to 
the theory of appearing, perceptual experience is to be understood as a relation holding 
between subject, object(s) and some qualities.  The relation is one of appearing (looking, 
sounding, etc.).  So, for example, a subject S’s visual experience of a ripe tomato could be 
described as ‘The tomato’s looking red to S’.  Insofar as this characterisation makes the 
object perceived a constituent of the experience, the theory of appearing stands as a form 
of relationalism as described in chapter 1.  And, depending on how one uses this relational 
claim to explain phenomenology, the theory of appearing could be construed consistently 
with the natural view.32  
 
As a form of relationalism, the theory of appearing faces the same problem from 
hallucination as any theory endorsing the natural view.  Since it explains perception, and 
thereby phenomenology, as a relation to worldly objects, how will it explain 
phenomenology in cases where a worldly object is not perceived?  Both Langsam and 
Alston endorse a version of disjunctivism: they point out that, while perceptual and 
hallucinatory experiences might appear the same, this does not entail that they are the 
same, metaphysically speaking (Langsam 1997: 39; Alston 1999: 190).  Both presume that 
hallucinations can involve awareness of qualities, but deny that these need to be the same 
sorts of qualities, or inhere in the same sorts of objects, as those qualities we are aware of 
                                                 
32  Although Langsam describes the theory of appearing as a form of naïve realism, his account falls short of 
endorsing the natural view, identifying phenomenal qualities with extrinsic properties of perceived 
objects; specifically, their properties of appearing F (red, sweet, etc.) to the subject (Langsam 1997: 53-
56).   
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when we perceive.  No fully worked-out alternative is offered; both consider non-
committedly the notion that hallucinatory experiences might be relations to regions of 
space – the regions that the hallucinated objects seem to occupy (Langsam 1997: 47; 
Alston 1999: 191), although the obvious shortcoming here is that it tells us only where the 
(metaphysically distinct) phenomenal qualities of the hallucination seem to reside, and not 
what they are or how they come to feature in experience in this way.  Alston favours 
instead the idea that hallucinations involve awareness of mental images, although he does 
not claim to offer a robust exposition or defence of the suggestion (Alston 1999: 191-2). 
 
In any case, the worry with any such ‘mixed’ account is just the one we noted at the 
outset: it offers a glaringly disunified explanation of phenomenology.  Sometimes this is 
attributable to awareness of worldly objects and qualities, and sometimes to awareness of 
qualia, mental images or mind-dependent objects, etc.  We can intuitively understand how 
qualities such as colour can belong to worldly objects (our intuitive commitment to this is, 
after all, part of the motivating insight behind the natural view), but it is difficult to grasp 
how they can also belong to such curious entities as ‘experiences’ or ‘sense data’.   
 
Such views might also seem to undermine the insistence that genuinely perceptual 
experience involves direct awareness of worldly objects.  What is distinctive about such 
awareness if a subjective similar hallucinatory experience can result from awareness of 
something else – sense data, mental images, etc.?  There might remain epistemological 
motivations for insisting on direct awareness of worldly objects – for example, to explain 
our ability to think about particular worldly objects (see e.g. Campbell 2002a: 114 ff.) – 
but the phenomenological motivation lying behind the natural view would seem to be 
much weakened.  This is, of course, just to acknowledge the urge to unifying explanation 
which drives the argument from hallucination.  As we shall see, the same worry afflicts the 
next option. 
 
 
4.4   Option 1b – uninstantiated universals 
 
This option is proposed by Mark Johnston, an avowed ‘radical direct realist’ who 
suggests that hallucinatory experience involves the awareness of a ‘sensible profile’ – a 
structured arrangement of qualities.  The sensible profile is just the same as that which a 
subject might be aware of in genuinely perceiving a scene – it is after all just the array of 
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qualities that determines what it is like to perceive that scene; the yellowness of the autumn 
foliage against the blue of the sky perhaps.  Crucially, though, a corresponding 
hallucination of autumnal trees would, on Johnston’s view, involve awareness of the same 
kind of sensible profile but one that is not instantiated in worldly particulars or indeed in 
any objects, worldly or otherwise (Johnston 2004: 134 ff.).33 
 
This account is unlike Option 1a in that it is not a ‘mixed’ view – it does not postulate 
different kinds of objects to be the bearers of phenomenal qualities in the perceptual and 
hallucinatory cases.  Indeed, it posits a common factor among these cases – the sensible 
profile shared by subjectively indistinguishable perceptual and hallucinatory experiences, 
awareness of which determines what it’s like to have those experiences.  To that extent, it 
departs from the disjunctivist rejection of a common factor shared by perceptual and 
hallucinatory experiences and which is supposed to determine the experiences’ 
phenomenology (Johnston 2004: 170-1). 34   
 
Option 1b thus has an explanatory virtue inasmuch as it offers a unified account of 
phenomenology in both kinds of experience.  However, its explanatory power proves a 
somewhat mixed blessing.  By giving a positive explanation of phenomenology in the 
hallucinatory case, in terms of uninstantiated sensory profiles, the account offers 
something that might do the explanatory work for the perceptual case too.  Thus, if sensory 
profiles constitute the phenomenology of the hallucinatory cases, why not think that they 
constitute the phenomenology of the perceptual cases too?  In other words, if veridical 
perception and hallucination can share the same sensible profile, and this sensible profile 
constitutes what it is like for the subject to have the experience in question (constitutes its 
phenomenology, in other words), then there doesn't seem to be any role for the particular 
qua particular (as opposed to the instantiation of a sensible profile) in determining the 
phenomenology of the experience in the veridical case.  There is, we might say, no way in 
                                                 
33  It is important that perception, for Johnston, involves the awareness of instantiations of sensible profiles 
and not merely sensible profiles that are instantiated.  As Dunn points out, there is nothing to rule out a 
particular sensible profile's being instantiated even when it is the primary object of a hallucination, since I 
might hallucinate a sensible profile which is not instantiated by anything in front of me (as of, say a spiny 
anteater) but which is, coincidentally, instantiated on the other side of the world.  If veridical perception 
were construed as the awareness of sensible profiles that are instantiated (somewhere), this would have 
the absurd consequence that I am veridically perceiving a spiny anteater (Dunn 2008: 379). 
34  Johnston is explicit that his theory is non-disjunctivist insofar as it admits a common mental factor 
amongst perceptual and hallucinatory experiences, namely the (awareness of the) sensible profile that is 
instantiated in the former case but not in the latter.  However, it remains disjunctivist to the extent that it 
allows for an experiential report to be made true by two different kinds of state: one that is awareness of 
an instantiated sensible profile, and another that is awareness of an uninstantiated sensible profile. 
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which the worldly objects can ‘show up’ in phenomenology over and above what is 
provided by the sensory profile.  As Martin puts it, the feature that determines 
phenomenology in the hallucinatory case ‘screens off’ the ‘naïve realist aspects’ from 
making any distinctive contribution to the phenomenology in the perceptual case (Martin 
2004: 62). 
 
To be fair, Johnston is at pains to emphasise that the subject is not, in perceiving, 
aware of the object in virtue of being aware of the sensible profile, for that would make 
object perception indirect for his purposes: 
 
[I]t is not that we see particulars by being visually aware of the sensible 
profiles that they have or instantiate.  Instead, we see them as having 
certain sensible profiles, which are after all just certain complex sensible 
profiles.  We may have to be visually aware of those sensible profiles in 
order to see particulars as having them, but this implies no indirection. 
          
       Johnston 2004: 155 
 
Not only does this avoid implying any ‘indirection’ (the sensible profile as an 
intermediary object of awareness), but it also signals that, first and foremost, what is 
perceived is the object which bears the relevant sensible properties.   
 
If there is a residual worry with the sensible profile account, however, it is that its 
postulation of awareness of uninstantiated sensory profiles undermines any 
phenomenological motivation for thinking that in genuine perceptual experience our 
awareness of sensible profiles is thereby a direct awareness of the objects that instantiate 
them.  Once we have admitted awareness of uninstantiated sensory profiles it seems that 
direct awareness of objects has at best a diminished role to play in the explanation of 
phenomenology.  If a given sensible profile could be common to both a perceptual and a 
hallucinatory experience, what grounds do we have for imputing a direct awareness of 
objects in the former case?35   
 
                                                 
35  Johnston’s account is therefore vulnerable to the ‘screening-off’ problem raised by Martin, namely the 
worry that any common factor shared by hallucination and perception, and which is responsible for the 
phenomenology of hallucination, will inevitably ‘screen off’ the actual worldly objects from having any 
phenomenological impact in the case of perception (Martin 2004: 62).  I will discuss the screening-off 
worry further in section 4.5 below.   
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A similar objection faces any theory that offers a positive explanation of 
phenomenology as awareness of anything other than worldly objects.  The natural view is 
motivated by the intuition that perceptual experience is a direct apprehension of worldly 
objects so that its phenomenology is simply composed of those objects.  If phenomenology 
might just as well be composed of non-worldly objects or uninstantiated qualities then 
worldly objects lose their special or distinctive role in constituting phenomenology, and the 
motivating intuition behind the natural view is undermined. 
 
Behind this worry lies what we might see as the core weakness of Johnston's theory: 
its offering a positive explanation of the manifest character of hallucination in terms of 
something – the (uninstantiated) sensible profile – that itself needs considerable 
explanation.  The appeal of naïve realism, and the natural view in particular, is its 
explanation of phenomenology in terms of familiar worldly objects, but this appealing 
feature is undermined by the introduction of such mysterious entities as uninstantiated 
sensible profiles.36  Any explanatory virtue the view might claim (the appeal to a common 
explanation of phenomenology) thus needs to be set against a considerable metaphysical 
vice.  Compared with option 1a, the account has the virtue of not appealing to such obscure 
entities as sense-data or qualia, but it gains this by introducing the equally puzzling notion 
of ‘free-floating’, uninstantiated qualities, presumably to be given a special ontological 
status as universals.   
 
                                                 
36  Sensible profiles might seem candidates for what others have called sense-data, although Hilbert suggests 
that Johnston’s view is better understood as a version of representationalism (Hilbert 2004: 190).  As 
such, the suggestion that experience involves the awareness of sensible profiles might be taken as a gloss 
on the claim that experience represents the instantiation of sensible properties.  According to certain 
‘particularist’ forms of representationalism, perceptual experience has representational content that 
includes as constituents the mind-independent objects perceived along with their properties.  The content 
is ‘singular’ in taking the perceived particular as a constituent, but the content also includes the 
particular’s properties.  One option available to the particularist representationalist when challenged to 
account for hallucinatory experience is to claim that such experience also has representational content but 
the content is existential rather than singular, i.e. it represents that there is something that is F rather than 
that that o is F.  Another way to put it is to say that the representational content of experience has one or 
more ‘slots’ for the particular(s) perceived, that these slots are filled in the case of perceptual experience 
but ‘gappy’ when one hallucinates (Tye 2009: 80-83).  The upshot of this claim – which Tye calls the 
‘Singular (When Filled) Thesis’ – is that the phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
can be composed of the same qualities, namely those that are represented in the existential content.  What 
distinguishes them is that the content of the perceptual experience is singular, while that of the 
hallucinatory experience is gappy (ibid.).  Or, in Johnston’s terms, the perceptual experience involves 
awareness of an instantiated sensible profile (i.e. the object that bears those sensible properties) which the 
hallucinatory experience involves awareness of an uninstantiated sensible profile.  I don’t propose to deal 
with this version of representationalism in detail, except to note that it suffers the same weaknesses that 
have been identified for Johnston’s account (inevitably so, if they are structurally the same).  It is also far 
from clear whether any perceptual theory in which the notion of representation is fundamental could 
underwrite the natural view as I have presented it. 
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The mystery is not dispelled by Johnston’s elaboration of his metaphysical account, in 
which he posits what I have called the simple metaphysical picture as an account of 
perceptual experience: 
 
[T]he relation between seeing an object and the long physical process 
involving first the light coming from the object and then the operation of 
the visual system is not the relation between a first mental effect and a 
prior physical process that causes it.  Seeing the object is not the next event 
after the visual system operates.  Seeing the object is an event materially 
constituted by the long physical process connecting the object seen to the 
final state of the visual system.  Seeing the object is an event that is (as it 
actually turns out) constituted by a physical process that goes all the way 
out to the object seen.  […]  The failure to understand the relation between 
the underlying causal process and seeing as material constitution, rather 
than process causation, is one of the deepest sources of the Conjunctive 
Analysis.37                
Johnston 2004: 138-9 
 
He offers this statement of the simple metaphysical picture for the same reason that I 
use it to underpin the natural view, namely to make sense of the intuition that worldly 
objects ‘get into’ experience as constituents of phenomenology.  Otherwise, as Johnston 
acknowledges, his claim that perceiving involves direct awareness of more than one is 
aware of in hallucinating appears at odds with “a common picture of psychophysical 
causation”, namely the causal theory of perception discussed in chapter 2.  It is to avoid the 
consequences of the causal theory of perception and so secure the directness of perception 
that Johnston offers his version of the simple metaphysical picture.   
 
Note that Johnston applies the simple metaphysical picture only to genuinely 
perceptual experience: whereas the perceptual experience is materially constituted by the 
whole causal process linking subject and object, he states that the hallucinatory experience 
is materially constituted by the state of the subject’s visual system alone (ibid.: 139).  The 
reasoning behind this divided metaphysical account is obvious if we assume that there is an 
object of awareness only in the perceptual case.  Nonetheless, this leaves us with the 
puzzle of how a mere state of the visual system could constitute awareness of a sensible 
profile.  With the simple metaphysical picture we have a straightforward explanation of 
how objects and their qualities feature in the phenomenology of perceptual experience – 
                                                 
37  Johnston’s wording here is potentially misleading: on one reading it is uncontroversial that seeing is 
constituted by the long physical process appropriately linking subject and object, but what he means by 
‘seeing’ here is evidently visual experience. 
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just by being the constituents of that phenomenology.  In other words, what we call 
phenomenology just is the assemblage of worldly objects as they are arrayed before the 
subject, and which are constituents of the perceptual process that is identified with the 
experience itself.  What we lack, in the sensible profile account, is a comparable 
explanation of how uninstantiated universals come to constitute or feature in the 
phenomenology of hallucinatory experiences.  On Johnston’s account, the experience is 
constituted by the state of the subject’s perceptual (visual) system alone.  There is no place 
for uninstantiated universals in this metaphysical picture, so positing their constitutive role 
in phenomenology here seems ad hoc.  Not only are we given no explanation of why a 
given state of the subject’s visual system would give rise to awareness of a sensible profile, 
we are given no explanation of why it should be awareness of this sensible profile and not 
any other.  Perhaps the claim might be that a given neural state gives rise, in hallucination, 
to awareness of whatever sensible profile would normally induce that kind of neural state 
through perception.  But in that case we would be left with the claim that neural states are 
sufficient from having an experience with the appropriate phenomenology, a claim that 
leaves genuine object awareness without a role to play in that phenomenology. 
 
 
4.5   Option 2 – the no phenomenology view 
 
We have reasons, then, to reject the first broad naïve realist approach to explaining 
hallucination; that is, the claim that hallucination involves awareness of phenomenal 
qualities that are either instantiated in non-worldly objects (sense-data perhaps) or 
uninstantiated or free-floating in some sense (Johnston’s sensible profiles).  The second 
option is to claim that when we hallucinate there are in fact no phenomenal qualities of 
which we are aware – it merely seems to us that we are aware of phenomenal qualities.  On 
this account, to the extent that we can talk of hallucinatory experiences as having 
phenomenology this is not what we might call robust phenomenology (cf. Fish 2009: 83), 
insofar as it does not involve awareness of actual qualities, whether free-floating or 
instantiated in one or other kind of object.  Rather, the phenomenology of hallucination is 
taken to be merely apparent. 
 
The obvious advantage of this approach, which we might call the no phenomenology 
view, is that it entirely removes any pressure to give a common account of phenomenology 
between the perceptual and hallucinatory cases; since there is no phenomenology in 
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hallucination.  In fact, it leaves the notion of hallucinatory ‘phenomenology’ wholly 
parasitic on that of the genuine phenomenology of perceptual experience: what it’s like to 
hallucinate is not explicable in terms of any actual qualities manifest in the hallucinatory 
experience, but solely in terms of what it would be like to have a certain perceptual 
experience. 
 
There are broadly two versions of the no phenomenology view.  The first is developed 
by Martin (2004, 2006), and offers a purely epistemic account of hallucination as the 
subject’s being in a state that she cannot know by reflection is not a veridical perception.  
The second is described by Fish, and explains hallucination as a mental state that has the 
same cognitive effects – produces the same beliefs and judgments – as a possible veridical 
experience (2009: 93 ff.).  The two theories are motivated by the same desire to defend 
naïve realism from the argument from hallucination.  However, although they are closely 
related and superficially very similar, I will note some significant differences.  Ultimately, 
however, both theories embrace the same counter-intuitive position and so suffer the same 
weakness, namely that they deny our compelling intuition that hallucinations have a 
substantial quasi-sensory phenomenology.  In other words, they are vulnerable to the 
challenge that they fail to account for the ‘felt reality’ of hallucinatory experiences.  I will 
argue that this challenge is a powerful and compelling one, despite claims by both Martin 
and Fish that their respective accounts can indeed account for the felt reality of 
hallucination. 
 
Let us consider first Martin’s ‘negative epistemic account’ of hallucination.  Whereas 
the theories considered so far have given a positive metaphysical explanation of 
hallucinatory experience – explaining it in terms of the nature of the objects of awareness 
in hallucination – Martin’s account eschews all such metaphysical claims and instead 
asserts that hallucination is fully explicable in terms of certain limitations on our first-
person, reflective knowledge of our own mental states.  On this view, to hallucinate is to be 
in a state that one could not know by reflection alone is not a state of perceiving (Martin 
2004: 76).  Thus, it is a ‘negative epistemic account’ because it is cast entirely in terms of 
what a subject cannot know.  Since Martin denies the possibility of a positive metaphysical 
account of hallucination, it follows that there is nothing in virtue of which the hallucination 
is indiscriminable from a possible perceptual experience.  The standard assumption which 
Martin is anxious to reject is that hallucination possesses, prior to our introspective 
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reflection upon it, some phenomenology that grounds its indiscriminability from some 
possible veridical perceptual experience.  Instead, Martin contends that the 
indiscriminability is not reducible to the occurrence of any other mental properties - the 
hallucination has no mental or psychological properties grounding the indiscriminability.38   
 
It is worth noting Martin’s wider metaphysical commitments in which he sets his 
negative epistemic account.  He is expressly concerned to defend naïve realism while 
respecting what he calls experiential naturalism, namely the idea that sensory experiences 
are part of the natural realm of causes and effects (2004: 39).  In the case of hallucination 
this means that whatever we appeal to in explaining the phenomenon must not include 
influences or constituents from beyond the natural realm (ibid.).   
 
Martin is also particularly concerned to address the plausible possibility of ‘proximally 
causally matching hallucinations’, viz. that the very same kind of brain state might be 
involved in a perceptual experience and a (presumably subjectively indiscriminable) 
hallucination (2004: 53, 71).39  It is crucial to understand why such causally matching 
hallucinations play a central role in Martin’s theory.  Plausibly, there could be 
hallucinations lacking the same proximal causes as possible perceptions – that is, cases in 
which the hallucinating subject’s brain state is different from that involved in any possible 
perception.  Such cases would still count as sensory experiences on Martin’s account 
provided they exhibit the crucial indiscriminability property.  They nonetheless pose a less 
direct challenge to naïve realism than causally matching hallucinations.  Of course, as 
                                                 
38  Importantly, the indiscriminability relation that holds between hallucination and veridical perception is 
not symmetrical.  Martin does offer an overarching definition of visual experience in general – intended 
to embrace both hallucinatory and perceptual experiences – in terms of indiscriminability from possible 
veridical perceptions.  However, although visual perceptions meet this criterion – being indiscriminable 
from themselves – this does not exhaust their nature, which in fact rests on their possessing something 
extra that is lacking from hallucinations, namely genuine phenomenology (Martin 2006: 376).  The 
defining feature of hallucination is thus entirely parasitic on this extra feature of the corresponding 
perceptual experience. 
39  It is implicit in Martin’s assertion of experiential naturalism that perceptual experiences too are caused, 
and he admits that “there does seem to be a causal dependency of our visual perceptions on the activity of 
parts of our brains, even if we do not yet know the full pattern of this dependency” (2004: 54).  However, 
if we assume the relevant causes to be local, e.g. physical states of the subject, and also admit the 
possibility of ‘proximally matching’ hallucination then this is open to the objection that sameness of 
cause entails sameness of effect such that a perceptual experience and its proximally matching 
hallucination must involve the same kind of psychological state or event (Robinson 1994: 154 ff.).  
Martin argues in defence of naïve realism that perceived objects can be both causes and constituents of 
perceptual experiences, where something’s being a constituent is,  in this context, taken to be equivalent 
to its being a necessary condition on the occurrence of the experience (Martin 2004: 55-7; see also Martin 
2006: 368).  An alternative is to take perceptual experiences to be materially constituted by the whole 
physical chain of events linking object and subject, as per the simple metaphysical picture.  It is doubtful 
then whether perceptual experience should be considered a state or event that is caused.  
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described earlier, any non-perceptual experience which seems to possess phenomenology 
brings into play the pressure to find a single, unified account of phenomenology regardless 
of what kind of experience possesses it.  However, proximally causally matching 
hallucinations present an additional and more direct challenge, since here it seems that 
some event or state (in the subject’s brain) is shared by both the hallucinatory and 
perceptual experiences.  If that is so, and this event or state is sufficient for 
phenomenology in the hallucinatory experience, then it ought to be sufficient for 
(presumably matching) phenomenology in the perceptual experience, leaving nothing for 
the ‘naïve realist aspects’ – the direct awareness of worldly objects – to contribute 
phenomenally.  As Martin puts it, the phenomenology yielded by the inner state or event 
common to both hallucination and perception would ‘screen off’ the awareness of worldly 
objects, leaving them no role in explaining the phenomenology in the perceptual case 
(Martin 2004: 62).  It is these cases of causally matching hallucinations, vulnerable to this 
screening-off problem, that motivate and are the key target of Martin’s negative epistemic 
account. 
 
Causally non-matching hallucinations do not present such a direct challenge to the 
naïve realist.  If the hallucinating subject’s brain state is different from that involved in any 
possible perception, then the naïve realist might speculate that this distinctively non-
perceptual brain state somehow ‘generates’ its own phenomenology.  We could in such 
cases attribute the seeming phenomenology to something other than mere 
indiscriminability from possible perceptual experience (to awareness of sense data or 
qualia, for example), and to do so without directly raising the screening-off worry.  This 
would yield a ‘mixed’ account of phenomenology, according to which the phenomenology 
of perceptual experiences is constituted by (awareness of) worldly objects, that of causally 
matching hallucinations is merely apparent, and that of non-matching hallucinations is 
constituted by (awareness of) something other than worldly objects, such as sense-data or 
qualia.  Such a mixed view would avoid the screening-off worry, but would still face the 
objection that it presents a glaringly disunified account of something – phenomenology – 
that appears on reflection to have a common nature across the various categories of 
experience, perceptual and non-perceptual.   
 
A second version of the no phenomenology view is offered by Fish (2009: 93 ff.).  
Fish’s account, like Martin’s, denies that hallucinations possess what he calls ‘robust’ 
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phenomenology.  A hallucination as of an F is, on this view, a state which causes the same 
cognitive acts (beliefs, desires, etc.) as would have been caused by the subject’s veridically 
perceiving an F.  These may include forming certain beliefs about the existence of an F 
before one, as well as the higher order belief that one is indeed veridically perceiving an F.  
Fish takes his account to be a development of Martin’s theory, one which expands on what 
might naturally seem to be the implications of the indiscriminability criterion.  What it is 
for a mental state to be indiscriminable from a possible perceptual experience is, on this 
view, for it to give rise to the same beliefs and judgments as would be produced by that 
perception.40   
 
Martin and Fish’s accounts are, however, more different than this sketch might 
suggest.  To understand the difference, it is helpful to look more closely at what, for 
Martin, is the central kind of case – the proximally causally matching hallucination.  Here, 
we imagine a pair of cases, in both of which the subject’s brain occupies the same kind of 
state.  In the perceptual case this brain state is caused (distally) by the object perceived; in 
the hallucinatory case the brain state is caused (distally) in some other way, such as by an 
electrode-wielding neuroscientist.  Now, although the perceiving and hallucinating subjects 
are in all relevant respects physically identical, the naïve realist assumes that they differ 
mentally in an important respect.  Indeed, the naïve realist may think that they differ to the 
extent that the hallucinating subject is not enjoying a truly mental state at all.  To see why, 
consider that the naïve realist is likely to think that the conscious mental aspects of 
perceptual experience are exhausted by its sensory phenomenology, and that this 
phenomenology is furthermore exhausted by awareness of the worldly objects perceived 
with their perceptible qualities.  In the case of the proximally causally matching 
hallucination there is no awareness of worldly objects, so there is no phenomenology and 
no conscious mental aspects of the experience. 
                                                 
40  As Fish acknowledges, we need to be careful when we talk of ‘same cognitive effects’ in this context.  
While we can assume that a proximally causally matching pair of hallucinatory and perceptual 
experiences would have the same physical effects, it is far from clear that their cognitive effects would be 
the same.  A difference arises if we take these cognitive effects to be mental states (beliefs, for example), 
if we further assume those states to have their content essentially, and also allow that the content of those 
mental states is in at least some instances externally determined.  A pertinent example would be 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects – pertinent especially because a desire to account for the 
possibility of such thoughts is a key motivation for naïve realism in the first place.  If such thoughts are 
externally determined – if their content includes reference to worldly particulars – then the corresponding 
thoughts arising from the proximally causally matching hallucination would lack the singular, object-
dependent element of content, and so be different thoughts.  The members of the perceptual/hallucinatory 
pair would therefore not give rise to all of the same cognitive effects despite their identical physical 
effects (Fish 2009: 94 fn. 13; see also Martin 2004: 63-4; Martin 2013: 42-3). 
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Thus, if the hallucination lacks any positive mental characteristics, as Martin insists, 
then there is indeed nothing positive to say about it in mental terms.  Of course, in setting 
up the case we have acknowledged that we can say something about it in physical terms.  
The pressure to talk about it in psychological terms comes because the subject inevitably 
behaves as though she is enjoying a state with positive mental characteristics – a perceptual 
experience, to be precise.  This similarity of behaviour is inevitable so long as we assume 
some form of determinism since, ex hypothesi, the subject is in the same physical state 
when hallucinating as she would be in if she were perceiving.   
 
Now we can see the difference from Fish’s account.  Fish thinks that we can say 
something positive about hallucination in mental terms: we can say that something is a 
hallucination if it has the same cognitive effects as a possible perceptual experience, or at 
least some relevantly circumscribed subset of those cognitive effects.  Fish in fact goes 
further, and says that a state is not hallucinatory until and unless those cognitive effects 
arise.  In response to Siegel’s objection that we can conceive of a subject having a 
hallucination but without manifesting some or all of the relevant cognitive effects (Siegel 
2008: 217), Fish replies as follows:  
 
It is the presence of the right kinds of cognitive effects that turns an otherwise 
unexceptional mental event into a hallucination.  The hallucination itself has no 
special features at all that could enable us to identify it as a hallucination in the 
absence of the right kinds of effects.  This means that, if cognitively 
sophisticated subjects do not believe they are having an experience of a certain 
kind, then they are simply not hallucinating. 
         Fish 2009: 104 
 
The cognitive effects thus appear on Fish’s view to be constitutive of the hallucinatory 
experience and not merely consequences of it.  A hallucination is therefore a state that 
causes certain cognitive effects, and has those causes essentially.  For Fish, the obtaining 
of the relevant cognitive effects (in the absence of phenomenology) is both necessary and 
sufficient for the occurrence of a hallucination.  This is certainly not Martin’s view – while 
he might accept that a hallucination has some or all of the same mental and/or physical 
effects as a proximally causally matching perceptual experience, he would not treat these 
as constitutive of the hallucination itself.  By restricting himself to a negative epistemic 
criterion for hallucination, Martin does not need to claim that in order to hallucinate a 
subject must exercise any or all of a certain set of beliefs or judgments.   
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For Martin, the occurrence of certain cognitive effects is not sufficient for a state’s 
being a hallucination, since it might be that these effects are caused by a state that is not 
hallucinatory in the required sense, a state in which the subject could know she was not 
perceiving if her powers of reflection were more acute.  Nor should Martin think the 
occurrence of certain cognitive effects necessary for a state’s being a hallucination even if, 
as noted above, we should expect certain beliefs to arise (chiefly, that she is perceiving 
some F).  After all, Martin’s is a modal claim; a subject is hallucinating so long as she 
could not know by reflection alone that she is not perceiving.  It does not require that she 
does in fact come to form a belief to that effect; she may for example, pass out 
immediately after having the hallucination and before she has been able to form any 
relevant judgments.   
 
The obvious objection to both Martin and Fish’s accounts, for all their ingenuity, is 
simply that they fail to do justice to our intuition that hallucinations have genuine, robust 
phenomenology.  In other words, they do not seem adequately to account for the felt reality 
of hallucination.  Plainly, since both Martin and Fish base their account precisely on the 
denial that hallucinations have robust phenomenology, this objection is unlikely to move 
them much.  What’s more, both argue that they can account for the felt reality of 
hallucination without appealing to robust phenomenology.  According to Fish, this is 
explained precisely as the outcome of the subject’s undergoing the same cognitive effects 
as would result from an appropriate perceptual experience.  That is, the hallucination’s 
feeling real is nothing more or less than its being constituted by those cognitive effects – 
for it to feel real is just for the subject to believe that she is perceiving (2009: 97-8).  The 
felt reality of the hallucination is thus parasitic on the felt reality of perceptual experience 
(2009: 109-10).  Understanding the parasitic nature of this relationship avoids the possible 
objection that the cognitive effects, being common to both perception and matching 
hallucination, ought to suffice for the felt reality of the perceptual experience too.  The felt 
reality of perceptual experience is granted by its robust phenomenology – its presentation 
of worldly objects and their qualities – and the cognitive effects in the case of hallucination 
impart a felt reality only by reference to that robust phenomenology.  The hallucination 
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lacks robust phenomenology but the subject nonetheless thinks and acts as though it were 
present.41   
 
Martin similarly argues that his negative epistemic account can explain the felt reality 
of hallucination – as he puts it, the indiscriminability property definitive of (conscious) 
hallucinatory experience can be treated as determining what it’s like for the subject to have 
that experience (2006: 397).42  He rejects the suggestion that the negative epistemic 
account leaves hallucinatory experience as a failure to recognise the absence of 
phenomenology (as a case of “unknown absent qualia” as he puts it), instead arguing that 
we should treat it as a case of phenomenal or sensory consciousness understood in terms of 
the subject’s ‘subjective perspective’ (Martin 2006: 396).  Fish in fact says very much the 
same thing when defending his notion of ‘felt reality’ from Martin’s objections: he says 
that felt reality is not to be construed as something a bit like phenomenology which 
accompanies certain cognitive states, but instead it is intended to capture merely the 
subject’s (misleading) perspective on her own mental state.  It is “intended to express how 
things are for the subject – how things are from the subject’s point of view” (Fish 2013: 
63).  For Martin, this subjective perspective is one characterised negatively, as a limitation 
on what the subject can know about her own mental state, one which is nonetheless 
sufficient, according to Martin, for its seeming to the subject as though she were 
perceiving.  For Fish, the subjective perspective can be characterised positively, as the 
subject’s holding certain beliefs about her mental states, beliefs that she would have had 
were she perceiving.  
 
                                                 
41  Martin argues that Fish’s account of the felt reality of hallucination fails because Fish offers no account 
of what it is in virtue of which hallucinations have the relevant cognitive effects (Martin 2013: 45).  
However, Martin’s own appeal to sameness of proximal neural effects would suffice here: hallucinations 
have the same cognitive effects as possible perceptual experiences in virtue of involving the same kind of 
brain state (see Martin 2013: 46).  Note that appeal to the involvement of a common brain state does not 
require a commitment to that brain state being a ‘realizer’ of either the perceptual or hallucinatory 
experience, contrary to what Martin states here (ibid.). 
42  I have avoided using the phrase ‘what it is like’ in connection with Fish’s theory of hallucination.  In his 
(2013) he states that his definitional use of ‘what it is like’ is tied to the notion of phenomenology, which 
in his account is the assemblage of robust properties of experiences that determine their conscious 
character.  This means, he suggests, that if there is something it is like for the subject to be in a certain 
state then that state has (robust) phenomenology (Fish 2009: 8-11; Fish 2013: 62-3).  The issue is 
somewhat complicated, however, by his use of ‘presentational properties/character’ to denote the 
(assemblage of) properties “that are, or at least seem to be, presented to the subject of experience and 
thereby characterize what it is like to be in the experiential state” (2009: 12; my italics).  It would 
therefore seem open to him to claim that there is something it is like to hallucinate since, although lacking 
phenomenology (there being no robust experiential properties), hallucinations nonetheless possess 
presentational character since they seem to present the subject with properties. 
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Whether or not we find Martin and Fish’s explanations of the felt reality of 
hallucination convincing, we are left with the related problem that both Martin’s and Fish’s 
accounts rule out the most natural explanation of why a hallucinating subject comes to 
entertain the relevant beliefs.  The natural explanation is to say that it is the 
phenomenology of the hallucination that induces the subject to believe that there is an F 
before her.  But on Fish’s account the entertaining of the relevant beliefs is constitutive of 
the hallucination and so cannot be a consequence of it (see Pautz 2013: 30).  On Martin’s 
account, meanwhile, hallucination consists simply in the brute unknowability condition 
which is clearly incapable of explanatorily grounding any claims to knowledge.  For these 
same reasons, it will not do to appeal to the felt reality of hallucination (to use Fish’s term) 
to explain why the relevant beliefs arise, for the fact that it seems to the subject as if she is 
perceiving some F is constituted by the indiscriminability or the relevant cognitive effects 
(as the case may be), and cannot thereby explain them.  Of course, given the nature of their 
accounts, neither Martin nor Fish feels compelled to provide an explanation of the beliefs 
consequent upon (or constitutive of) the hallucination – the hallucination has no substantial 
metaphysical nature that could ground either the beliefs or the explanation.  However, this 
merely adds to the counter-intuitive consequences of denying phenomenology in these 
cases. 
 
Before leaving the no phenomenology view, it is worth remarking on the scope of 
Martin and Fish’s accounts of hallucination.  With their appeal to indiscriminability and 
sameness of cognitive effects, Martin and Fish’s accounts focus on hallucinations that 
seem to ‘match’ possible veridical perceptions; those that they call ‘pure’ or ‘perfect’ 
hallucinations.  We might think that there are all manner of possible hallucinations that are 
nothing like genuine perceptual experiences.  These might include stereotypically 
‘fantastic’ hallucinations involving unworldly juxtapositions of elements (pink elephants, 
for example), as well as the sort of visual experiences sometimes induced by migraine, 
anoxia and certain drugs, often taking the form of geometric patterns appearing to ‘float’ in 
the visual field.  At first sight, it might seem that such cases would not even count as 
sensory experiences given Martin’s definition of sensory experiences (intended to cover 
both perceptual and hallucinatory cases) as any experience that a subject cannot know by 
reflection is not a veridical perception.  (Lucid dreams would seem to offer a good example 
of a sensory experience that is knowable by reflection alone to be a non-perceptual 
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experience – it is precisely definitive of lucid dreams that the subject knows she is 
dreaming, and this despite the vividness of the phenomenal qualities experienced.) 
 
However, both Martin’s and Fish’s accounts arguably have the scope to accommodate 
these kinds of cases as hallucinations.  In Martin’s case, the matter hinges on the scope of 
the ‘by reflection alone’ clause in his definition of sensory experiences in general.  As 
noted earlier, the clause is intended to allow for the possibility that a subject is 
hallucinating and knows that she is not perceiving on account of some background 
knowledge (perhaps she remembers taking the LSD or knows that the friend she is 
hallucinating is currently in another country).  To put it another way, all that would be 
required to show that the subject could not know by reflection alone that she is not 
perceiving would be establish that there could be some perceptual experience, however 
contrived, that matched the hallucination in question.  Even in the case of the hallucinated 
pink elephant or the migraine aura, we could imagine some carefully stage-managed 
scenario in which a perceptual experience could be made to match those experiences.  
Fish’s account lends itself to a similar scope-broadening claim: for him, it hinges on the 
possibility of perceptual experiences that would elicit the same cognitive effects, and the 
possible contrivances just mentioned would do precisely this.43 
 
                                                 
43  In fact, Martin offers an alternative way in which we can accommodate within the general picture those 
hallucinations that might seem obviously hallucinatory on reflection.  Those he mentions include 
hallucinations of impossible scenes (an Escher staircase), novel colours (supersaturated red) and, less 
dramatically, the sorts of partial hallucination in which hallucinated elements are experienced against a 
background scene that is genuinely perceived (2004: 80).  His suggested explanation is that we could 
apply the indiscriminability criterion not to the experience as a whole but to discrete elements of the 
experience (2004: 81).  To take an example, we might know by reflection alone that a hallucination of an 
Escher staircase is not a veridical perception, but we could segment the experience into elements that, 
although impossible when combined a certain way, are potentially veridical when taken in isolation.  Two 
things are worth noting here.  First, which cases are problematic in this respect depends partly on what 
scope we grant to the ‘by reflection alone’ and so whether we think that, e.g., recognising the 
impossibility of an Escher staircase relies on background knowledge.  Second, and more importantly, the 
need for an appeal to experiential segmentation arguably arises because Martin arranges his theory around 
the contrast between hallucination and veridical perception, i.e. leaving illusory perception unaccounted 
for.  If we assume that illusory perceptions can be fully explained by reference to how things are in the 
worldly scene before the subject, then there should be no reason for Martin not to broaden his central 
claim so that the concept of a sensory experience is general is of an experience that is indiscriminable 
from a possible perception, irrespective of whether that perception is veridical or illusory.  This would 
allow us to explain the hallucination of an Escher staircase in terms of the experience’s indiscriminability 
from a perception of a drawing of an Escher staircase or a carefully crafted model of the same, even if we 
consider these to be illusory perceptions.  It is unclear what to say of the supersaturated red case, although 
it is not obviously explained either by Martin’s appeal to segmenting experience into discrete elements, 
since it is unclear how we could separate a hallucinatory experience of novel colour into discrete 
‘elements’. 
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To conclude this section, we have seen that the no phenomenology view seeks to 
avoid the problems consequent upon any attempt to give a positive explanation of 
phenomenology in terms of awareness of something other than worldly objects.  However, 
in so doing, its central claim runs counter to our intuitive commitment to the notion that 
hallucinations can have a substantial felt reality grounded in genuine awareness of 
properties.  In the next section I will describe an alternative account of hallucination, based 
on the simple metaphysical picture, which promises to avoid the argument from 
hallucination while acknowledging that hallucinations have robust phenomenology. 
 
 
4.6   A simple metaphysical picture of hallucination 
 
On the face of it, the simple metaphysical picture might seem worse than useless for 
explaining hallucination.  Its explanation for the object-involving nature of perceptual 
experience works by taking what is standardly treated as a cause of the experience and 
treating it instead as a constituent of the experience – by taking the experience to be, not a 
mental and/or physical event within the subject, but the process that culminates in some 
physical event within the subject.  But in the case of hallucination we assume that this 
involves an experience that expressly lacks a real worldly object.  It would thus appear that 
the simple metaphysical picture is useless to serve the explanatory purpose it serves in 
respect of perceptual experience, where it identifies the elements of phenomenology with 
real worldly constituents of the perceptual process.   
 
Invoking the simple metaphysical picture might indeed seem to make matters worse if 
we further assume that the brain state involved in hallucination must have some causal 
antecedents – psychedelic drugs or a devious neuroscientist wielding electrodes, perhaps.  
Applying the simple metaphysical picture to such cases generates the puzzle why the 
hallucinatory experience is not ostensibly of those causal antecedents (assuming it isn’t) – 
why, in other words, the drugs, the scientist or the electrodes do not feature as elements of 
the hallucinatory phenomenology.     
 
I will argue, however, that the simple metaphysical picture can underpin a positive 
account of hallucinatory phenomenology after all.  It does so by showing how we might 
reject the first assumption, namely that hallucination lacks a real worldly object.  The core 
idea is that a hallucinatory experience as of an F might in fact be constituted by a process 
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in which an F is a causal determinant of the subject’s hallucinatory brain state.44  Of 
course, this is much the same sort of claim that the simple metaphysical picture makes for 
perceptual experience – that a perceptual experience of an F is constituted by the process 
in which that F visually affects the subject.  The difference is not that the hallucinatory 
experience lacks the F as a constituent, but that the process linking the F and the subject is, 
in some important respect, atypical. 
 
Consider, for example, a typical case of visual experience – of seeing a cat, say.  The 
subject’s seeing the cat involves a process in which the cat causally influences the subject 
(most pertinently her brain state) via appropriate causal intermediaries (reflected light, 
retinal states, optic nerve firing, etc.).  This is not yet to say anything about the nature of 
the experience itself.  According to the causal theory of perception, this experience is the 
final upshot of the causal process described, leaving a question mark over the relationship 
between the phenomenology of the experience and the object perceived (the cat) which is 
merely a cause of the experience.  The simple metaphysical picture purports to avoid this 
puzzle by claiming that the ‘experience’ is nothing more or less than the experiencing, 
which is an active relation of awareness holding between subject and object and which is 
describable in physical terms as a process of a certain sort.  This allows us to envisage a 
straightforward relationship between the phenomenology of perceiving and the worldly 
objects perceived: the former is simply a matter of how those objects’ qualities are arrayed 
within the subject’s field of view. 
 
Now consider a case in which the subject hallucinates a cat.  For simplicity’s sake, let 
us suppose that the subject hallucinates her pet cat Oscar.  What does the phenomenology 
consist of in this case?  I suggest that, as in the perceptual case, the relevant element of the 
hallucination’s phenomenology is nothing other than Oscar himself.  Of course Oscar is 
not seen, and we shall assume that Oscar is not currently located within the subject’s 
potential field of view.  In fact, let us assume that Oscar is in fact dead and buried.  It 
might seem therefore that our subject cannot be standing in any kind of relation to Oscar 
now.  However, this would be too hasty: it is perfectly possible that the subject is currently 
standing in some (causal and/or psychological) relationship to Oscar as he was at some 
                                                 
44  The proposal here is structurally identical to that made by Manzotti in what he calls his ‘process-oriented 
view of perception’ (2008: 187-8), although the upshot is metaphysically quite different.  As I explained 
in chapter 1, Manzotti claims that phenomenal qualities are constituted by perceptual processes, whereas I 
claim that phenomenal qualities are, at least in many ‘good’ cases of perception, where they seem to be, 
inhering in worldly objects. 
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time in the past when he was alive.  That is precisely what I suggest – just as in the 
perceptual case, the subject’s physical state, and in particular her brain state, is 
appropriately (i.e. visually) a causal consequence of Oscar, albeit as he was at some time 
significantly past rather than in the present.  How can this be?  Since Oscar is dead and 
gone, and since his effects in structuring the distribution of reflected light in the subject’s 
environment have long since dissipated, we must look inside the subject’s physiology for 
any residual effects of Oscar.  From here the story plausibly looks something like this: the 
structure of the subject’s brain retains the effects of Oscar as, inter alia, some visual 
memory trace.  The details of how this might work physiologically are unimportant, 
provided that the subject’s brain has some physical properties that would be lacking in the 
counterfactual scenario in which she had never seen Oscar, and which embody information 
about Oscar’s visible qualities.  Next we suppose that, for some reason, this memory trace 
becomes ‘activated’ in such a way that it interacts causally with other brain states of the 
subject that are involved in reflective awareness and belief formation.  Typically this sort 
of interaction would amount to the subject’s enjoying a visual memory of Oscar and 
recognising her mental state as such.  However, for whatever reason, on the occasion in 
question the subject forms the erroneous belief that Oscar is not merely recalled but is 
actually seen, perhaps because the activation of the memory trace results in an unusually 
vivid visual recollection of Oscar.  The subject is now hallucinating; it seems to her that 
she is seeing Oscar. 
 
It is implicit here that at least some kinds of memory – specifically, episodic or 
‘imagistic’ memories – are quasi-sensory experiences with (perhaps vague or indistinct) 
phenomenology, and that this phenomenology is to be explained via an extension of the 
simple metaphysical picture.  Extending the simple metaphysical picture amounts to 
claiming that there is nothing more to (perceptually or ‘imagistically’) remembering 
something than one’s standing in a certain relation of (delayed or deviated) awareness to 
that thing, a relation fully describable in physical terms as a process involving, inter alia, 
the object’s sensorily affecting the subject.  As I have explained it, this effect will include 
the establishment of appropriate ‘memory traces’, and the ‘reactivation’ of these memory 
traces’ in such a way as to restore the subject’s conscious access to some of that object’s 
perceptible qualities.   
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Weir and Manzotti separately propose just this account of experiential memory as part 
of their ‘ultra-realist’ and ‘process-oriented’ theories of perception, respectively.  Manzotti 
explicitly describes memory precisely as ‘delayed awareness’ effected via persistent 
modifications to the brain resulting from earlier perceptual encounters, i.e. memory traces 
(Manzotti 2006: 26-7).  In Weir’s terms, the reactivation of memory traces in the brain 
“bind[s] earlier objects and properties once more into situations” (Weir 2004: 120).  Both 
Weir and Manzotti exploit this account of memory in order to explain hallucination   
 
Note that the appeal to memory in explaining hallucination is plausible independently 
of applying the simple metaphysical picture.  The thought is just that in all actual cases of 
hallucination, the phenomenology depends on and borrows from that of our past 
experiences, if not wholesale then at least in terms of its constituent elements.  Importantly, 
as both Weir and Manzotti point out, the possibility that hallucinatory phenomenology is 
sometimes ‘assembled’ out of elements of disparate perceptual experiences allows the 
account to explain not only memory-based ‘snapshots’ of previously perceived scenes but 
also the more fantastic or bizarre hallucinations that we might think of as stereotypical (see 
Weir 2004: 122-3; Manzotti 2008: 188).  To use Manzotti’s example, we might hallucinate 
a pink elephant despite never having seen such a thing because we have nonetheless seen 
diverse pink things and elephants.  The subject’s having the hallucination is due to the 
convergence of multiple processes originating variously in pink things and elephants, such 
that when the respective memory traces are reactivated their objects seem to coexist 
spatially, or rather the recollected quality of pinkness seems to qualify the elephant 
(Manzotti 2008: 188).45  Or, as Weir puts it, the activation of the subject’s memory trace 
binds diverse objects and qualities previously perceived into novel situations in which they 
may appear juxtaposed in ways never previously encountered (Weir 2004: 122-3). 
 
The notion that the more fantastic hallucinations are ‘assembled’ by way of the joint 
re-presentation of diverse objects previously perceived might seem unattractively 
complicated.  However, it is worth recognising that a similar complexity is likely to attend 
any alternative account of hallucination, even one rejecting the natural view in favour of, 
say, intentionalism.  Suppose, for example, that one were to hold that hallucination results 
                                                 
45  Note that, whereas Weir’s account of memory and hallucination is set within the context of a theory 
consistent with the natural view, Manzotti’s account holds that phenomenal qualities are themselves 
identical to the whole perceptual process involving subject and object, and so are not taken specifically to 
qualify the worldly object perceived. 
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from the inappropriate activation of ‘perceptual capacities’ that normally function to single 
out and recognise objects of a certain sort (Schellenberg 2013).  Presumably, then, to 
explain a hallucination of a pink, winged elephant we must invoke the simultaneous 
activation of perceptual capacities for, variously, pinkness, wings and elephants.  Not only 
that, but we must explain how the pinkness, wings and elephant components come to 
appear as combined in the appropriate fashion; in other words, mere simultaneity of 
activation of each perceptual capacity is not enough, else the subject might equally 
hallucinate an ordinary-looking elephant next to some unattached wings and a ‘floating’ 
patch of pinkness.  In my own explanation of hallucination I have not offered a specific 
explanation of this apparent conjoinedness – my point is merely that it no more (and 
perhaps no less) faces this challenge than rival theories of hallucination. 
 
I should acknowledge that, even if it seems plausible to appeal to memory in 
explaining hallucination, one might find it harder to swallow the claim that a past event or 
state of an object could be a constituent of an experience had now.  It is worth noting, 
however, that this implication already falls from the simple metaphysical picture even as it 
is applied to perceptual experience.  The perceptual process is of course a temporally 
extended chain of events such that what is perceived is always the object as it was prior to 
the moment of successful perception, assuming that the event of successfully perceiving is 
no earlier than the onset of the brain event caused by the object perceived.46  In most 
ordinary situations this lapse of time between the event perceived and the act of perceiving 
is negligible, but there are perfectly everyday (if not quite mundane) perceptual 
experiences that involve a very substantial time gap.  For example, to see the Sun is to see 
it as it was roughly eight minutes ago, given that this is the time it takes for the Sun’s light 
to reach the Earth.  We can see some other stars as they were thousands of years ago, so 
that we can, as it were, look back to a time long before we were born.  This suggestion that 
a visual experience we are having now could take as a constituent some event that 
happened thousands of years ago is likely to seem ludicrous, although this reaction follows 
from taking ‘experiences’ to be (‘mental’) states of the subject, a notion that I have 
rejected.  Suffice it to say for now that the awareness of past objects or events is a general 
                                                 
46  In this respect, we often use ‘perceiving’ in its more specific cognates (e.g. ‘seeing’) to denote an 
achievement on the part of the subject, something that is datable roughly to the onset of the relevant effect 
on the subject’s brain.  Seeing in this sense is not to be equated with the visual experience, which takes 
the worldly object as a constituent and is, according to the simple metaphysical picture, not the outcome 
of the perceptual process but the process itself. 
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consequence of the simple metaphysical picture and not one required only by its account of 
hallucination as I present it here. 
 
We should admit, all the same, that the nature of the time delay in cases of 
hallucination is somewhat different to that involved in, for example, seeing distant celestial 
objects.  In the case of hallucination I have suggested that the delay is not to do with 
transmission of the perceptual medium (light, sound, etc.) across large distances, but is 
instead a feature of the memory-based mechanism proposed.  Accordingly, the delay 
results from ‘storage’ of what was originally a perceptual effect in the form of a persistent 
change in the structure and/or function of the brain (the ‘laying down of a memory trace’, 
as we might put it).  The causal relation holding between object and subject in 
hallucination therefore has this added complication or convolution when compared with 
the mere temporally drawn-out nature of the causal relation in cases of stargazing.   
 
Even if we grant the claim that hallucinations are not unique or special in involving 
past events or objects, we might still wonder what it is about certain time-delay cases 
(seeing the Andromeda galaxy) that makes them count as instances of perception, while 
others (having a vision of Oscar) are treated as hallucination.  The first thing to say here is 
that we should not expect necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing perceptual 
from hallucinatory experiences, any more than we should for distinguishing memory and 
hallucination.  A key purpose of applying the simple metaphysical picture to hallucinatory 
experiences is precisely to show that they occupy some vaguely-bounded region of a 
continuum also occupied by perceptions and episodic memories, thus allowing us to offer a 
unified explanation for the phenomenology possessed by all such experiences.   
 
Nonetheless, we do have some more or less common-sense basis for our ordinary 
judgments about whether an experience is perceptual or hallucinatory, just as we do for the 
analogous judgment about hallucination versus memory.  For one thing, there is a question 
of directness: we expect perception to give us relatively direct awareness of objects, e.g. by 
the uninterrupted transmission of light from object to eye.  Note that we shouldn’t hesitate 
to say that we see the Andromeda galaxy directly when we look straight at it, even though 
the light has travelled for two-and-a-half million years to reach us, such that we are seeing 
the galaxy as it was two-and-a-half million years ago.  After all, there is no more direct 
way to see it (although admittedly our ordinary attachment to the immediacy of seeing 
114 
 
 
 
might be strained here).  The more interrupted or convoluted this transmission becomes, 
the less inclined we will be to call a case one of perception.  Where the convolution is 
merely a matter of our seeing something via a reflection – the light bouncing off a mirror 
on its way between object and eye – we may be happy still to treat this as a case of 
perception.  Less so once the transmission is mediated by television cameras, radio signals 
and TV sets, and less still once transmission is delayed through the storage of images on 
video recorders or indeed through the laying down of ‘memory traces’ in the brain as in the 
mechanism proposed for hallucination. 
 
With cases like television viewing, another feature besides directness comes into play, 
namely fidelity.  By ‘fidelity’ I mean the degree to which an experience accurately and 
completely presents the perceptually available elements of a scene.  Some experiences will 
be treated as poor cases of perception because of some ‘loss of signal’, as when our vision 
is blurry immediately upon waking.  More relevant to the distinction between perception 
and hallucination would be those cases of, on the one hand, partial hallucination, and on 
the other, fantastic hallucination.  In the former case, the phenomenology includes more 
than the elements (objects and qualities) that are actually present within the environment in 
front of the subject.  In the latter case, these extraneous elements are also juxtaposed with 
each other in ways that the subject has never seen, or indeed ways in which they may never 
have been juxtaposed at all, perceived or not. 
 
A third feature relevant to the perception/hallucination distinction is the experience’s 
contribution to a subject’s powers to track worldly objects: when an object is 
straightforwardly seen the subject is typically in a position to track the object visually.  In 
other words, changes in the visible qualities of the object (including its location as well as 
features like colour, reflectance, etc.) will, for as long as the subject is seen, correspond 
with changes in the subject’s experience.  In the hallucinatory case, meanwhile, we needn’t 
expect changes in the subject’s experience to correspond to actual changes in the object 
hallucinated, even if the hallucination were to take a single particular as its object.  It could 
be, of course, that some hallucination takes the form of a faithful recollection of some 
previously perceived event, unfolding in the same sequence and with the same lapse of 
time as when originally perceived.  In such a case, both the fidelity and tracking criteria are 
met, but the directness is not – the event was tracked more closely in the original 
perceptual experience. 
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Paradigmatic cases of perceiving, then, would be experiences in which our awareness 
of an object and its qualities is as direct as possible, and as complete and accurate as our 
perspective permits, and which enable us to track changes in the object.  Paradigmatic 
cases of hallucinating would include those that meet none of these criteria.  Many cases 
will fall in the middle and may elicit uncertain judgments about their classification as 
perception or hallucination.  To repeat, it is not claimed that we can find here any 
necessary or sufficient conditions for either perception or hallucination, and by which we 
might sharply distinguish them.  No such sharp distinction is to be expected since the same 
metaphysical underpinning is proposed to explain both kinds of experience. 
 
We can offer similar observations to underscore our ordinary distinction between 
hallucination and (episodic) memory, as between hallucination and perception.  What 
marks the difference between episodic memory and hallucination might include the 
vividness of the experience, the degree to which it is felt to arise voluntarily, and the 
degree to which it is mistaken for a perceptual experience.  Again, we needn’t look among 
these dimensions for some necessary or sufficient conditions for being a memory rather 
than a hallucination or vice versa.  Since both admit of the same metaphysical explanation 
we can be content to allow that experiences might exist on a continuum between full-
blown hallucination (vivid, unbidden and confused for reality) and obvious memory 
(indistinct, willed and recognised as recollection).  For example, although forming the 
belief that one is perceiving is a typical consequence of many hallucinations, it is far from 
necessary; a subject can hallucinate knowingly, i.e. with insight into the non-perceptual 
nature of the phenomenology of her experience.   
 
 
4.7   Dreams and other quasi-hallucinatory phenomena 
 
It should be obvious that the simple metaphysical picture might form the basis for a 
similar explanation other experiential phenomena that we might loosely describe as 
hallucinatory, such as dreams, sensory imagination, after-images, and so on (see Manzotti 
2008: 185 ff.).  The examples I cited when discussing the no phenomenology view 
included phenomena such as migraine auras and the sort of geometrical or fantastic 
imagery arising through anoxia and certain forms of intoxication.  Here the hallucination is 
often not one in which the subject seems to be aware of concrete objects, but one in which 
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there seem to be ‘free-floating’ patterns of colours that may not even appear to reside in the 
environment perceived.  Such cases might be described as involving visual sensation rather 
than perception. 
 
Since such hallucinations do not appear to acquaint us with a familiar object, or even a 
more or less simple ‘patchwork’ of (bits of) familiar objects (as with Manzotti’s pink 
elephant), a simple appeal to memory-mediated awareness of previously perceived objects 
might seem less promising.  Nonetheless, the same form of explanation does still suffice.  
Imagine a case in which subject S has a hallucination in which a circular grid of red lines 
occupies the centre of her field of vision.  Let us further suppose that this hallucination is 
associated with some pattern of neural activity in the visual cortex of her brain (cf. ffytche 
et al. 1998).  Although this pattern of neural activity, taken as a whole, has presumably 
never been associated with a perceptual experience, and is therefore not tantamount to the 
reactivation of a specific memory trace, we might plausible suppose that the structure and 
activity of each of the individual neurons involved, their connections to one another, and 
the structure and activity of the relevant brain region as a whole, have been influenced 
causally by the innumerable visual experiences that the subject has enjoyed and which 
have involved that brain region.  In other words, the structure and functioning of that 
region is a causal consequence of both the genetically determined development of the brain 
since the subject’s conception and the diverse ‘traces’ left behind by its visual interactions 
with the subject’s environment over its lifetime so far.  Then, when some local cause 
(oxygen deprivation or a psychedelic drug, say) sparks the relevant pattern of visual 
cortical activity, that activity is also an effect of diverse objects previously encountered 
perceptually.  We might speculate that, in the example proposed, a feature common to 
many or most of these previously seen objects is their possessing the colour red; the 
activated neurons might be ones whose pattern of activity in hallucination is what it is as a 
result of their previous activation by the redness of perceived objects.  Thus, when 
activated in hallucination, their precise form of activation is a causal product not just of 
whatever proximal causes brought about the hallucinatory brain state but also of more 
distal causes, crucially including the red objects previously perceived.  It is the 
‘reawakening’ of the visual-causal link between the subject and these red objects that 
accounts for the red qualities of awareness in the hallucination.47 
                                                 
47  It is a further question how many, and which, previously seen red objects one is thereby aware of.  If we 
think of the awareness relation in causal terms it is easier to see how there might be a matter of fact here, 
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We can approach the problem from a different direction if we return to the contention 
that migraine auras, after-images and the like involve visual sensation rather than 
perception.  Here, one line of thought antagonistic to the natural view might be that if we 
can treat such cases as involving sensation rather than perception and further acknowledge 
that these present genuine phenomenal qualities, then we ought to treat paradigmatic 
perceptions as also composed ultimately of sensations, albeit sensations that we ‘project’ 
onto the world or construe as worldly things and qualities.  The proponent of the natural 
view should here turn the argument on its head, however.  We can imagine a situation 
where someone blind from birth has his sight restored, and in which this formerly blind 
subject is at first unable to make sense of the shifting arrangement of visually-apprehended 
qualities now presented to him.  We could of course take this as introspective evidence for 
the claim that perceptions are constructed from sensations.  However, we could equally 
interpret the situation as one in which the subject is simply unable to correctly ‘place’ the 
objects or qualities of which he is now aware.   
 
What I suggest is happening in cases of migraine auras, after-images and the like is 
that subjects are likewise unable accurately to locate the objects or qualities of which they 
are aware.  However, in such cases the inability reflects no inexperience or lack of skill on 
the part of the subjects, as it does in the case of the formerly blind subject attending to the 
scene before him.  In after-images (or, equally, migraine auras or geometric hallucinations) 
we are given no clues as to the location of the qualities of which we are aware.  In normal 
perception, the worldly qualities occupy a more or less stable location relative to the 
subject and to each other, and – at least for things close at hand – share the same space and 
time.  Some hallucinations too might give us clues regarding the worldly spatial and 
temporal location of the hallucinated qualities, as when the hallucination is effectively a 
highly vivid memory image or ‘flashback’ to some specific event.  Migraine auras and the 
like are limit cases in which the arrangement of qualities is so thoroughly ‘shuffled’ that 
reconstruction or recognition of their original spatial or temporal location is all but 
impossible. 
 
                                                 
assuming some principled means of establishing the causal influence of any previously seen red object on 
the form of the hallucinatory brain state. 
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After-images comprise an especially interesting class of quasi-hallucinatory 
phenomena, whose explanation via the simple metaphysical picture is a little more 
complicated than those discussed so far.  After-images result from the visual system’s 
adaptation to prolonged exposure to a single colour stimulus.48  They are explained as 
arising mainly as a consequence of the opponent structure of visual processing, allied to 
the phenomenon of ‘neural rebound’, whereby nerve cells caused by a stimulus to enter 
one state (excitatory or inhibitory) will ‘rebound’ into the opposite state when the stimulus 
is withdrawn (De Valois & De Valois 1997: 127).  Accordingly, a neuron that responds 
ultimately to a red stimulus by entering an excitatory state will rebound into an inhibitory 
state when the red stimulus is withdrawn.  As it happens, it is a feature of the opponent 
structure of the visual system that this inhibitory state is the neuron’s normal response to a 
green stimulus (ibid.).  The upshot, then, is that prolonged viewing of a red object will, 
when abruptly terminated, cause the subject’s brain to enter a state that is otherwise caused 
by the viewing of green objects.  According to the account I have proposed, consistently 
with the natural view, this reaction will not be sufficient for the appearance of green 
enjoyed by the subject.  For this the subject must be aware of some actual instances of 
greenness.  To deliver that, we must suppose that the subject’s ‘rebound’ brain state is not 
only an effect of the (proximal)) red object but also an effect of previously seen green 
objects.  And that will require an explanation like the generic one offered above, whereby 
the rebound state of the relevant brain region bears some ‘trace’ of previous causal 
interactions between that brain region and green objects.   
 
Admittedly, this explanation leaves much unsaid about how or why traces should be 
left.  However, this sort of explanation of after-images appears to be what is required if we 
are to retain the natural view along with naïve realism’s explanatory virtue; that is, if we 
are to explain the phenomenology of after-images by appeal to awareness of actual 
instances of the relevant colours.  As we will see in chapter 6, there are good reasons to 
doubt that this explanatory virtue, and naïve realism more generally, can hold in the face of 
some other phenomena of colour perception.  In chapter 7 I will consider the implications 
of this for the natural view. 
 
                                                 
48  I am concerned here with negative after-images, i.e. those of a colour complementary to the original 
stimulus.  Positive after-images, i.e. of the same colour as the stimulus, are also possible, but are elicited 
by different means (De Valois & De Valois 1997: 126). 
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In the meantime, we might press the simple metaphysical picture into service in 
explaining a puzzling form of illusion that I mentioned in chapter 3.5, namely motion-
induced colour, as in Benham’s Disk.  In that chapter I promised to offer an explanation 
borrowing the account of hallucination.  The explanation here might be related to the one 
offered above for simple geometric hallucination.  So, we might imagine that the rapidly 
rotating or flickering black and white pattern elicits, by some physiological quirk of the 
visual system, certain neural effects that are not normally induced by black and white 
stimuli but which in fact are more typically induced by things of the illusory colour (red 
and green, say).  When the disk spins fast enough, then, a certain effect is brought about 
which is constrained in its form by neural modifications brought about by previous visual 
encounters with red and green things.  The effect in question therefore reawakens the 
visual-causal links to those previously perceived red and green things and so brings their 
redness and greenness into the subject’s awareness.   
 
This account raises an interesting question.  Since the neural activation is now the 
effect of a spinning or flickering black and white object, we might wonder whether this 
object is ‘in competition’ with the more distal causes (red and green things) for a dominant 
role in phenomenology.  If a subject were granted innumerable Benham’s Disk viewings 
but deprived of coloured objects, would the neural effect come to be constrained causally 
more by the (recent) encounters with the disk and less by the increasingly historical 
encounters with red and green things?  If so, we ought to expect the illusory colour to fade 
from the disk experience.  Certainly, if the simple metaphysical picture explanation is 
correct, we should expect that a subject with normal vision but deprived of colour 
experience since birth would not be aware of any chromatic colour when exposed to 
Benham’s Disk.  We might in fact expect that such a subject would, if exposed to 
something red or green for the first time, have an experience whose phenomenology was in 
part constituted by previously perceived spinning or flickering black and white patterns, in 
a reversal of the normal illusion.49 
 
 
                                                 
49  One alternative explanation of the Benham’s Disk illusion might be to argue that it is not an illusion at all, 
and that the disk is coloured when spun fast enough.  We are likely to reject this on the empirical grounds 
that we find no difference in the physical surface properties (including spectral reflectance) when the disk 
is spun, and therefore we would lose any explanatory link between the measurable properties of the object 
and its observable colour.  However, as I will explain in chapter 6, this explanatory link is one that is 
loosened by consideration of certain other features of colour and colour perception. 
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4.8   Missing and impossible colours 
 
The account I have proposed in this chapter seeks to explain what it’s like to 
hallucinate by appeal to the awareness of previously perceived objects (their ‘re-
presentation’, as I put it).  Now, however, the account faces a problem with the possibility 
of one’s hallucinating, imagining or illusorily perceiving qualities that one has never 
perceived before – such as Hume’s missing shade of blue (Hume 2007: 14-15) – or 
qualities that are in fact not instantiated anywhere, such as ‘supersaturated red’ (Johnston 
2004: 141-2) and impossible-sounding binary hues like reddish-green and blueish-yellow 
(Crane & Piantanida 1983; Billock & Tsou 2010).   
 
Usefully, the explanation of the subject’s awareness admits of a different explanation 
in each case.  One can be understood as a case of illusion (‘impossible’ binary hues), 
another as a case of partial hallucination (supersaturated red), and the third as a more 
complex act of perceptual imagination (the missing shade of blue).  We can take these in 
turn. 
 
The awareness of ‘impossible’ binary hues can be explained as a form of illusion, 
namely as misleading awareness of qualities actually instantiated before the subject.  
Subjects can be made to see reddish-green and yellowish-blue by presenting subjects with 
adjacent vertical stripes of opposing colours (red and green, or blue and yellow) and by 
stabilising the boundary between the stripes on the subjects’ retinas by means of eye-
tracking devices (Crane & Piantanida 1983; Billock & Tsou 2010).  In the earlier 
experiments, subjects variously reported a single uniform field of colour, a granular array 
of small patches of each distinct colour, or larger ‘islands’ of one colour against a 
background of the other (Crane & Piantanida 1983: 1079).  Later researchers discovered 
that the patchy appearance of grains or islands can be eliminated by using adjacent colours 
of equal luminance (Billock & Tsou 2010).  This leaves the appearance of a uniform field 
of colour that is neither solely one colour nor another, which is the reddish green or 
yellowish blue of interest.  Subjects vary, nonetheless, in their description of this colour 
field.  Some find it difficult to describe, while recognising that it is coloured in some way.  
Most, however, describe them as simultaneously red and green or blue and yellow (Crane 
& Piantanida 1983: 1079).  There remains some variation in how this simultaneity appears 
to manifest: in some cases as a gradient from, say, pure red at one side to pure green at the 
other, and in between a continuous range of greenish reds through reddish greens; others 
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see red and green fields as if superimposed on one another but at different depths; while 
others see just a uniform field of reddish green (Billock & Tsou 2010).  It is clear that in at 
least some of these cases the subjects take themselves to be aware of both green and red at 
the same time.  In other cases, this is less clear, and the authors seem to suggest that 
reddish green can sometimes appear as a single, uniform and unfamiliar colour and not just 
an amalgam of two familiar colours, perhaps in the way that purple can be understood as a 
mixture of blue and red without appearing simultaneously blue and red. 
 
Regardless of which appearance results, Billock & Tsou conclude that although the 
subjects might be said to perceive ‘new’ colours, these remain “compounds of familiar 
colors” (2010).  This would suggest that the outcome is consistent with the natural view 
that the phenomenology is wholly explicable as awareness of qualities instantiated in the 
subject’s environment.  Certainly, it is crucial to recognise that what is going on actual 
cases of seeing ‘reddish-green’ is genuine perception, albeit illusory perception.  There is 
therefore no doubt that subjects are in fact simultaneously seeing red and green as if they 
were occupying the same region of the field of view (but perhaps as if they were at 
different depths).  That this should look strange is no surprise once we acknowledge that 
seeing red and green as co-located in this way, but without them interfering with one 
another, is normally impossible.  If all awareness of reddish green is illusory it is because 
red and green are never co-instantiated in worldly objects, but this does not preclude our 
being aware of red and green as if they were co-located. 
 
Awareness of another ‘impossible’ colour – supersaturated red – admits of a different 
explanation, one which appeals not just to awareness of qualities currently instantiated 
before the subject but also to awareness of qualities previously perceived.  This case is 
therefore better classed as a partial hallucination than an illusion.  Supersaturated red is an 
unnaturally intense or vivid shade of red which subjects appear to see when they look at an 
ordinary red object after first looking at a bright source of pure green light.  In effect, the 
subjects experience a red after-image ‘superimposed’ on the red object, and the appearance 
of unnaturally vivid, ‘supersaturated’ red is the result (Johnston 2004: 141-2).  Again, the 
supposed problem for the natural view is that supersaturated red is a colour that is never in 
fact instantiated in the world.  As such, it might seem to elude the explanation offered for 
hallucination, viz. by appeal to actual qualities previously perceived.  However, here again 
we can offer an explanation of this sort after all.  We might explain awareness of 
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supersaturated red as resulting from simultaneous awareness of multiple instances of 
redness as if they were co-located or superimposed.  Given the mechanism of inducing the 
experience, this is expressly just what is going on, at least if we accept that enjoying a red 
after-image involves one’s being aware of redness.  I explained the latter as awareness of 
previously perceived instances of redness.  As such, the actual red objects of which the 
subject is aware, in having the experience of supersaturated red, are not co-located in time 
and need not be co-located in space.  One of the red objects is currently before the subject, 
but the other red objects – those contributing constitutively to the after-image – are objects 
seen at different times and most likely in different places. 
 
Although we might thus explain supersaturated red in terms of the simultaneous 
awareness of different instances of redness, we should acknowledge that this is quite a 
peculiar form of simultaneous awareness of redness.  Supersaturated red is not typically 
seen when, for example, we mix two lots of red paint, or view a red object through red 
lenses, or cross our eyes so that two red patches, each seen with a different eye, appear to 
overlap in our field of vision.  Rather, this is a peculiar situation in which we are, as it were 
with each eye, simultaneously aware of two separate instances of redness as if co-located, a 
sort of ‘double awareness’ that is impossible via genuine perception.  The result is not a 
novel hue but a familiar hue manifesting abnormal saturation or intensity. 
 
The crucial question, ultimately, is not whether novel colours like reddish green or 
supersaturated red can really be instantiated in worldly objects but whether the appearance 
of those colours can be explained solely by reference to worldly objects and their 
perceptible qualities.  The simple metaphysical picture offers us a way to answer this 
positively. 
 
We might similarly offer a positive explanation of the possibility, entertained by 
Hume, that a subject might imagine a colour she has never seen before.  Here Hume 
imagines a subject who has encountered all manner of colours, including many shades of 
blue, but who has never encountered one particular shade of blue.  Hume considers it 
plausible to assume that the subject will nonetheless be able to imagine this ‘missing’ 
shade (Hume 2007: 14-15).  Here, we should understand ‘imagine’ in terms of Hume’s 
notions of ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’, and so as involving a kind of awareness of the 
missing shade of blue that is ‘less lively’ than perception of an actual instance of that shade 
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(ibid.: 17-18).  If we are to accommodate this possibility consistently with the natural view 
we might explain it via the simple metaphysical picture more or less along the lines of 
imagination more generally, viz. as some sort of ‘rearrangement’ of qualities previously 
perceived.  In this case, the relevant qualities will be other shades of blue, as well as other 
colours depending on just where the ‘missing’ shade lies along a spectrum of possible 
colours.  To see how this works, we can reflect on the observation that the various colours 
can be understood as either ‘pure’ (‘unique’) or ‘mixed’ (‘binary’).  The former include 
those colours – certain shades of red, green, blue and yellow – which do not appear to have 
any hint of each other.  The mixed or binary colours, conversely, are those in which there 
appears to be some discernible hint of more than one colour, such as a bluish-green (see 
e.g. Allen 2010a, Tye 2006).  On this model, the imagining of Hume’s missing shade of 
blue can be understood as the ‘remixing’ of pure hues previously perceived, just as 
imagining (or hallucinating) a pink elephant involves the rearrangement of elements 
previously perceived separately.  If there is a difference between the missing shade of blue 
and the pink elephant, it is that the latter seems more obviously to involve a simple 
juxtaposition of previously disparate elements.  The missing shade of blue, meanwhile, is a 
uniform and novel colour rather than a juxtaposition of, say, yellows and blues previously 
seen.  The account therefore relies on the assumption that we really can understand the 
missing shade of blue as being composed of two familiar colours, rather than being 
irreducibly a novel colour in its own right.  It is not obvious how we could settle this 
definitively.  Nor, however, is it obvious that Hume is right to think that a subject could 
imagine a colour never before seen. 
 
 
4.9   Which constituents of the perceptual process are perceived? 
 
Having seen the view spelled out with a variety of examples, we can now revisit my 
acknowledgement at the start of this chapter that, as a means of explaining hallucination, 
the simple metaphysical picture might appear useless, if not worse than useless.  The mere 
uselessness was supposed to follow from the clash between the claim (consistent with the 
simple metaphysical picture) that hallucinations are object-involving experiences in 
essentially the same way as perceptual experiences, and the standard characterisation of 
hallucinations as object-less experiences.  With the simple metaphysical picture-based 
account laid out we can now see that this prima facie objection is without merit – an 
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object-involving account of hallucination can be given while retaining most if not all of the 
ordinary conceptual distinction between hallucination and perception. 
 
This should help to defuse the further worry that the simple metaphysical picture 
might be worse than useless as an explanation of hallucination.  The concern here arose 
from the thought that a hallucinatory experience, even if it lacks a worldly object, 
nonetheless might be presumed to have some worldly cause, such as a psychedelic drug or 
a devious neuroscientist with his carefully placed electrodes.  If these are the causes of the 
brain state involved in hallucination, why do they not feature in the phenomenology of the 
experience?  With the recognition that the relevant causes can include just the sorts of 
worldly objects that seem to feature in the phenomenology of the hallucinatory experience, 
the sting is taken out of this objection to some extent, since we now have available a 
straightforward explanation for the phenomenology in terms of the presentation of worldly 
objects and their qualities.  As a result, the simple metaphysical picture-based account of 
hallucination can lay claim to what I have called the explanatory virtue of naïve realism: 
 
The explanatory virtue: naïve realism explains what it’s like to perceive an 
object solely by reference to objects and qualities in the subject’s environment 
as they are arranged to the subject’s perspective. 
 
This does not entirely neutralise the objection, however.  Lurking within it is a worry 
that applies to the simple metaphysical picture’s explanation of experience more generally, 
whether hallucinatory or perceptual.  The worry is simply that identifying an experience, of 
whatever sort, with a physical process does not constrain which constituents of the process 
should feature as elements of phenomenology.  Why should a process in which an apple 
visually affects a subject’s brain amount to an experience whose phenomenology is 
composed of the apple?  Why should the phenomenology not feature any of the other 
constituents of the process – the mediating light, the optic nerve or the brain state itself?  
Furthermore, any such process is open-ended historically, so we might wonder why the 
phenomenology doesn’t feature elements of the causal process preceding the apple – the 
sun that shines on it, the tree from which the apple was plucked, the seed from which that 
tree grew, and so on.  In the case of an apple hallucination that is instigated by the 
neuroscientist’s electrode, the simple metaphysical picture-based account will claim that 
the electrode caused activation of a memory trace of an apple, thereby bringing into being 
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a new causal process mediating between the historical apple and the subject’s current brain 
states in such a way that the subject is now able to reflect on the visual appearance of that 
apple.  But why should the subject not now be able to reflect also upon the visual 
appearance of the electrode? 
 
It should be clear that this is a puzzle that arises only from the simple metaphysical 
picture and the way in which it presents the awareness relation from an outside 
perspective, as if we were examining the physical goings-on involved in someone else’s 
perceptual act.  The natural view itself faces no such puzzle.  It is not a claim about how an 
object gets to be ‘in’ experience – how it gets to be the thing perceived.  The natural view, 
as a claim about phenomenology, is a claim about experience from the ‘inside’, i.e. about 
how things seem from a first-person perspective.  From this perspective, the object is 
already there in our field of view, and the natural view is not concerned with how it gets 
there (simply by being seen) but with what it is that occupies our field of view (possesses 
phenomenal character), namely just the object itself.  What the simple metaphysical picture 
offers is a way to ‘reconstruct’ how it is that we become aware of objects.  If we were 
concerned only with veridical perception, we mightn’t feel the same need for such a 
reconstruction, since the relationship between ourselves and the objects we perceive is 
quite transparent.  That is, the objects which seem to be there in front of us are there in 
front of us.  With hallucination, however, the relationship between ourselves and the 
objects our awareness is greatly obscured.  It no longer seems adequate to explain our 
awareness as the straightforward consequence of an object’s being there and our seeing it.  
In a sense, this means that there isn’t a truly natural view of hallucination, and it places 
greater importance on the simple metaphysical picture to explain our awareness from that 
external, third-person perspective. 
 
What is demanded here is an explanation of phenomenology in terms of some 
properties of the physical process that is taken to constitute the experience.  Accordingly, 
we might explain phenomenology in terms of the ways in which certain constituents of the 
physical process affect the subject.  If something is to feature in the phenomenology of 
experience we would expect that it must affect the subject in such a way that she should 
(assuming she is physically and mentally competent) be able to react appropriately and 
non-coincidentally to its perceptible features.  Such appropriate reactions might include 
physical manipulations of the object, verbal descriptions of its perceptible qualities, artistic 
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depictions of it, and so on.  Since these behaviours are causally consequent upon physical 
states of the subject that are themselves caused by the object, it will be a requirement that 
the relevant states of the subject preserve and can transmit information about whatever 
perceptible features of the object are at issue.   
 
Applied to the examples above, this requirement shows why, for example, the apple 
hallucination is of an apple and not (also) of an electrode: the electrode, for one thing, does 
not affect the subject visually, and the way in which the subject is affected by it is not one 
that preserves any significant information about any of the electrode’s perceptible qualities.  
In the case of the subject’s seeing an apple, the phenomenology of the experience does not 
feature the causally antecedent tree or seed because the apple’s effect on the subject does 
not preserve any information about the visible qualities of the tree or the seed, only of the 
apple itself.  It is therefore the nature and arrangement of only those qualities that can go 
on to causally influence the subject’s apple-eating or apple-sketching behaviours.  Note, 
however, that certain other constituents of the perceptual process do play a role in 
determining the experience’s phenomenology: for example, the sun shining on the apple 
and the reflected light, although we might not say they are seen – they are not what we are 
looking at – nonetheless contribute to the phenomenology in terms of the brightness of the 
apple, its apparent colour and the various shadows and specular highlights that appear on 
its surface. 
 
We might also note here that, in looking at the apple, we are (counterfactually) 
sensitive to some qualities of the sun – specifically its brightness – but not to others, such 
as its shape; it would make no difference to the phenomenology of our experience if the 
sun were cuboid instead of spherical.  But it would make a difference if the sun were more 
or less bright.  We are therefore sensitive to some features of the sun but perhaps not those 
(like shape) that incline us to say we see the sun.  If nothing else, this suggests, perhaps 
helpfully, that there isn’t a clear boundary between those constituents of the perceptual 
process that are perceived and those that are not.  A clearer, but perhaps yet imperfect, 
boundary might lie between those constituents or qualities to which we are sensitive – 
which make a difference to phenomenology – and those to which we are not. 
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4.10   Conclusion – the argument from hallucination 
 
I have in this chapter described the explanatory challenge presented by hallucination to 
proponents of the natural view, and various possible ways this challenge might be met.  
Three main strategies are available: (1) to acknowledge the genuine (‘robust’) nature of 
hallucinatory phenomenology and give a positive explanation of it in terms of awareness of 
something other than worldly objects; (2) to deny that hallucinations have robust 
phenomenology, and explain their seeming to have phenomenology in terms of their 
negative epistemic properties or cognitive effects; and (3) to acknowledge the robust 
phenomenology of hallucinations and explain it in terms of awareness of worldly objects.  
My aim in this chapter has been to show that the third strategy, although absurd at first 
sight, is tractable and perhaps even plausible given an account based on the simple 
metaphysical picture. 
 
The simple metaphysical picture-based account has several crucial advantages over the 
other strategies.  Indeed, it avoids most or all of the key problems that bedevil one or other 
of the alternative explanatory options.  First, it acknowledges and accounts for the felt 
reality of hallucinatory experience in a way that equates felt reality with the possession of 
robust phenomenology.  Second, it does so using an explanation whose essential 
ingredients are shared by the simple metaphysical picture of perceptual experience, making 
it explanatorily elegant and parsimonious.  Third, by eschewing any appeal to awareness of 
something other than worldly objects it avoids the threat of the argument from 
hallucination while nonetheless sharing its pursuit of unifying explanation.  Fourth, it has 
no difficulty accommodating cases in which the subject has insight into the hallucinatory 
nature of her experience.  Fifth, in explaining the robust phenomenology of hallucination it 
allows us to explain the cognitive and behavioural effects of hallucination as being 
grounded in that phenomenology.  And, sixth, by treating these cognitive effects as 
inessential accompaniments of hallucination rather than constitutive of it, the view allows 
that we can grant hallucinations to non-human animals and other subjects incapable of 
reflecting cognitively on their experiences. 
 
The explanation of hallucination via the simple metaphysical picture also offered an 
explanation of several other sensory phenomena that might otherwise appear to threaten 
the natural view.  As we shall see in the next chapter, it also points the way to an 
explanation of a widespread feature of ordinary perceptual experience, namely the way in 
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which its phenomenology is influenced by the subject’s beliefs, judgments and 
expectations.  This explanation will allow us to show that the natural view, while 
motivated by the seeming immediacy of perceptual experience, can also accommodate its 
generality. 
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CHAPTER 5 – PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (III): COGNITIVE 
INFLUENCES ON AWARENESS 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
In the preceding two chapters I have described the challenges posed to the natural 
view by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination, and proposed some ways 
to respond to those challenges, in part using the simple metaphysical picture of experience.  
In this chapter I will discuss a further challenge arising from a perceptual phenomenon that 
features in many of our ordinary experiences, including the veridical ones, although it may 
also contribute to many cases of what we would call perceptual illusion.  The phenomenon 
in question is the seeming role of cognitive states such as beliefs and desires in influencing 
the phenomenology of experience.  Like hallucination, we seem to have here cases in 
which the phenomenology of experience is determined in part by factors other than the 
objects and qualities present in the scene before the subject.  However, here it looks as 
though the extra factor is not some awareness of previously perceived objects but some 
cognitive processes.  
 
In this chapter I will describe some evidence for the constitutive role of cognition in 
experiences’ phenomenology, explain in more detail the problem it presents to a proponent 
of the natural view, and offer an account – again using the simple metaphysical picture – 
that positively explains the phenomenon while leaving the natural view intact.   
 
Before that, however, it will be worth saying something more about the relationship 
between a subject’s awareness of worldly particulars and her cognitive faculties.  Although 
the motivating insight behind the natural view is the seeming immediacy of perception, we 
should be wary of neglecting a distinct but complementary aspect of perceptual awareness, 
namely its generality.  That is, our perceptual encounters with worldly objects seem to 
present us with those objects in more than their bare particularity.  Rather, we typically 
perceive those objects as objects of a certain kind.   There is disagreement about the extent 
to which this generality is manifest in the phenomenology of experience, rather than 
issuing merely from some distinct judgment based on that phenomenology.50 
                                                 
50   For a defence of the constitutive role of kind-properties in phenomenology, cast in terms of 
representational content, see Siegel (2006). 
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We might usefully recall here Brewer’s defence of naïve realism from the argument 
from illusion.  He sought to protect the immediacy of perception by distinguishing the 
‘sensory core’ of an experience from a cognitive component that grounds judgments based 
on that sensory core.  The idea is that, in all cases, perceptual experience has this sensory 
core – constituted by the object itself and its perceptible qualities – but that in many cases, 
if not all, there is also the cognitive component which is responsible for acts of recognition 
and judgment.  The upshot is what I have called the ‘two-faculty’ view that perceptual 
experience commonly involves the interplay of two more or less distinct faculties:  
 
1. A faculty of (direct) awareness which acquaints the subject with the worldly 
objects and their qualities. 
 
2. A cognitive faculty that delivers judgments based on the objects and qualities 
revealed by the faculty of awareness. 
 
As described earlier, the two-faculty view enables the naïve realist to hold that the 
sensory core of illusory experience remains attributable to the mere awareness of worldly 
particulars and their qualities, while the illusory aspect results from a more or less distinct 
act of judgment.    
 
One thing the two-faculty picture lacks, however, is a clear account of how the two 
faculties are connected, i.e. how having things presented to her in perceptual experience 
constrains a subject’s judgments about what state of affairs obtains.  This question is a 
recurrent theme in the work of philosophers such as Sellars, McDowell and Davidson, 
where it is framed in terms of the capacity of our rational faculty – governed by holistic, 
inferential rules – to get a purchase on the causally-governed world of objects and events 
(see e.g. Sellars 2000: §36; McDowell 2009: 185; Davidson 2000: 156-7).  My concern is 
chiefly to account for the manifest phenomenology of experience and not its epistemic 
status, so I will not seek to explore this question in great detail.  Nonetheless, the relation 
between our sensory and conceptual faculties is clearly key to explaining the 
phenomenological role of cognition, which in turn presents a challenge to the natural view, 
as I will shortly describe.  
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Insofar as they do seek to account for the interface between perception and belief, 
naïve realists typically explain it in terms of a subject’s capacity to recognise the things she 
perceives and categorise them as belonging to certain kinds of objects.  Travis describes 
this as a subject’s ‘expertise’ in judging what state of affairs obtains based on things’ 
simply being that way (Travis 2007: 233-5).  In other words, it is through the operations of 
what Fish calls a ‘conceptual-recognitional capacity’ that we are able to bring to bear on 
our beliefs the worldly things that we are simply presented with in experience (Fish 2009: 
68).   
 
Fish expands somewhat on Brewer’s and Travis’s account of this conceptual-
recognitional capacity.  His immediate concern is to account for an intuition that prior 
experience and knowledge can influence our perception of the world.  He cites an example 
from Crane, who asks us to imagine the different experiences of a child and a scientist 
when presented visually with a cathode ray tube.  The example is supposed to highlight 
both a commonality and a difference between the two subjects’ experiences: a 
commonality in that both subjects see the same object; a difference in that only the 
scientist sees the object as being a cathode ray tube (Fish 2009: 68).   
 
Fish explains the difference by recasting what it is that we see – not objects and/or 
properties, but facts understood as complex wholes of objects-bearing-properties; what are 
sometimes called states of affairs or situations (2009: 53).51  What the scientist possesses 
but the child lacks is the capacity to recognise the fact that is the object’s being a cathode 
ray tube.  And the scientist possesses this capacity in virtue of possessing the concept of a 
cathode ray tube; this is what makes it a conceptual-recognitional capacity (2009: 68). 
 
As we saw earlier, Fish employs the same account to explain what he calls ‘cognitive 
illusions’, in which a subject perceives one kind of object but mistakes it for another (2009: 
165 ff.).  He uses the example of seeing a coiled rope and mistaking it for a snake.  As he 
notes, such cases clearly cannot involve the subject’s acquaintance with the fact of the 
object’s being a snake, for the object is not a snake.  Rather, the subject deploys her 
conceptual-recognitional capacity (for picking out snakes) inappropriately (2009: 169). 
 
                                                 
51  Fish is at pains to emphasize that this claim about what we perceive is intended as an expression of how 
the world seems to be presented to us rather than as a claim for the ontological priority of facts over 
objects and properties (2009: 53). 
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Fish acknowledges that this explanation only takes us so far before we are confronted 
with the disputed question of what constitutes a concept and hence what it takes to possess 
one (2009: 69).  Without delving too deeply into this question, he suggests that an answer 
will “appeal in part to the highly specific interactions with the environment that the subject 
has enjoyed” (2009: 70). 
 
It is important also to note that Fish’s account of cognitive-recognitional capacities 
reflects something of his account of hallucination.  Recall from chapter 4.5 above that Fish 
denies hallucination genuine phenomenal character and explains the ‘felt reality’ of 
hallucination as mistaken beliefs brought about by the (non-phenomenal) hallucinatory 
state (2009: 94).  This solution allows Fish to accept that hallucinatory states are wholly 
internal (they supervene locally on neural states so that these neural states are sufficient for 
the occurrence of those hallucinations) while avoiding the pressure to say the same about 
veridical perceptual experiences.  It seems that he also takes the cognitive factors involved 
in conceptual-recognitional capacities to be internal to the subject (2009: 173).  Putting the 
two together, we can conclude that the employment of a conceptual-recognitional capacity 
should not alter the phenomenology of a perceptual experience, but instead influence the 
beliefs and judgments we form on the basis of that experience.  Although the clear 
distinction between external (perceptual) and internal (cognitive or conceptual) factors 
might appear somewhat blurred by Fish’s above-noted claim that perception acquaints us 
first and foremost with facts, we should recall that the relevant facts are to be understood 
as the objective ways things are arranged perceptibly before the subject.  This allows Fish 
to develop a disjunctive approach to veridical versus illusory cases of fact perception, so 
that the fact in the former case is a genuine contributor to the character of the experience, 
while the subject in the illusory case merely and mistakenly believes there to be a fact ‘out 
there’ and hence that there is the phenomenal quality that would be constituted by that fact 
(2009: 171). 
 
The same worry therefore applies to Fish’s account of cognitive illusion as to his 
account of hallucination, namely that it fails to do justice to our sense of the ‘felt reality’ of 
the illusory phenomenology.  As with hallucination, however, Fish needs to avoid positing 
a genuine effect on phenomenology from such cognitive effects, on pain of undermining 
the unique claim of what is ‘out there’ to ‘shaping the contours’ of experience.   
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In this regard, we might note it is implicit in Brewer’s description of “two levels in the 
subjective character of experience” that for him both the simple awareness of the object 
and the application of the relevant concept play a role in determining the phenomenology 
of the experience.  This is confirmed explicitly in more recent work, where Brewer 
characterises the two levels in terms of the object’s ‘thinly’ and ‘thickly’ looking some 
way to a subject: it thinly looks a certain way F in that it in fact looks relevantly similar to 
paradigm instances of F things; and it thickly looks F if, additionally, the subject 
recognises it as an instantiating F-ness (Brewer 2011: 121).  Brewer insists that this 
application of the concept of F-ness – one’s seeing the object thickly as an instance of F-
ness – makes a genuine difference to the phenomenology of the experience, but without 
altering how the object thinly looks (2011: 123).  So it seems that the respective 
contributions to phenomenology of something’s looking thinly and thickly F remain 
independent of one another at least insofar as how it thickly looks does not alter how it 
thinly looks.  Presumably it is important for Brewer’s naïve realism to maintain some 
distinction between, as we might put it, perceptual and conceptual phenomenology, for fear 
of leaving the view vulnerable to the generalising step and inviting the challenge to explain 
why all of the phenomenology of experience shouldn’t be determined by internal states of 
the subject. 
 
There is compelling evidence, however, for the claim that our sensory and conceptual 
or cognitive faculties are much more closely intertwined than the two-faculty picture 
suggests, so that our acts of recognition or belief do not merely take the phenomenology of 
experience as an input but can actually influence the phenomenology itself.  On the face of 
it, this would seem to present a challenge to the natural view, since any admission that 
ostensibly ‘inner’ processes of recognition contribute to phenomenology once again 
challenges us to explain why we shouldn’t think that all phenomenology is determined by 
processes internal to the subject.  I will, however, go on to offer an explanation of this 
cognitive influence on phenomenology which is consistent with the natural view and in 
which the notion of a conceptual-recognitional faculty plays a central role.  Unlike Fish’s 
account, but in keeping with my earlier account of hallucination (chapter 4), my account 
will attribute the phenomenology, both perceptual and conceptual, to awareness of worldly 
objects. 
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5.2   Perceptual learning and cognitive penetration 
 
There are two more or less distinct phenomena that offer evidence for the genuine 
effects of cognitive factors on the phenomenology of perceptual experience.  These 
phenomena are perceptual learning and cognitive penetration of perceptual experience, 
and I will consider them in turn in this section.  In the following section I will describe 
some evidence that one or both of these phenomena involve awareness of qualities not 
attributable to the scene perceived. 
 
Perceptual learning is the process whereby repeated perceptual exposure to some 
object or type of object results in a more or less permanent change in one’s perceptual 
experience of the same (Gibson 1963: 29).  Perceptual learning is responsible for the 
ability of subjects to improve their discriminatory powers with respect to certain kinds of 
perceived objects and qualities, sufficiently in many cases for those subjects to become 
‘expert perceivers’ such as wine tasters and field botanists.  Whether perceptual learning 
poses a challenge to the natural view depends on what sort of mechanism we think is 
responsible.  Gibson notes that theories of perceptual learning fall into two broad 
categories: what she calls enrichment theories, whereby our prior experience (including 
memories and beliefs) adds something to our current perceptual experience; and 
differentiation theories, whereby we become better able to attend to and discriminate 
certain of the more distinctive or salient qualities of perceived objects (Gibson 1963: 40; 
see also Gibson & Gibson 1955).   
 
If differentiation theories are correct and perceptual learning elicits changes to the 
phenomenology of experience by modifying attention or focus in some way, then there is 
not obviously a problem for the natural view.  A change in focus or attention does not 
introduce any phenomenology that cannot be attributed to the scene before the subject; it 
merely alters the way in which we single out, or indeed group, certain objects and qualities 
for particular attention.  We can allow that this amounts to changing the phenomenal 
character of the scene, insofar as phenomenal character is understood merely as that 
relational property of a scene which is how it appears perceptually to a subject.  Any 
change in phenomenal character here is perhaps best understood as a change in how we are 
aware of a scene; if there is an influence on what we are aware of insofar as we are more or 
less likely to notice certain qualities or groupings of qualities, there is nonetheless no 
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change in the qualities that are presented to us and therefore no change in what we can be 
aware of.   
 
Fish’s claim that we perceive facts is pertinent here (recalling that a fact for Fish’s 
purposes is to be understood as an obtaining state of affairs rather than a true proposition) 
(Fish 2009: 52-3).  Fish claims that we can allow for a difference in phenomenology 
between experiences of expert and inexpert perceivers, and that we can account for this 
compatibly with naïve realism by appealing to the different ‘conceptual-recognitional 
capacities’ of the different subjects (2009: 68ff. & 167ff.).  Expert perceivers recognise 
that certain arrangements of qualities belong to a certain kind of object while inexpert 
perceivers might be aware of all the same qualities without recognising that the relevant 
fact obtains (for example, that the mottled patch in the leaf litter is a woodcock).  We 
might seek an explanation for the development of recognitional capacities via a 
differentiation theory whereby prior perceptual encounters with a certain kind of object 
alter the salience of certain qualities or groupings of qualities and so influence the way in 
which subjects attend to or focus upon the object.  Crucially, this would not require a 
change in what the subject is aware of – which objects and qualities are presented to her – 
but a difference in the extent to which different elements of the scene ‘stand out’ in 
awareness. 
 
The second kind of perceptual learning theory appears less easy to accommodate to 
the natural view.  Enrichment theories claim that repeated exposure to a type of stimulus 
alters the subject’s successive experiences not (or not merely) by altering her attentional 
focus and her ability to discriminate certain qualities or groupings of features but by adding 
something to the later experiences that alters or embellishes their phenomenology.  We 
might, for example, think of the added ingredient as memory images which are evoked by 
the stimulus through a process of association (Gibson 1963: 40; Gibson & Gibson 1955: 
34).  As Gibson & Gibson put it, the result is that with increasing experience and expertise 
“perception is progressively in decreasing correspondence with stimulation” (1955: 34); 
or, in terms of the natural view, we might say that the phenomenology becomes less 
attributable to the object before the subject and more attributable to remembered objects.  
If enrichment theories are true then there may be more to perceptual phenomenology than 
is contributed by awareness of the worldly objects and qualities perceived, in which case 
136 
 
 
 
we are confronted again with the generalising worry that was threatened by the arguments 
from illusion and hallucination. 
 
Differentiation and enrichment theories are, of course, not mutually exclusive – there 
is no reason why both mechanisms might not be operative in some cases, even if others 
involve only one.  Ornithological expertise and familiarity with hen harriers might enable 
me to distinguish them from marsh harriers in part by focusing on salient features (a 
whitish rump present on the former but not the latter), but it may also augment the 
phenomenology of my experience by making the whiteness appear even whiter than can be 
accounted for by the qualities inhering in the bird itself.  Deciding which mechanism is 
operative in any specific case may be notoriously difficult (Gibson 1963: 40ff.) but, 
crucially for our current concern, there is good evidence that something like enrichment 
can occur in at least some cases.  I will consider this evidence in the next section. 
 
While perceptual learning is considered to involve a more or less permanent change in 
the perception of some target class of stimuli through repeated exposure (Gibson 1963: 
29), presumably by some associative process beyond the subject’s conscious control,   
there is another way in which prior experience might influence the phenomenology of 
perception.  Thus, there is good evidence that a subject’s perceptual experience can be 
shaped by her concepts, beliefs or desires concerning the object perceived, all of which 
may be consciously brought to bear on the experience of that object.  It is said that, in this 
regard, the subject’s perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable by the subject’s 
beliefs, etc.  What the thesis of cognitive penetration entails can be understood by way of 
its opposite, namely the claim that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable: 
 
[P]erceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable if it is not possible for 
two subjects (or one subject at different times) to have two different 
experiences on account of a difference in their cognitive systems which makes 
this difference intelligible when certain facts about the case are held fixed, 
namely, the nature of the proximal stimulus on the sensory organ, the state of 
the sensory organ, and the location of attentional focus of the subject. 
 
       Macpherson 2012: 29 
 
Note that, to count as genuine cognitive penetration, the alteration to phenomenology 
should reflect the content of the influential cognitive state.  This rules out indirect effects 
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of cognitive states on phenomenology, such as, say, visual disturbances brought on by 
fearful beliefs (see Macpherson 2012: 26). 
 
 
5.3   Empirical evidence for cognitive contributions to phenomenology 
 
Several studies have shown that subjects’ memories and expectations exert an 
influence on their perception of colour.  In a classic study by Delk and Fillenbaum (1965), 
subjects were exposed to a set of nine shapes cut from card of identical, uniform colour 
(orange-red).  The nine shapes fell into three groups according to their conventional 
association with the colour red: the first group (heart, apple and lip shapes) are positively 
associated with redness; the second group (oval, circle and ellipse) are neither positively 
nor negatively associated with redness; and the third group (horse, bell and mushroom) 
negatively associated with redness.  The shapes were presented against a background 
composed of a colour-mixer that could be adjusted by the subjects to any shade between 
red and yellow-orange.  Subjects were asked to view each shape in turn and adjust the 
colour-mixer until it was the same colour as the shape, such that the shape became 
indiscernible from the background.  The crucial finding was that, although all of the shapes 
tested were cut from the same uniformly orange-red card, subjects tended to adjust the 
background to different colours depending on which shape was being viewed.  Where the 
three conventionally red shapes were presented, the subjects tended significantly to adjust 
the background to a redder shade in order to achieve the subjective match than was 
required for the three neutral shapes.  A more limited effect in the opposite direction was 
achieved in respect of the shapes negatively associated with redness, i.e. in some cases 
there was a significant tendency to select a more yellow-orange background than for the 
neutral figures (Delk & Fillenbaum 1965: 292-3). 
 
The authors conclude that previous experience of shape/colour associations influences 
perceived colour.  Hansen et al. (2006) draw a similar conclusion from their own 
experiments, in which subjects were shown digital photographic images of familiar fruits 
presented against a uniformly grey background and asked to adjust the colour of the fruit 
images until they appeared grey, i.e. lacking chromaticity (colour) but still with normal 
variation in luminance (brightness).  The researchers found that subjects tended to 
overcompensate in their colour adjustment in order to see the fruits as grey, e.g. they 
adjusted the banana image until it was objectively slightly blue (ibid.: 1367).  
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Concomitantly, when the banana image was objectively grey (achromatic) the subjects 
reported it as being slightly yellow (ibid.).  The authors conclude that “knowledge of the 
world affects our perception” (ibid.: 1368). 
 
It is not obvious whether these two cases ought to be considered evidence for 
perceptual learning, on the one hand, or cognitive penetration on the other.  Macpherson 
presents the Delk and Fillenbaum experiment as likely evidence for cognitive penetration, 
but acknowledges that the results might instead be explained in terms of the influence of 
past experience (of characteristically red shapes) via some associative mechanism, and 
without the input of concepts, beliefs and so on (Macpherson 2012: 45).  In other words, 
these might be cases of perceptual learning rather than cognitive penetration.  As 
Macpherson notes, this would help to explain the likely imperviousness of the effect to 
changes in the subjects’ beliefs (ibid.: 46). 
 
Macpherson offers as a more clear-cut case of cognitive penetration an experiment by 
Levin and Banaji (2006), in which subjects were shown various greyscale images of faces 
which were computer-generated to have stereotypical features of black people in some 
cases and stereotypical features of white people in others.  Crucially, the images could also 
be adjusted in respect of their luminance and contrast, so that image pairs of ‘white’ and 
‘black’ faces could be produced in which both images were of the same mean luminance 
and contrast.  In one experiment, subjects were presented with such an image pair, and 
asked to adjust the luminance of each in turn until it seemed to match the luminance of a 
further reference image, which was again of a ‘black’ or ‘white’ face, but possibly of some 
different starting mean luminance.  Where subjects had to match an adjustable ‘black’ face 
with a fixed reference ‘white’ face, they would tend to over-adjust the luminance of the 
adjustable image, i.e. make it even lighter than the reference image.  Conversely, they 
would tend to adjust a stereotypically ‘white’ face to make it too dark when matching 
against a ‘black’ reference image (Levin & Banaji 2006: 504).   
 
This suggests that the appearance of stereotypically ‘white’ or ‘black’ facial features 
makes the images look, respectively, lighter or darker than they really are.  As described, 
the experiment is inadequate to settle whether this is due to cognitive penetration or 
perceptual learning, since it could be that the perceived link between lightness and other 
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facial attributes is merely associative, even if this seems a more sophisticated association 
than between, say, heart-shapes and redness.   
 
That cognitive penetration is involved seems clearer, however, from a further 
experiment performed by the same authors.  In this test they again presented subjects with 
image pairs, but this time one of the images (for half of the subjects the ‘white’ face and 
the other half the ‘black’ face) was replaced with an ‘ambiguous’ face whose features 
were, roughly speaking, intermediate in form between the stereotypical ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
faces.  The members of each image pair were labelled as ‘white’ or ‘black’ so that each 
‘ambiguous’ face was labelled unambiguously as ‘white’ when its pair was ‘black’ and 
vice versa.  This time, the subjects were asked to match each member of the image pair in 
turn to an adjustable grey rectangle.  The result was that subjects adjusted the grey 
rectangle to a darker shade when matching against an ‘ambiguous’ face labelled as ‘black’ 
than they did when matching it against the same ‘ambiguous’ face labelled as ‘white’ 
(Levin & Banaji 2006: 505-6).  
 
Unlike the cases presented by Delk and Fillenbaum and by Hansen et al., this 
experiment clearly shows that the nature of the perceptual effect is to some extent under 
the control of the subjects’ conscious beliefs.  Unfortunately, it is at the same time less 
clear that Levin and Banaji’s results couldn’t be explained merely as the result of differing 
judgments by the subjects involved.  What convinces that there are real phenomenological 
differences in the other studies – that the heart-shape really does look redder, and that the 
grey banana image really looks yellowish – is the way in which the images are presented 
against, and indeed embedded in, their background.  By leaving the target and reference 
images side-by-side but separate, Levin and Banaji leave room to attribute any mismatch to 
judgment rather than a real difference in the phenomenal qualities of which the subjects are 
aware. 
 
This shortcoming might be remedied by an amended methodology, but what matters 
for my account is that at least one of perceptual learning or cognitive penetration 
demonstrably involves some aspects of phenomenology that cannot be attributed to the 
scene before the subject.  This poses a similar challenge to the natural view to that posed 
by the kinds of illusory and hallucinatory phenomena described in previous chapters.  In 
the following sections I will argue that the simple metaphysical picture allows us to explain 
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this cognitive influence on phenomenology along the same lines as the explanation of 
hallucination offered in chapter 4.  The mechanism is perhaps most easily expressed in 
respect of perceptual learning, but I will go on to show how it might be extended to 
accommodate cognitive penetration. 
 
 
5.4   A simple metaphysical picture of perceptual learning 
 
I have suggested that in at least some cases of illusion, the argument can be avoided by 
insisting that, in fact, the phenomenology of the experience can be exhaustively attributed 
to the scene itself if we allow for the constitutive role of factors such as ambient lighting.  
Hallucination I admitted cannot be accounted for in this way, but I have suggested instead 
an alternative explanation (consistent with the natural view) involving the constitutive role 
of previously seen objects in the phenomenology of current experience.  Now, with 
perceptual learning and/or cognitive penetration, we appear to have cases like hallucination 
where phenomenology cannot be attributed exhaustively to the scene arrayed before the 
subject.  In this case, however, the ‘extra’ elements of phenomenology – additional to what 
is constituted by the scene before the subject – seem attributable to a subject’s prior 
experience, expectations or beliefs.  
 
This claim about the constitutive role of cognitive factors in the phenomenology of 
experience can be used to form a variant of the argument from illusion/hallucination.  
Thus, if some part of an experience’s phenomenology can be determined or constituted by 
cognitive factors, and if we further think of these cognitive factors as in some sense 
internal to the subject, then why should we not allow that the whole of that experience’s 
phenomenology is determined or constituted by more or less internal states of the subject?   
 
In this section I will propose a reply to this argument that uses the natural view to 
show how, even in cognitively-influenced experiences, we might attribute the 
phenomenology wholly to awareness of worldly things.  The proposed mechanism has the 
following virtues:  
 
 it acknowledges the inseparable cognitive or conceptual aspect of much or all 
perceptual experience; 
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 it offers a unified explanation of both the sensory and conceptual elements of 
perceptual experience and so resolves any puzzle about how the two combine to 
yield an experience’s overall phenomenology; 
 
 it holds that the conceptual elements, like the sensory elements, are ‘out there’ and 
so avoids the potentially problematic implications of phenomenal qualities arising 
from purely inner mental states or factors. 
 
My suggested account will draw on my earlier account of hallucinatory experience, 
and specifically the claim that the seemingly problematic elements of phenomenology 
derive from previously perceived objects (see chapter 4).  The aim of that account was to 
explain how hallucinations come about in a way that does justice to the intuition that they 
possess ‘robust’ phenomenology.  The upshot was that we can account for hallucination 
consistently with the natural view, as having genuine phenomenology for the same reason 
that perceptual experiences have phenomenology, namely because hallucinations too are 
object-involving experiences and so do not supervene on neural states.   
 
I arrived at this surprising conclusion via a parallel between a certain kind of 
hallucination and certain (allegedly problematic) cases of perception.  The perceptual cases 
in question were those involving substantial ‘time gaps’, i.e. a marked lapse of time 
between the event perceived and the act of perceiving it.  Such time-gap cases merely 
reveal what, given the natural view, is always true to a greater or lesser extent, namely that 
past events are constituents of current experiences.52  I suggested that hallucinations could 
be understood as the reappearance or re-presentation of objects previously perceived.  In 
light of the simple metaphysical picture, this reappearance was understood as the 
recurrence in the subject of a similar neural state as that caused by the object when it was 
originally perceived, in such a way that the current neural state is also relevantly an effect 
of the same object (i.e. the same temporal stage of object as previously perceived).  Of 
course, the object exerts its effect on the subject’s current neural state by a more 
convoluted and temporally drawn-out route than that by which it exerted its original effect 
in being perceived.  Nonetheless, given the simple metaphysical picture and the time-gap 
                                                 
52  Cases involving extreme time gaps, e.g. a subject’s perceiving distant celestial events that took place 
thousands of years before her birth, are typically cited in order to undermine claims for the directness of 
perception (e.g. Robinson 1994: 80-4).  I sought to avoid the reductio ad absurdum by noting that it 
seems compelling only because of an antecedent commitment to a certain substantial notion of 
‘experiences’ as states or events that in some sense ‘belong’ to the subject. 
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cases of perception, there seems no principled way to rule out such convoluted and drawn-
out processes as cases in which the object contributes constitutively to an experience’s 
phenomenology. 
 
How, then, does this account of hallucination bear on the proposed mechanism for 
perceptual learning?  The next ingredient of the account comes by way of two potential 
objections to the natural view and simple metaphysical picture.   
 
The first objection is one I alluded to in the earlier discussion of hallucination, namely 
that the process involving the perceived object and the perceiving subject is open-ended 
historically and has an infinite or near-infinite number of constituents besides the object 
that ostensibly is presented in experience.  The challenge to the proponent of the natural 
view and simple metaphysical picture is to explain just why it is that object and not any 
other constituent that contributes constitutively to the phenomenology of the experience.  
My answer was that what distinguishes the perceived object from (some) other constituents 
of the perceptual process is that the relevant neural state of the subject preserves a 
substantial amount of information about the perceptible qualities of that object.  
Furthermore, we should expect that this information-preserving causal relation is one that 
persists but is updated over time – that changes in the subject’s neural state are sensitive to 
changes in the perceptible qualities of the object.  This continuing sensitivity that can be 
understood as tracking (whether we think of this as the neural state’s tracking the object or 
its making possible our tracking of the object).53   
 
The second potential objection is that a given perceptual neural state must inevitably 
be the product of a variety of causes that are themselves not directly causally related.  This 
multiplicity of causes is especially marked given some further assumptions:  
 
                                                 
53   We might worry here that the subject’s neural state effectively tracks all of the intermediate parts of the 
perceptual process between the object and the subject, since each intermediate part must equally carry the 
information that is eventually transmitted to the subject.  However, what distinguishes the perceived 
object from later time-slices of the perceptual process is that the former is the origin of the information or 
what, in a sense, the information is about.  The subject’s neural state in a sense tracks all time-slices 
between the object and itself, but the object is what it ultimately tracks; all other intervening time-slices of 
the process are tracked in virtue of the neural state’s tracking the object.  Meanwhile, the further back we 
go prior to the relevant temporal stage of the object, the less information the neural state contains about 
those earlier time-slices. 
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1. There is considerable overlap in the neural locus of perceptual effects brought 
about by (possibly greatly) different perceived objects.  
 
2. Some of the neural effects at these loci are persistent beyond the duration of the 
relevant perceptual episode, and these persistent effects (‘traces’, we might call 
them) are at least partially responsible for subsequent conscious recollection of the 
object as originally perceived. 
 
3. The traces left by an object A at time t may constrain the perceptual effects 
wrought by a different object B at a later time (t + 1) insofar as the neural loci of 
A’s traces and B’s effects overlap.  Where this is so, the neural effect of B is also to 
some extent an effect of A. 
 
The overlap suggested in (1) may be reduced by a degree of neural localisation, but the 
scope for this must be limited given, on the one hand, the finite capacity of the relevant 
parts of the brain and, on the other, the boundless diversity of possible objects of 
perception.  
 
Given the third assumption, adherence to the simple metaphysical picture might 
encourage the thought that, in seeing B, the subject is also in some sense ‘seeing’ A.  Apart 
from anything else, the partial nature of the overlap between the neural loci of A and B’s 
perceptual effects (assuming that A and B are perceptibly different) means that only some 
parts or elements of B’s overall effect are constrained by the persistent effects of A.  It is 
easier to segregate the effects of B (which we see) from those of A (which we have 
previously seen) if we think in terms of perceptual tracking.  Arguably, seeing an object 
necessarily involves an ability visually to track changes in that object in real time, so that 
this tracking relationship is partly constitutive of what it is to see an object. A crucial 
distinction between hallucinated and seen objects, then, is that we are tracking the latter but 
not the former.  Returning to the simple metaphysical picture of cognitive penetration, we 
might talk more loosely of a subject’s neural states’ tracking an object, where this denotes 
a sensitivity or causal correlation between changes in those neural states and changes in the 
object or our perspectival relation to it.54 
                                                 
54  When we cast it in neural terms, it is easier to see that our visually tracking an object is not sufficient for 
seeing it; consider seeing a television, where the activity of one’s visual system is causally correlated with 
some internal workings of the television, internal workings that are certainly not seen.  In addition, more 
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With these assumptions and caveats in mind, we can now turn to the proposed 
mechanism for perceptual learning.  As a start, we might endorse the naïve realists’ appeal 
to a conceptual-recognitional capacity as the ‘entry-level’ interface between perceived 
objects and our thoughts and beliefs.  At the most basic level, what this capacity surely 
consists in is sensitivity to perceptible similarities amongst distinct particulars, which 
similarities ground categorisation.  The model I am proposing asserts that the engagement 
of a conceptual-recognitional capacity in perception consists, at the most rudimentary 
level, in the perceived object’s evoking or bringing to mind other previously perceived 
objects that are relevantly similar and which are therefore likely to be assigned to a 
common category or kind.  What I mean here by ‘evoking’ and ‘bringing to mind’ will 
hopefully become clear, but it involves those previously perceived objects becoming 
available to awareness. 
 
Before attempting to defend this surprising conclusion, I should say a little more about 
the role of perceptible similarity in the account.  I take it that a conceptual-recognitional 
capacity exploits perceptible similarities between objects of the same type or temporal 
stages of the same object.  Furthermore, I assume that the exploitation of similarities 
among objects or temporal stages of an object is made possible in turn by similarities 
among the perceptual effects of those objects or temporal stages, notably their effects on 
the subject’s neural states. 
 
This latter appeal to similar perceptual effects avoids a concern about circumscribing 
the range of possible similarities among perceived objects.  The concern is that one could 
posit all manner of similarity relations between any pair of objects; claiming that we are 
perceptually sensitive to objective similarities therefore invites the demand that we explain 
just which of many possible similarity relations we are sensitive to.  Appealing instead to 
similarity relations among perceptual effects, rather than what these are effects of, obviates 
the need for any such explanation.   
 
The requirement for similar perceptual effects is also made plausible by the thought 
that a subject’s application of the same concept to perceptual experiences of different 
                                                 
needs to be said to generate a necessary condition for seeing in terms of tracking.  For example, we can 
see things for a split second but it is questionable whether we can be said to track things over such a short 
period; the condition should perhaps be that we can track them for as long as they affect us visually.   
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objects or temporal stages of an object is itself a common kind of effect of diverse 
experiences.  It might be objected, however, that the same problem recurs in respect of 
similarity among neural effects.  Which of many possible similarity relations among neural 
states are significant in relation to the respective perceptual experiences or the application 
of a concept to both?   
 
Implicit in the question is the thought that we must, in applying a concept, select from 
among various possible similarities among, on the one hand, the perceived objects or, on 
the other, their neural causes.  The solution, however, is to recognise that what is involved 
in bringing diverse objects under the same concept is a certain commonality of behavioural 
response to those objects.  Just what those behavioural similarities are will depend on the 
concept under consideration, but the principle can be illustrated by example.  So, applying 
the concept CAT to diverse perceptual experiences of cats (and misleadingly cat-like non-
cats) will in each case consist in, for example, the subject’s assenting to the utterance ‘Is 
that a cat?’, reaching for the cat food, and so on.55   
 
To see how our conceptual-recognitional capacity involves the exploitation of 
similarities among diverse objects, and how my account uses this to posit a constitutive 
role in current perceptual experience for previously perceived objects, it will help to 
consider an example.  Let us imagine a subject’s sequence of perceptions of a series of 
similar objects – the subject’s seeing some sunflowers, say.  According to my earlier 
assumption, the similarity of the environmental stimuli will be reflected in certain 
similarities in the resulting perceptual neural states; not least a similarity in the locus of 
neural effect.56  Again, let us assume that the subject’s visual experience leaves ‘traces’ at 
the locus of its perceptual effect, traces which underwrite later recollection of the object 
and its perceptible qualities.  It follows from these two assumptions that the subject’s 
seeing a sunflower at time t1 (let us call this object sunflower 1) will leave a trace over 
more or less the same neural locus that is activated by a sunflower seen at a later time t2 
                                                 
55  Whether we could enumerate necessary and/or sufficient conditions for possession of the concept CAT is 
debatable and arguably beside the point.  As will become apparent, an account of concepts relevant to the 
sorts of perceptual phenomena considered here will take the notion of concept possession as having to do 
ultimately with subjects’ propensity to assimilate certain worldly objects and qualities in virtue of how 
they appear perceptually. 
56  I am ignoring possible differences in the subject’s perspective on the different sunflowers and possible 
differences in background conditions such as illumination.  These possible differences potentially 
complicate a theory of concept formation along the lines I am proposing, but it is beyond the scope of the 
current thesis to address this. 
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(sunflower 2).  Now, given my assumption (3) above, this trace will to some extent 
influence or constrain the neural effect wrought by sunflower 2.  In other words, this neural 
effect would have been different had the subject not previously seen sunflower 1.  What 
this means is that the neural state instantiated in seeing sunflower 2 is the effect of both 
sunflower 2 and sunflower 1, and furthermore that the neural state in some measure carries 
information about, because it is isomorphic to, both sunflowers 1 and 2.  As the subject 
goes on to see sunflowers 3, 4, 5 and so on, there develops a layering or progressive 
modification of traces over roughly the same neural locus, so that each subsequent neural 
state is causally constrained by all of those that preceded it. 
 
Now, when we bring the simple metaphysical picture back into the frame, it might 
seem that sunflowers 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. are all on a par when it comes to seeing the latest 
sunflower in the series.  All of them participate causally in the perceptual process 
culminating in the subject’s instantiating the relevant neural state.  And in each case the 
form of the sunflower influences the form of the neural state such that there is a significant 
degree of isomorphism between one and the other.  We might therefore wonder whether it 
follows, given the simple metaphysical picture, that the subject’s seeing sunflower 4 is 
also, to some extent, an experience of sunflowers 1, 2 and 3. 
 
On the face of it, this is implausible.  The kind of experience we wish to account for is 
explicitly an ordinary one in which it appears to the subject that she perceives only the one 
sunflower – the one that is before her at the time, namely sunflower 4.  Nonetheless, the 
conclusion I wish to draw is precisely that sunflowers 1, 2 and 3 play a constitutive role in 
the experience of sunflower 4 in such a way as to influence its phenomenology.  Clearly, 
however, the four objects are not on a par when it comes to the experience and its 
phenomenology.  What is needed is an explanation of how the other sunflowers exert an 
influence over the experience’s phenomenology and how this differs from the influence of 
the one that is seen. 
 
All of sunflowers 1-4 affect the subject causally and appropriately via her visual 
system, albeit that the causal process is, for sunflowers 1-3, mediated by some ‘memory 
traces’.  Furthermore, we might assume that the causal process is in each case 
appropriately information preserving, i.e. the effect (the subject’s perceptual brain state) is 
one which contains significant information about the visible properties of each of 
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sunflowers 1-4.  As I suggested earlier in this section, the crucial difference between the 
subject’s awareness of sunflower 4 and her awareness of sunflowers 1-3 is not that the 
former lacks a mediating memory trace, but that this awareness permits her to track 
sunflower 4 over time through changes in its perceptible properties.  To put it in terms of 
the physical process of perception, the subject’s perceptual neural state comes under the 
causal constraint of sunflower 4 in a way that it doesn’t to sunflowers 1-3, i.e. there is a 
causally-mediated correlation between changes in sunflower 4 and changes in the subject’s 
relevant neural activity. 
 
What, then, should we say of sunflowers 1, 2 and 3 if not that they are seen?  Nor 
should we say that they are recalled, despite the fact that their role in a current experience 
is akin to that of a remembered (or hallucinated) object, inasmuch as they are previously 
perceived objects playing a constitutive role in a current experience, and so coming back 
into awareness.  After all, it is not typically the case that, in seeing sunflower 4, a subject 
will consciously recall any or all of sunflowers 1, 2 and 3.  In other words, sunflowers 1, 2 
and 3 do not obviously intrude into the phenomenology of the experience. 
 
Nonetheless, I have claimed that sunflowers 1, 2 and 3 do in fact contribute 
constitutively to the phenomenology of the experience of seeing sunflower 4.  So how is 
this manifest if it is typically not obvious to the subject upon reflection?  Recall the 
experiments that revealed the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience.  Presumably 
in these cases – of heart-shapes appearing redder than their objective hue, bananas more 
yellow, etc. – the subjects were not reflectively aware of these biases in their perceptual 
experiences until they were revealed to them by the experimenters.  Nonetheless, the 
effects were demonstrably real.   
 
In the case of the heart-shapes, my theory would suggest that the ‘extra’ redness not 
objectively qualifying the currently seen heart-shape is constituted by the actual redness of 
previously seen heart-shapes.  A notable feature of this phenomenon is that these 
previously seen heart-shapes and their qualities are manifested in the experience’s 
phenomenology ‘merged’ with the currently seen shape and its qualities.  In other words, 
we do not see the heart-shape located before us and have some vague and unlocated sense 
of ‘extra’ redness – this redness qualifies the same apparent location as the genuinely seen 
shape.  The perceived object is thus, in a sense, imbued or amalgamated with more or less 
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faint ‘traces’ of similar objects previously perceived.  It is presumably a combination of 
this ‘faintness’ of the previously perceived objects and their subsumption within the 
apparent location of the currently perceived object that accounts for our usual lack of 
reflective awareness of cognitive penetration.   
 
There are thus two aspects to what we might call the ‘domination’ of the currently 
perceived object over the previously perceived objects: first, the former’s determination of 
the perceived location of the relevant phenomenal qualities; and, second, the greater 
contribution of the former’s qualities to the phenomenology of the experience.  This 
second factor might be explained in terms of the magnitude of their respective causal 
influence on the perceptual neural state.  We can understand this in counterfactual terms: if 
we take a set of objects that contribute causally and formally to a neural state N, and 
consider counterfactual situations in which each object in turn is deleted from the relevant 
causal history, the counterfactual neural states N’, N’’, N’’’ etc. will each differ to a 
greater or lesser extent from the actual state N.  The limit case will be the counterfactual 
situation in which the currently perceived object is deleted (Sunflower 4 in the previous 
example): in this case neither neural state N nor anything relevantly similar will be 
activated.  Here we can see a special sense in which the currently perceived object plays 
the dominant causal role in bringing about N.  There is an asymmetric causal dependence 
of the effects of sunflowers 1 to 3 on the effects of sunflower 4: sunflowers 1 to 3 would 
not have effected any current neural activity at the relevant locus were it not for the effects 
of sunflower 4, whereas sunflower 4 would still have wrought some such (if somewhat 
different) effects had some or all of sunflowers 1 to 3 never been seen.57   
 
I have described the effect of perceptual learning as one in which the qualities of 
previously perceived objects are in a sense amalgamated with the qualities of whatever is 
currently before the subject.  This implies a sort of superimposition of the past quality on 
the present.  Note, however, that the case of the banana image (Hansen et al. 2006) shows 
that we would be wrong to think that the cognitive effect literally involves the 
superimposition of the colour of past bananas (yellow) over that of the current banana-
image (blue-grey), for that would presumably result in the appearance of greenish grey 
rather than grey.  Rather, the effect appears to be one of interference more than 
                                                 
57  This notion of asymmetric dependence owes something to Fodor’s account of perceptual content (Fodor 
1989: 106-110). 
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superimposition, at least in this case where, unlike the Delk and Fillenbaum example, the 
contribution of the cognitive faculty is a colour complementary (i.e. opposed) to that 
possessed by the target object.   
 
 
5.5   From perceptual learning to cognitive penetration 
 
In summary, then, the proposed theory of perceptual learning, drawing on the simple 
metaphysical picture, holds that the phenomenology of experience is attributable both to 
awareness of what is presently perceived and to awareness of one or more things 
previously perceived.  Those previously perceived objects that contribute significantly to 
phenomenology in this way are ‘brought to mind’ by virtue of their perceptually relevant 
similarities to the object currently perceived.   
 
As far as it goes, this might sound like a possible account of perceptual learning, since 
the influence of previously perceived objects is more or less permanent (as permanent as 
the memory ‘traces’ presumably) and not obviously susceptible to conscious control by the 
subject.  It would be reasonable to consider the mechanism genuinely cognitive inasmuch 
as it purports to form the basis of conceptual-recognitional capacities.  All the same, there 
is no explicit role for beliefs or similarly sophisticated cognitive states in generating the 
influence, so this is clearly not suitable as an account of cognitive penetration.   
 
Extending the account to accommodate cognitive penetration might, however, be 
achievable without too much modification.  Consider the Levin and Banaji experiment 
with the ambiguous face images (and assume that this is genuinely a case of cognitive 
penetration).  Here the subjects’ beliefs about the ambiguous image are engineered by 
labelling the images as either ‘black’ or ‘white’.  Perhaps what is going on here is that, in 
the given context, the written word ‘black’ evokes a ‘memory image’ of one or more black 
persons’ faces.  In line with my account of perceptual learning, the ‘memory image’ is 
really constituted by awareness of those previously perceived faces.  As in the heart-shape 
or the banana-image, the recalled objects (faces in this case) are ‘superimposed’ on the 
seen image such that it seems to the subjects that they are aware of only the one object.  
The difference with perceptual learning is just that the recollection or evocation of 
previously perceived objects is augmented or potentiated by some stimulus other than the 
target object.   
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It is likely, of course, that the ambiguous face image itself evokes previously 
perceived faces, albeit that the ambiguity is likely to evoke previously-seen black and 
white faces more or less equally.  What the addition of the label does is to skew the 
balance in favour of recollecting black faces.  It might be assumed that the provision of the 
label here serves to prompt a conscious belief of the sort expressed by ‘That is a black 
face’, although it is unclear, given the proposed mechanism, whether we really need to 
think of this belief as a genuine intermediary between the image and the phenomenological 
effect.  Certainly, we need some way of accounting for the way in which the unqualified 
word ‘black’ is understood to refer to the character of the represented face.  Furthermore, 
we need a mechanism by which perception of the written word ‘black’ inspires recollection 
of previously perceived black faces.  Some sort of associative mechanism seems likely 
here, whereby the brain effects appropriate causal linkages between perceived words (e.g. 
the written or spoken word ‘black’) and certain objects.  A given word might become 
associated with different objects for different reasons, so that ambiguity results (think of 
black people, black cats, black moods, etc.), and a plausible associative theory would need 
to account for the role of context in effecting disambiguation, presumably by providing 
other perceptible objects that reinforce some associative linkages and not others.  A 
detailed account of this sort is beyond the scope of this thesis, but we might begin to see 
how the notion of beliefs as intermediary states or events between an object perceived and 
one (or more) recollected might not be necessary.  Just as the associative mechanism 
proposed to account for perceptual learning might form the basis for what we call a 
conceptual-recognitional capacity, the evocation of previously perceived objects (what we 
might metaphorically call the ‘priming of memory images’) by certain external cues 
(written words, for example) might be sufficient in itself to account for what we call the 
influence of belief on perception in at least some cases.58 
 
 
  
                                                 
58  Compare Macpherson’s ‘indirect mechanism’ of cognitive penetration, which takes the latter to involves 
two steps: first, the relevant cognitive state by a quasi-imaginative process generates some appropriate 
phenomenal qualities (as when, for example, the belief that an image is a heart shape evokes the colour 
red and puts it before the mind’s eye, as it were); and, second, this phenomenal quality is in some more or 
less literal sense amalgamated with the phenomenal quality instantiated in virtue of one’s perceptual 
experience of the heart-shaped image (Macpherson 2012: 54-5).   
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5.6   Ambiguous figures and error 
 
Cognitive penetration has been held responsible for the familiar phenomenon of 
‘aspect shifts’ involving ambiguous figures, as when the famous duck-rabbit figure is seen 
at one moment as a duck and at another moment a rabbit.  This phenomenon might be 
accommodated using the same mechanism as described in the previous two sections.  
Assuming that the figure’s ambiguity comprises its roughly equal similarity to both 
stereotypical ducks (or duck images) and stereotypical rabbits (or rabbit images), and that 
this similarity is reflected in a similar degree of congruence or overlap between the 
following pairs of neural states: [Nf (neural state caused by the figure) & Nd (neural state 
caused by typical duck/duck image)] and [Nf & Nr (neural state caused by typical 
rabbit/rabbit image)].  With such a similar degree of congruence between Nf and Nd as 
between Nf and Nr, we might suppose that there is a more or less equal likelihood of the 
figure evoking previously seen ducks as rabbits (in other words, a similar likelihood that 
the subject will see the figure as a duck as that she will see it as a rabbit).   
 
As described, this mechanism implies that the ‘aspect seeing’ involved, whichever 
way it goes, is a product of perceptual learning.  That is, it results from a simple associative 
mechanism requiring no involvement of beliefs, etc., and the effect, albeit ambiguous, 
might be assumed to be more or less permanent.  If the phenomenon exemplifies cognitive 
penetration, it is therefore not in the phenomenon of aspect seeing itself, but in the 
subject’s ability to ‘flip’ the phenomenology more or less at will.  Here, it might be said 
that the subject’s consciously entertaining the thought that the image represents a duck is 
what ‘triggers’ the switch to seeing it as a duck.  Given my account of cognitive 
penetration, we might account for the aspect switch as resulting from the ‘priming’ of 
some potentially recollected objects more than others by means of some separate object of 
awareness.  This separate, ‘priming’ object might be a label (‘Duck’) next to the 
ambiguous figure or it might itself be a recollected hearing of the spoken word ‘duck’, and 
so on.  However the priming as achieved, it is liable to be described in terms of the 
subject’s ‘entertaining a thought about ducks’ or some such, but it should be clear that no 
distinct ‘thought’ is required here beyond the recollection (‘reawakened’ awareness) of 
previously perceived ducks, and awareness of the priming stimulus (an utterance of ‘duck’, 
say). 
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Of course, aspect seeing or ‘seeing-as’ is a ubiquitous phenomenon not confined to 
ambiguous figures and the like.  Most often, it is responsible for a certain veridicality in 
perception, namely our correct recognition of perceived objects as belonging to certain 
kinds.  It is also, on occasion, responsible for error.  We can account for error, too, using 
the simple metaphysical picture of perceptual learning proposed here.  Consider Fodor’s 
example of mistaking a cow for a horse (Fodor 1989: 107).  To put it in Fish’s terms, we 
here apply the wrong conceptual-recognitional capacity to the experience of the cow 
(2009: 165 ff.).  However, the simple metaphysical picture explains the error in terms that 
acknowledge a genuine influence on phenomenology from the application of the wrong 
concept.  What occurs in the case of seeing the cow is that, perhaps because of peculiarities 
of lighting or perspective, the cow causes activation of a perceptual neural state that is 
relevantly similar to that normally caused by horses.  The occurrence and form of this 
neural state thus comes under the causal constraint of previously seen horses which thus 
help to shape the phenomenology of the experience. 
 
If we ask what makes it ‘wrong’ for a sighting of a cow to elicit the re-presentation of 
previously seen horses then one answer is straightforward, not to say glib: a cow is not a 
horse.  The model of concepts and perceptual content involved here is rather different to, 
say, Fodor’s account, in which concepts are internal states or entities that represent horses 
or cows by virtue of some causal covariation with sightings of horses or cows.  Beyond 
this causal connection, the link between representational state and what is represented is 
arbitrary, and it is this feature that generates a problem that Fodor’s asymmetric 
dependence claim is intended to solve, viz. the problem that if causal covariation suffices 
for representation then the HORSE concept represents not just horses but also cows in bad 
light, large dogs in the mist, and so on (see Fodor 1989: 100 ff.).   
 
Since the simple metaphysical picture does not posit inner representations this 
problem does not arise.  On this view, what we call ‘concepts’ are better thought of as 
complex regularities of causal interaction between physical subjects and worldly objects.  
What do the work in perceptual experience – what contribute constitutively to its 
phenomenology – are not inner representations (or their representata) but worldly objects 
and their qualities.   
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Of course, more needs to be said about what makes a case of this sort an instance of 
misidentification and not just an instance of a cow putting us in mind of a horse.  It should, 
for example, be a case in which the evocation of previously seen horses primes us to 
behave as if the thing seen really were a horse, e.g. to assent to “Is that a horse?”, to put on 
a riding hat, etc.  In other cases, there might be enough ambiguity in the cow’s appearance 
to make us doubt our identification.  In still other cases, we might recognise on balance 
that it is a cow and yet simultaneously enjoy the slight ambiguity and aspect shift that it 
engenders. 
 
 
5.7   Conclusion – perception as presentation and re-presentation 
 
I have proposed an account of the interface between the perceptual presence of our 
environment and our conceptual-recognitional capacities.  This account combines the 
simple metaphysical picture of perceptual presence with its similarly object-involving 
account of memory and hallucination in order to build up a picture of the ‘conceptual 
presence’ of previously perceived objects in our current perceptual experience.  Especially 
if such cognitive influences on phenomenology are widespread or even ubiquitous in 
perception, we might think that they undermine the natural view that perception is just a 
straightforward encounter with our environment.  At least, they force us to acknowledge 
that perception is not always simply an encounter with what is before us right now.  Even 
so, the account offered here still explains the cognitive aspects of phenomenology 
exhaustively by appeal to objects ‘out there’ in our environment, and without recourse to 
some ‘internal’ factors.   
 
In summary, the account rests on a mechanism for perceptual learning (framed in 
terms of vision) which goes as follows: 
 
1. The object O is before the subject S, and S sees O. 
 
2. S's seeing O involves O's causing some pattern of neural activity N in S.  N's 
occurring now is therefore a causal consequence of O's presence. 
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3. Visually similar objects (seen in the same conditions) cause correspondingly 
similar patterns of brain activity in a given subject, both in respect of the location 
and form (pattern) of neuronal activity. 
 
4. Normally, when an object perceptually causes a certain pattern of brain activity, the 
affected areas of the brain are altered such that their responsiveness to subsequent 
inputs of the same kind is changed in some way.  The changes in part constitute 
what we call 'memory traces'. 
 
5. That being so, and assuming a history of the subject's seeing objects like O, N's 
having the form that it does is a causal consequence not just of O's presence now 
but also of S's having previously seen relevantly similar objects. 
 
6. Given the simple metaphysical picture, since the (visually perceptible) formal 
properties of the previously seen objects are partly causally responsible for N's 
having the form or pattern it does, those formal properties (and therefore the 
previously-seen objects) contribute to the phenomenology of the experience. 
 
7. The visual experience of O has a character constituted not just by O and its 
properties but also by the visually similar previously seen objects. 
 
8. Seeing O therefore 'brings to mind' in a rather literal sense those previously seen 
objects that belong to the same kind.  Whether or not the subject is aware of the 
presence of those objects (recalls them as such), they exert an influence over the 
character of the experience, as revealed in cases of cognitive penetration. 
 
I suggested that, with modest elaboration, the same mechanism could account for at 
least some of what is called cognitive penetration of perceptual experience.  The extra step 
would be allowing an additional ‘reawakening’ of causal links to previously perceived O-
like objects by way of associative links to other perceptible objects (labels, utterances, 
etc.).  Much more needs to be said about the associative mechanism at play here to make a 
strong case for a simple metaphysical picture of cognitive penetration, and that is beyond 
the scope of the current thesis. 
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It would likewise require a much larger project to assess whether the proposed 
mechanism for perceptual learning could form the basis for a full-blown theory of 
concepts.  However, it does seek to marry the natural view with the claim that a 
conceptual-recognitional capacity serves at least as a bridge or interface between the 
perceptual (what we perceive in the sense of tracking) and the cognitive.  As such, 
perceptual ‘concepts’ as I have described them appear as a certain kind of coming together 
or amalgamation of relevantly similar (current and previously) perceived objects in 
awareness, in such a way that they make a joint contribution to the overall 
phenomenology.59  In light of the simple metaphysical picture, this ‘coming together’ of 
currently and previously objects is recast as a complex causal interaction mediated by the 
subject, and specifically her relevant neural state, a state whose occurrence and form is the 
causal upshot of all of those objects that contribute constitutively to the phenomenology of 
the experience.  Thus, individual objects and the perception of them are clearly prior to the 
‘concepts’ that are composed from them.   
 
The proposed account also permits a partial rapprochement with the concerns of those 
philosophers who hold that experience is representational rather than merely 
presentational. Although the object perceived is not represented in experience, but merely 
presented, there is a sense in which perceptual experience does typically involve some 
representation.  The ‘conceptual-recognitional’ element in experience is, in a rather literal 
sense, the re-presentation of objects previously perceived, objects that the currently 
perceived object ‘brings to mind’ in the manner described above.  The explanation of the 
sensory and conceptual elements is thus unified, such that what is now a conceptual 
element was once a sensory element.  Moreover, the proposed account makes it plausible 
to suppose that – except perhaps in some state of newborn inexperience – all of our 
perceptual experiences are ‘conceptual’ in the sense of involving such re-presentation to 
some extent.  This would follow from a substantial overlap of neural loci for the effects of 
different experiences, as described above.  The upshot is an explanation for both the 
immediacy and generality of perception cast simply in terms of awareness of worldly 
objects. 
 
                                                 
59  It is an interesting question whether we should therefore say that the phenomenal character is borne by 
the scene before the subject.  Our answer will hinge on whether we take the scene to be just what is 
physically most present to the subject, or the totality of what the subject is aware of.  If the latter, then the 
scene is a complex amalgam of present and past objects of awareness. 
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CHAPTER 6 – PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (IV): THE SUBJECT-
RELATIVITY OF PHENOMENAL QUALITIES  
 
6.1   Introduction   
 
In previous chapters I have described a number of perceptual phenomena that are 
ostensibly at odds with the natural view, and argued that they can in fact be squared with 
the natural view in one way or another.  Most straightforwardly, many cases of perceptual 
illusion (notably what Fish calls physical illusions) can be accommodated to the natural 
view simply by noting that the latter does not require that worldly objects always appear 
perceptually to be how they really are.  Rather, it requires only that the phenomenology of 
perception is explicable by reference to those objects and their qualities (plus background 
conditions of illumination, etc. and the way the objects are arrayed before the subject).  
This is consistent with the possibility that the way in which those objects and qualities are 
presented to us – perhaps in strange lighting or from an unusual angle – leads us to an 
erroneous judgment about the nature of the objects and qualities.  Hallucinations, 
meanwhile, require a more sophisticated explanation, and here I appealed to the simple 
metaphysical picture as a way to account for the genuine phenomenology of hallucinatory 
experiences while avoiding the postulation of peculiar mental objects or qualities of 
awareness.  The proposed solution – which takes hallucinations to have worldly objects – 
furthermore offered a way to account for some more pervasive, everyday aspects of both 
illusory and veridical perception, namely the constitutive role in phenomenology of 
cognitive states such as memory, beliefs and judgments.   
 
Common to these explanations was an attempt to explain the relevant experiences 
without compromising the natural view and, crucially, to do so while preserving the 
explanatory virtue of naïve realism.  Thus, in each case I sought to account for the 
experience in such a way that its phenomenology is explicable by reference to worldly 
objects of awareness and their perceptible qualities.  In other words, the order of 
explanation goes from the antecedent nature of the worldly objects and qualities perceived 
to the phenomenology of the experience. 
 
Nonetheless, one or two cases were described where this approach appears somewhat 
strained.  Key amongst these is the Rubik’s cube illusion described in chapter 3.5, in which 
certain parts of the adjacent images, when seen in isolation from their surroundings, can be 
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seen to have the same colour, namely grey, but appear to have quite opposed colours – blue 
and yellow – when seen within the context of the images as a whole.  Here, there seems to 
be a mismatch between how the image is, objectively, and how it subjectively appears to 
be.  Most importantly, this mismatch seems not to be explicable solely by appeal to how 
things are in the subject’s environment relative to the subject’s spatial perspective, but 
instead appears to derive from the nature of processes internal to the subject. 
 
In this chapter I will say more about this case as well as two further features of 
perceptual experience – in particular, of colour experience – that similarly point to what I 
will call the subject-relativity of phenomenal qualities.  I will concede that these cases 
provide compelling evidence that, at least in the case of colour, the nature of the 
phenomenal qualities we perceive objects to possess is dependent on the nature of the 
perceiving subject.  Put this way, the claim is ambiguous between several readings.  On 
one reading, it might be taken merely to acknowledge that the nature of the subject – the 
scope of her sensory apparatus – is such that she is able to perceive only some worldly 
qualities and not others.  That is entirely plausible but also perfectly compatible with the 
natural view, and as such is not relevant to my argument in this chapter.  Rather, the 
interesting readings are those which claim that, for some qualities actually perceived, the 
nature of those qualities is determined in part by the nature of the subject.   
 
As a first approximation, let us state the claim of subject-relativity as follows, 
formulated for the case of colour experience: 
 
Subject relativity: the nature of perceived (phenomenal) colour is determined 
in part by the nature of the perceiving subject. 
 
Further disambiguation is possible here.  On the one hand, we might claim that when a 
subject looks at a coloured object, which colour she perceives it to have is dependent in 
part on the nature of that subject.  On the other hand, we might claim that the nature of 
perceived colour in general is subject-relative.  The nature of colour in general I take to be 
exhausted by the full range of visible hues together with their relations of mutual similarity 
(these hues and relations can be visualised in the form of a phenomenal colour ‘space’ as I 
will describe further in section 6.4 below).   
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In respect of the first reading, we might imagine two normal sighted subjects viewing 
the same object under the same conditions of lighting, perspective and so on.  One sees the 
object as green, say, and the other sees it as blue (this is exactly the sort of case I will 
describe below as evidence for subject-relativity).  Here, the relevant phenomenal quality 
of each subject’s experience is relative to his or herself.  This does not entail, however, that 
the nature of colour in general is subject-relative, just that which colour an object is 
perceived to have on any given occasion is subject-relative.  We might very well claim in 
addition that the nature of colour in general is subject-relative, and this gives us our second 
reading of the subject-relativity claim.   
 
Thus, again for the example of colour, we can state the two readings as follows: 
 
Subject relativity particular: the colour an object is perceived to have is 
determined in part by the nature of the perceiving subject. 
 
Subject relativity general: the nature of colour itself, including the full range of 
possible hues and their relations of mutual similarity, is determined in part 
by the nature of the perceiving subject. 
 
I will cite some empirical findings concerning perception which compel us to concede 
the truth of both subject relativity particular and subject relativity general.  Subject relativity 
particular is defended by appeal to two phenomena of normal colour experience: first, cases of 
perceptual colour adaptation (exemplified by the Rubik’s cube illusion); and, second, 
marked intersubjective variation in hue perception.  Subject relativity general, meanwhile, is 
supported by compelling evidence that the nature of colour in general is indeed subject-
relative – specifically that the set of mutual similarity relations among colours, and which 
are partly constitutive of the nature of the colours, is explicable not by reference to 
properties of coloured objects but by the nature and functioning of the human visual 
system.   
 
As it turns out, the use of two different kinds of case to defend subject relativity particular 
exposes some residual ambiguity in that thesis.  In perceptual colour adaptation the 
subject-relativity of perceived (phenomenal) colour is illustrated by a phenomenon that is 
assumed to manifest similarly amongst all normally sighted subjects.  Meanwhile, 
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intersubjective variation in hue perception illustrates the subject-relativity of colour by 
showing that the colour an object is perceived to have depends on which particular subject 
is doing the looking.  In other words, perceptual colour adaptation shows that there is some 
feature common to normally sighted subjects – something in the structure and functioning 
of the normal human visual system – that partly determines and explains the (broad) 
colours objects are perceived to have in certain circumstances, while intersubjective 
variation in hue perception shows that differences between individual normally sighted 
subjects partly determine and explain more or less fine differences in the colours objects 
are perceived to have by those respective subjects.   
 
These findings are of course not in conflict, and indeed may be mutually supportive.  
The fact that the specific natures of individual subjects partly determine and explain the 
colours they perceive objects to have is perfectly compatible with a broad commonality 
amongst subjects in respect of perceived colour.  This follows straightforwardly if we 
factor in a broad similarity among normally sighted subjects in respect of the structure and 
functioning of their visual systems.60 
 
As such, there is compatibility between two kinds of phenomena illustrative of subject 
relativity particular.  Although one could endorse subject relativity particular without endorsing 
subject relativity general, it is doubtful whether one could endorse subject relativity general 
without also endorsing subject relativity particular.  If the very nature of colour is subject-
relative then whatever colour an object is perceived to have on a particular occasion must 
also depend upon the nature of the subject.  Note that this would not rule out the possibility 
that the nature of colour is determined by the nature of perceiving subjects but that all 
subjects nonetheless perceive the same objects as having the same colours.  The subject-
relativity of colour per se does not entail any intersubjective variation in colour perception, 
since all subjects might have visual systems that function in exactly the same way.  Rather, 
                                                 
60  The same point may be made to defuse a similar ambiguity that might be discerned in subject relativity 
general.  So, on the one hand, we might take perceived colour to have a nature – revealed in the structure of 
similarity relations among individual colours – that is common to all normally sighted subjects because 
determined by some features of the visual system shared by all these subjects.  On the other hand, we 
might find that the nature of colour is not common to all normally sighted subjects but varies according to 
the precise nature of the subject (the structure and functioning of her visual system).  In this latter case, 
the nature of colour in general – in particular, the structure of relations of mutual similarity among 
perceived colours – might vary from subject to subject, such that there is no single colour nature shared 
by all normally sighted subjects.  Conversely, were such intersubjective variation lacking, this would be 
explicable in terms of the identical functioning of different subjects’ visual systems. 
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it entails that the perceived colour of an object is subject-relative and cannot be explained 
without reference to something in the nature of the subject. 
 
Although subject relativity particular is thus consistent with the denial of subject relativity 
general, we might hope for a unified explanation of the two theses if it turns out that there is 
good independent evidence for both.  The phenomena of colour vision that I will describe 
in this chapter provide just such evidence, and I will go on to offer an account, employing 
the simple metaphysical picture, that might point to such a unified explanation. 
 
In the meantime, if one or both varieties of subject relativity are true then the natural 
view looks to be in trouble.  After all, if some or all phenomenal qualities are subject-
relative then surely they cannot be out there, inhering in worldly objects as they seem.  
That would be too hasty a conclusion, however.  What we are entitled to conclude from the 
conjunction of the natural view and subject relativity is that phenomenal qualities are out 
there in the environment, and that these qualities are subject-relative.  However absurd that 
conclusion might seem, it is at least consistent and intelligible.  The seeming absurdity 
reflects the fact that conjoining the natural view and subject relativity yields the denial of 
the realism claim, namely the claim that worldly objects exist and have their perceptible 
qualities independently of their being perceived.  Since I defined naïve realism as the 
conjunction of the natural view and the realism claim, it follows that the truth of subject 
relativity entails the falsity of naïve realism but not the falsity of the natural view. 
 
Still, abandoning the realism claim would seem a very high price to pay for retaining 
the natural view.  It would leave us with two major questions:  
 
1. How can we make sense of qualities’ being out there in the environment and yet 
also determined in part by the subject? 
 
2. What does this entail for other qualities of objects that do not seem to be subject-
relative, and indeed for the objects themselves? 
 
The second question reflects a seeming disparity thrown up by subject relativity between 
those qualities that seem subject-relative (colour, in the cases to be described) and others 
that seem quintessentially subject-independent, such as shape and mass.  To suggest this 
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distinction is of course to echo the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
proposed by Galileo, Locke and others.  Those thinkers were led by this distinction to 
conclude that certain qualities are really out there (primary qualities) while others exist 
only ‘in the mind’ (secondary qualities).  The natural view plainly requires that we reject 
the latter confinement of colours, etc., to the mind, but accepting something like the 
primary/secondary quality distinction forces us then to conclude that, of the perceptible 
qualities of worldly objects, some are subjective (subject-relative) and some are objective 
(subject-independent).  This is worrying since it is rather implicit in the natural view that 
all perceptible qualities are ‘on a par’: when a subject looks at a tomato it is the tomato’s 
roundness and the tomato’s redness that together constitute the relevant part of the 
experience’s phenomenology.  According to the natural view we are aware of these 
(respectively, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’) qualities in the same way – simply by their being 
out there in the world and our seeing them.  What’s more, the roundness and redness in this 
instance are rather literally bound together – the redness pervades the tomato’s outer 
surface which in turn defines its shape.   
 
Any solution to the second question is likely to hinge on our answer to the first.  As it 
turns out, the view that certain qualities are out there in the world but nonetheless subject-
relative (or ‘mind-dependent’) can in fact be found quite widely among philosophers, 
albeit not allied to anything like the natural view.  The kinds of perceptual phenomena 
motivating subject relativity are often used to support the broad kind of theory known as 
relationalism about colour (for a defence see e.g. Cohen 2004, Cohen 2007).  Several 
varieties of colour relationalism have been proposed (for a brief summary see Cohen 2010: 
232), but one in particular has been widely defended and conforms, at least on the face of 
it, with the view (explicit in the natural view) that colours are out there inhering in the 
ostensibly coloured objects perceived.  This kind of colour relationalism holds that colours 
are dispositional in nature – specifically, an object’s colour is its disposition to look a 
certain way (red, green, etc.).  So, for a tomato to be red is for it to be disposed to look red 
to normal subjects under normal conditions (of illumination etc.).  The redness here is 
identified with the disposition to look red, and is therefore subject-relative since its being 
the quality it is tied essentially to how it looks to normal subjects.61 
                                                 
61  There is a related account of colour which says that what it is for an object to be red is for it to have a 
property that disposes it to look red to normal subjects under normal conditions.  Where the relevant 
property is taken to be physical, this can be considered a form of physicalism about colour (see e.g. Glüer 
2007).   
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I will later remark on the unsuitability of a dispositional account of colours for a 
theory endorsing the natural view.  Unfortunately, this will leave few, if any, obvious 
alternatives.  Several of the more promising theories of colour will prove casualties of the 
perceptual phenomena I am about to describe.  Notably, these theories include those that 
identify them with physical properties of objects (one or other form of physicalism), and 
those that, by contrast, treat them as occurrent properties of objects that are primitive, 
irreducible to physical properties (this is primitivism about colour). 
 
Mindful of some of the features of colour experience that I am about to describe, 
Johnston claims that 
 
when it comes to the external explanatory causes of our color experiences, 
psychophysics has narrowed down the options.  Those causes are either non-
dispositional microphysical properties, light dispositions (reflectance or 
Edwin Land’s designator dispositions or something of that sort) or 
psychological dispositions (dispositions to appear colored) with 
microphysical or light-dispositional bases.   
       Johnston (1992: 224) 
   
It will transpire that neither the physicalist nor the dispositionalist theories of colour 
are a good fit for my defence of the natural view, since they either fail to explain certain 
features of colour experience or fail to accord with the basic insight of the natural view, 
viz. that phenomenal qualities like colours are out there in the environment, inhering in 
worldly objects.  I will argue, however, that if Johnston’s claim therefore seems to leave us 
without any remaining options, then that is in part because he is constrained by the 
assumption that experiences are caused by their objects.  A rejection of this assumption, 
via endorsement of the simple metaphysical picture, points the way to an alternative 
account of colours, one that acknowledges their subject-relativity while leaving them just 
as much ‘out there’ in the world as the shape and size of things, and indeed the things 
themselves.  First let us turn to the allegedly problematic features of colour perception. 
 
 
6.2   Colour adaptation phenomena 
 
A striking feature of colour perception is that the apparent colour of objects is 
susceptible to variation according to the visual context in which they are seen.  In chapter 2 
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I described the phenomena of simultaneous colour contrast and colour constancy, in which 
an object’s apparent colour is influenced, respectively, by the colour of its surrounds or by 
the ambient illumination.  Both phenomena can be understood as the upshot of 
compensatory processes in the visual system that enable subjects to track unchanging 
surface properties of objects through changes in visual context.62  For that reason I will 
collectively call these colour adaptation phenomena.   
 
In the normal course of events, colour adaptation actually serves to limit changes in 
the apparent colour of objects despite changes in visual context.  So, for example, surfaces 
often appear to retain their uniform colouration despite spatial or temporal variations in 
illumination.  However, I described cases in which the same phenomena give rise to 
illusion, and in these cases the context effects clearly alter the colour of the focal object or 
stimulus.  For example, in the Rubik’s cube illusion the two images are presented as 
though depicting the same or similar object situated in different background lighting 
conditions (or as seen through differently-coloured glasses).  The left-hand image appears 
to show the cube as if it were seen in a yellow light or through a yellow filter, while the 
right-hand image appears to show it in a blue light or through a blue filter.  One 
interpretation of what occurs in viewing these images is that we are led to judge mistakenly 
the colour of certain of the squares depicted as making up the surface of the cubes: certain 
of these squares are judged to be blue in the left-hand image and yellow in the right-hand 
image, when in both they prove to be grey when viewed in isolation.  However, the 
peculiar force of the illusion is precisely that it seems inadequate to explain it in terms of 
judgment, at least insofar as we are to draw a distinction between judgment and awareness 
in the way proposed by the two-faculty view discussed (and dismissed) when considering 
illusory perception in chapter 3.  What makes the illusion so powerful is that it seems to 
insist that the seeming blueness or yellowness of the squares in question are not merely 
matters of judgment, but are genuine qualities perceived – genuine phenomenal qualities.63 
 
                                                 
62  Similar perceptual constancy is observed in respect of other perceptible qualities such as shape and size 
(as when objects are seen from different perspectives). 
63  In this respect, the illusory cases avoid or dissolve an ambiguity that seems to attend the normal (loosely 
‘veridical’) upshots of colour adaptation.  For the philosopher of perception these latter cases can give 
rise to difficulties in disentangling different senses of ‘looks’: should we say that the white car under the 
sodium streetlamps looks both white (perhaps in the epistemic sense of ‘looks’) and orange (in the 
phenomenal sense)?  The more striking illusions, such as the Rubik’s cube illusion, are striking (i.e. 
clearly illusory) precisely because such ambiguity seems absent – the target squares in no way seem grey, 
the colour that they are seen to possess when viewed in isolation.  
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On the face of it, colour adaptation effects might seem to be explicable wholly in 
terms of how things are out in the world.  The phenomena seem to be universal and 
predictable, with the perceived colour of an object being systematically related to such 
‘external’ features as the object’s ‘actual colour’ (how it would look in optimal viewing 
conditions, however these are to be specified), its size and orientation relative to the 
subject, the colour and dimensions of surrounding objects, ambient illumination, and so on.  
Colour adaptation effects would therefore seem to exemplify what Fish calls physical 
illusions (noting of course that where the same phenomenon underwrites the appearance of 
colour constancy we would not attribute any illusion).  However, at least some of these 
contributory features would not seem sufficient genuinely to explain the perceived colour 
of the target object.  We can indeed understand how ambient illumination can change the 
apparent colour of an object (the white cube in red light, for example), namely by 
determining the actual spectral profile of light reflected from the object (to something like 
the profile that would be reflected by a red cube in white light).  By contrast, colour 
adaptation effects need not result from any change in the object itself or in the nature of the 
light it reflects.  To understand them fully it seems that we need to look elsewhere than in 
the subject’s environment – specifically, in some compensatory mechanisms in subjects’ 
visual systems that modulates the responses to localised colour stimuli according to the 
colour of background objects and/or the colour of ambient illumination.64   
 
Colour adaptation illusions thus support subject relativity particular, namely the claim 
that the perceived colour of a given object depends in part on the nature of perceiving 
subjects – in particular, the structure and functioning of their visual systems.  Nonetheless, 
we might envisage one possible explanation of this that renders it harmlessly compatible 
with both the natural view and the realism claim.  According to this explanation, the 
altered colour appearance of the object when seen against differently-coloured 
backgrounds might be due to changes in subjects’ sensitivity to certain components of the 
object’s colour due to adaptation effects (photoreceptor fatigue) arising from the 
background colour.  For example, subjects viewing a purple object against a red 
background might become less sensitive to the red component of the object’s colour, 
                                                 
64  For the classic explanation of simultaneous colour contrast in terms of opponent-process theory, see 
Jameson & Hurvich (1959), and for an alternative theory in light of more recent contradictory evidence 
see Ekroll & Faul (2012).  Although simultaneous contrast effects contribute towards colour constancy, 
the latter relies on compensatory responses to diverse confounding variables (e.g. orientation, depth, 
specular highlights and patterns of light and shade, in addition to changes in the colour of ambient light) 
so it seems likely that more than one physiological mechanism is involved. 
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effectively emphasising its blue component instead.  To this extent the phenomenon might 
be explicable in terms of effects at the photoreceptor level, and the change in perceived 
colour might be attributable to partial insensitivity to an object’s existing colour rather than 
to awareness of a different colour.  This explanation would be compatible with the 
conjunction of the natural view and the realism claim (i.e. naïve realism) since it would 
leave unhindered the claim that the relevant phenomenal quality (blue) is just the blueness 
mind-independently inhering in the object perceived.  The failure of the red component of 
the object’s purpleness to feature in phenomenology would simply reflect a (temporary) 
limitation on the subject’s perceptual sensitivity, where such limitations (permanent in the 
case of ultra-violet, for example) are perfectly compatible with the natural view. 
 
Certainly, the established physiological theories of simultaneous colour contrast allow 
that the effect may arise in part from adaptation to preceding and background colour 
stimuli in just the way described.  However, they also emphasise the more important 
influence of downstream processes in the visual system (e.g. Ekroll & Faul 2012).  In any 
case, an appeal to partial sensitivity would not account for colour adaptation effects 
experienced when looking at objects that are, under more optimal conditions, seen as 
possessing one of the unique hues, for in such cases the object’s colour has only a single 
colour component.  More strikingly still, partial sensitivity cannot account for the sort of 
colour adaptation effect exemplified by the Rubik’s cube illusion, where the target object is 
grey when viewed in isolation (i.e. altogether lacking in hue) and yet appears variously 
blue and yellow depending on its background.65 
                                                 
65  We might try to explain the Rubik’s cube illusion as a form of perceptual learning.  Thus, we might 
suggest that the appearance of blue or yellow where there is ‘objectively’ an instance of greyness is due to 
a learned grasp of how colour appearance varies under different lighting conditions.  Accordingly, when 
something is presented to us as achromatic under blue illumination (as depicted in one of the illusory 
images) perhaps we associate this with its being ‘objectively’ yellow (i.e. yellow in broad daylight) and it 
is the yellowness that is thus ‘brought to mind’ which influences the phenomenology of the experience.  
However, some sort of associative process appears unlikely here.  Notably, the colour adaptation 
phenomenon that seems chiefly responsible for the Rubik’s cube illusion is also observed when subjects 
view images that are not intended to depict the sort of real-world scenarios that might be expected to elicit 
learned associations.  Most typically, simultaneous colour contrast is illustrated with quite abstract images 
of a small square of one colour centred within a larger square of contrasting colour.  Although 
simultaneous contrast effects are typically hypothesised to reflect an evolved compensation of the visual 
system to variations in background illumination (Lotto & Purves 2000; although see Ekroll & Faul 2012 
for an alternative explanation), these sorts of abstract image do not look as though they involve or depict 
an instance of something’s being seen in coloured light.  The illusion therefore does not seem to involve 
or require any recognition or conceptualisation of the image as a depiction of something (a small square) 
seen in coloured light.  This tallies with evidence that the compensatory mechanism involved in 
simultaneous colour contrast occupies a stage in early visual processing, largely at the level of the 
opponent process (Ekroll & Faul 2012). 
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6.3   Intersubjective variation in unique hue perception 
 
While colour adaptation illusions seem to exemplify a form of subject-relativity that is 
universal amongst normal subjects, I will describe in this section a further phenomenon of 
colour perception whose interesting feature is that it presents as a difference between the 
colour perceptions of different subjects.  This therefore supports subject relativity particular 
via a somewhat different but complementary route.   
 
It is widely held that a universal and essential feature of perceived colours is their 
intuitive division into those that are ‘pure’ or ‘unique’ and those that appear to be formed 
from a mixture of those unique colours (see e.g. Hardin 1997: 291-2; Kay & McDaniel 
1997: 411; Conway & Stoughton 2008).  Thus, unique green is a green which appears 
neither bluish nor yellowish, and unique blue is a blue that appears to have a trace of 
neither green nor indigo.  Purple, however, is a ‘mixed’ or ‘impure’ colour that looks to be 
formed from blue and red.  Although different subjects typically agree that there is this 
distinction between unique and mixed colours (hues), there is often marked differences in 
the objects different subjects will point to as exemplars of the unique hues.  It is this 
intersubjective variation in unique hue perception that seems to support the thesis subject 
relativity particular.  Although any given subject may be consistent in attributing, say, unique 
greenness to the same object or spectral light at different times (assuming viewing 
conditions remain the same), a different subject is likely to (again, consistently) attribute 
unique greenness to spectral light of different wavelength or an object of different spectral 
reflectance (Kuehni 2004; Webster et al. 2000).66  Importantly, this is a phenomenon of 
normal colour vision; in other words, it is observed amongst subjects who have no 
recognised abnormality of colour vision, such as any of the various forms of ‘colour 
blindness’.  The intersubjective variation afflicts all of the unique hues (red, yellow, blue 
and green) but is especially marked for green (Kuehni 2004: 161).  As Block notes, so 
marked is it in the case of unique green that, among a random sample of normal subjects, 
there is never likely to a be a majority consensus over the identity of the unique hue: “if we 
                                                 
66  There is also evidence for some intrasubjective variation in unique hue perception over longer periods of 
time.  In particular, the wavelength of monochromatic light sources seen as unique green shorten as 
subjects age, and this seems likely to be due to changes in neuronal sensitivity at the level of the opponent 
process (Schefrin & Werner 1990).  The same study also found that an individual subject will attribute 
unique green to light sources of slightly different wavelengths depending on the intensity (luminance) of 
that light source (ibid.). 
167 
 
 
 
take a chip that any one subject in this experiment takes as being unique green, most of the 
others will see it as at least slightly bluish or yellowish” (Block 1999: 43).  More striking 
yet is the observation that there is overlap between the range of hues identified as uniquely 
blue and that identified as uniquely green – so there will be some hues that some subjects 
identify as uniquely green but others identify as uniquely blue (Kuehni 2004: 161).67   
 
The outline of the problem is as follows: 
 
1. Two different normal subjects, given the same viewing conditions, see the same 
stimulus (object or spectral light) as being of a different hue. 
 
2. The stimulus is presumed really to possess a single hue. 
 
3. Given (1) and (2), one or both subjects must be misperceiving the stimulus. 
 
4. However, there is no principled means of deciding which subject is misperceiving 
the stimulus. 
 
It is not known for certain why such intersubjective variation in hue perception occurs, 
although it presumably reflects some variation in the structure or functioning of subjects’ 
visual systems.  There is known to be genetic variation in retinal cone pigments between 
subjects which affects the peak spectral sensitivity of those pigments, and this is likely to 
explain at least some of the variation (Lutze et al. 1990; Neitz & Jacobs 1990).  If this is 
correct – if variation in colour perception is attributable to variation in the structure or 
function of subjects’ visual system – then we have strong grounds for concluding that the 
internal physical make-up of the subject at least partly determines the phenomenology of 
perceptual experience.  In other words, the phenomenon of intersubjective variation in hue 
perception appears to support subject relativity particular – the colour an object is perceived to 
have is determined (and explained) in part by the nature of the perceiving subject. 
 
Intersubjective variation in unique hue perception has been presented as a challenge to 
any form of objectivism about colour, namely the view that colour is an objective, mind-
                                                 
67  As Allen warns, however, this finding results from comparing results across different studies, which 
leaves open the possibility that the apparent intersubjective overlap of unique green and unique blue 
might be an artefact of different experimental conditions (Allen 2010a). 
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independent feature of the world.  Objectivism takes various forms (see Maund 2012, s.6.2 
& 6.3) but, crucially for our purposes, it would include naïve realism of the sort that 
endorses the natural view.  If we assume that (2) above is correct – that in a set of different 
hue samples there can be at most one that is unique green – then the naïve realist is 
committed to claiming that most of the normal subjects, even in optimal viewing 
conditions, misperceive the stimulus.  Yet, as (4) points out, all of the subjects in the 
relevant experiments are considered ‘normal’, so we have no way of determining what 
counts as misperceiving in these cases.   
 
It is easy to see how the problem of unique hues can lead to a denial of the mind-
independence of colour.  Certainly, the problem of unique hues generates considerable 
tension between the ‘naïve’ and ‘realist’ aspects of naïve realism: if we hold onto the claim 
that phenomenal properties are ‘out there’ in the physical environment of the subject, then 
this kind of intersubjective variation seems to entail that the properties are not mind-
independent.  As Kalderon puts it, “if the appearance of unique green depends on the 
visual system of the perceiver, then it is hard to understand how it could be the 
manifestation of a mind-independent quality” (2007: 589).  
 
Naïve realists and representationalists alike have sought to defend their views in light 
of this phenomenon.68  One response has been simply to insist that some subjects and not 
others accurately perceive the real hue of objects.  For example, it might be that organisms 
have evolved to perceive accurately only general or coarse-grained colours (blue rather 
than Prussian blue, perhaps), but vary in their accuracy in perceiving the determinate, fine-
grained colours perceived (Allen 2010a; Tye 2006).  The explanation for this might be that 
there has been no adaptive value in accurately perceiving fine-grained as opposed to 
coarse-grained colours (Tye 2006).  However, this explanation faces several objections.  
For one thing, the proposed solution requires that some ostensibly normal perceivers and 
not others misperceive the (fine-grained) colours involved, and yet the phenomenon is 
problematic precisely because there is no non-arbitrary way of deciding which subjects 
perceive accurately and which do not (Cohen, Hardin & McLaughlin 2006: 338-9).  In 
addition, and as noted above with the example of unique blue and unique green, subjects 
                                                 
68  See e.g. Tye (2006) for a defence of representationalism in light of variation in unique hue perception. 
This is the kind of strong representationalism which is ‘phenomenally externalist’ in holding that 
phenomenal qualities are to be identified with the (worldly) qualities represented by the experience (e.g. 
Dretske 1995, Lycan 2001, Byrne & Tye 2006). 
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may differ in their colour experience even to the extent of assigning the same objects to 
different coarse-grained colour classes (although see footnote 67 above).   
 
As it is, even if we think the appeal to coarse-grained colours suffices to uphold some 
form of direct realism (perhaps including Tye’s representationalist sort), it does not appear 
a satisfactory solution for a proponent of the natural view, for whom the phenomenal 
quality in veridical colour experience is just the colour itself.  Since we can discriminate 
fine-grained shades, it seems to follow from the natural view that the fine-grained colour 
attributions of normal subjects should agree under the same conditions of viewing.   
 
Fish offers a solution to the problem of unique hues which seems to get around this 
worry: perhaps subjects who differ in their colour experience are, as a result of differences 
in the sensitivity or functioning of their respective visual systems, aware of slightly 
different components of the colours that are really out there (2009: 154, fn. 3).69  However, 
Fish’s solution looks untenable for two reasons.  Firstly, unique hues are precisely those 
that lack multiple colour ‘components’, so it should not be possible for the ‘real’ unique 
hues to be seen as mixed by any normal subjects (when viewing in white light).  As such, a 
proponent of the natural view will struggle to explain how an objectively pure green object 
could appear blueish to some subjects and yellowish to others, if there is in fact no 
blueishness or yellowishness out there.  All normal subjects should therefore agree about 
the location of unique hues, and any disagreement should only pertain to nearby mixed 
hues whose minor component some ‘insensitive’ subjects are unable to perceive.  But this 
is not what the evidence indicates: subjects often disagree entirely about the location of the 
unique hues, with no overlap in location.70  It would follow from Fish’s suggestion that 
there are no unique hues – that hues are always mixed but sometimes appear unique. 
 
                                                 
69  Fish also suggests that the differences are not really in what phenomenal colour qualities are presented in 
their respective experiences, but are merely differences in the subjects’ colour judgments or attribution of 
colour terminology (Fish 2009: 154, fn. 3).  However, this effectively amounts to a denial of the 
supposedly reliable intuitive distinction between unique and mixed hues on which the whole claim is 
based.   
70  The response to Fish’s first solution also undermines Kalderon’s preferred solution, which is what he 
calls 'colour pluralism'.  This is the claim that objects may have many colours, not all of which will be 
visible to any given subject (Kalderon 2007).  Subjects' sensitivity to colour properties might, in this 
sense, be only partial.  But, again, a restricted sensitivity to some hues should still leave agreement about 
those hues that are simple (unique), and this is contradicted by the evidence.  Kalderon, indeed, admits 
that subjects are very consistent in attributing unique hues to narrow ranges of spectral light, whereas 
intersubjective variation is great (ibid.: 565). 
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The second counterargument to Fish’s proposal appeals to the physical nature of the 
light stimulus.  Subjects can perceive a unique hue when looking at an object in white (i.e. 
broad-spectrum) light, such that the object reflects light of various wavelengths.  This 
might seem potentially to lend support to Fish’s suggestion: perhaps different subjects are 
more or less sensitive to different parts of the visible spectrum of wavelengths.  However, 
unique hue perception can also occur when subjects are shown sources of light of a single 
wavelength, and again there will be disagreement among subjects as to which wavelengths 
correspond to the unique hues.  It therefore appears in this case that the physical stimulus 
itself embodies no mixture of components (no range of different wavelengths) that could 
underwrite Fish’s appeal to varying sensitivities.  If one subject is less sensitive than 
another to a certain wavelength of light, we might imagine that she will see it as a less 
intense colour, but we would expect her to see it as the same colour, unique or otherwise.   
 
We should note that this second objection to Fish is not conclusive: one might counter 
that it relies too heavily on the assumption that there is a close relationship between the 
nature of light and colour.  One might, for example, be a primitivist about colours and just 
take them to be sui generis properties of objects distinct from their physical properties.71  
However, there are good empirical reasons to think that colour perception is closely tied to 
the nature of the light stimulus (but, crucially for my argument, also to the nature of the 
physical subject).  As I argued in chapter 2, there are ample reasons to think that an 
appropriate causal link between subject and object is necessary for perception, and we 
might see the physical medium (light, in the case of vision) as an effective ‘bottleneck’ in 
terms of constraining what we can and cannot perceive of the object.  If the mediating 
stimulus is physically simple and homogeneous (as with light of a single spectral 
wavelength) then it is unclear how it could mediate the awareness of something complex or 
heterogeneous.  And yet, if the natural view is correct, it does precisely this.  After all, 
although subjects will see some single-wavelength light sources as being of a unique hue, 
those sources of intermediate (but still single) wavelength will be perceived as binary hues.   
 
If the various attempted explanations for the intersubjective variation in hue 
perception fail, then we are left with good evidence for subject relativity particular: which 
colours an object is perceived to have are subject-relative inasmuch as they can vary 
                                                 
71   For critical discussion of colour primitivism see Byrne & Hilbert 2007.  I will discuss primitivism further 
below, rejecting it as a possible explanation for subject relativity general. 
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markedly from one subject to another.  This complements the finding of the previous 
section, that colour adaptation effects reveal the subject-relativity of perceived colour in 
ways that are likely to be shared by all normal subjects.  In the next section we can go 
further and consider evidence for subject relativity general, namely that the nature of colour 
itself is subject-relative and can only be explained by reference to the ways in which the 
subject responds physiologically to perceptual contact with coloured objects. 
 
 
6.4   The nature of colour 
 
In the previous two sections we have considered two kinds of variability in colour 
perception that demonstrate the subject relativity of phenomenal colour in at least the first 
sense (subject relativity particular).  In the first case – colour adaptation – the phenomenon 
reveals intrapersonal variation in colour perception: an object viewed under the same 
lighting conditions but against differently coloured backdrops will look to any given 
subject to have a different colour in each case.  The example of the Rubik’s cube illusion 
was used to press home the conclusion that this difference in perceived colour was a 
genuinely phenomenal matter and not a matter of mere judgment.  Crucially, although the 
variation in perceived (phenomenal) colour is shared by different subjects and appears to 
be consistently and systematically related to the layout of the scene perceived, it is not 
adequately explained by the latter.  Rather, it seems better explained by the nature of 
adaptive visual mechanisms internal to the subject.   
 
The second kind of phenomenon under consideration revealed in addition a marked 
intersubjective variability in colour perception, specifically in the way different subjects 
will assign unique hues amongst diverse coloured objects or light sources.  In this section I 
will show that subject relativity of colour would still hold true even if there were no 
evidence for either intrasubjective or intersubjective variation.  Even if all subjects saw the 
same things to be the same colours, absent any simultaneous contrast effect, we would still 
be compelled to the conclusion that perceived colour is subject relative.  This is because 
the very nature of colour itself appears to be determined by the nature of subjects – 
specifically, the structure and functioning of their visual systems.  This amounts to what I 
called subject relativity general.   
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To appreciate this we first need to establish where to look for the nature of colour.  It 
is important to reiterate that it is perceived or phenomenal colour that we are interested in.  
Some theorists about colour will distinguish between the colours that objects seem to have 
(phenomenal or ‘subjective’ colours) and those that they ‘really’ have (‘objective’ colours), 
where the latter might be identified with physical properties of objects’ surfaces, etc. (see 
e.g. Harman 1996).  Phenomenal colours might, on this view, be identified with qualities 
of (inner) experiences (qualia), instances of which are caused to occur by the worldly 
properties that are identified as the real colours.  In any case, the natural view is a claim 
about phenomenal qualities, and phenomenology overall, and it furthermore identifies 
these with qualities inherent in the worldly objects perceived.  On this view, colours are as 
‘real’ as other qualities of objects, such as their shape and size. 
 
Now, in seeking the nature of colour, we might look for those of its properties that are 
considered essential to it.  In this respect, there is widespread agreement that the essential 
properties of colours include not only how they look but also, and derivatively, how the 
various colours relate to one another in terms of similarity and dissimilarity.  It is possible 
to illustrate these relations by plotting colours within a three-dimensional ‘colour space’ 
whose three axes correspond to the three principal attributes of colour, namely hue, 
saturation and brightness.  If we disregard the dimension of brightness (which is less 
obviously subject-relative, being a function of the luminance or amount of light emitted or 
reflected from an object) we obtain a two-dimensional array of hue and saturation which 
together define objects’ chromaticity.  It is the structure of this chromaticity space that is 
most obviously subject-relative.   
 
One reason for thinking so is that the structure of the chromaticity space is not 
correlated closely with any physical features of coloured objects.  For example, given a 
spectral light source, one can fix all of its physical properties (e.g. amplitude, polarity) 
while varying only its wavelength such that the light is of a single wavelength at any one 
time but this wavelength varies over time.  This light appears to vary in hue as its 
wavelength changes.  By gradually progressing from light of wavelength 380nm to light of 
wavelength 750nm a range of (‘spectral’) hues is generated which include all the colours of 
the rainbow in sequence from violet to red respectively.72  Strikingly, although the physical 
                                                 
72  Such spectral hues do not exhaust all the visible hues, which include hues such as purple which are 
obtainable only by mixing light of different wavelengths. 
173 
 
 
 
characterisation of the stimulus admits only continuous variation in a single dimension 
(light wavelength), the corresponding hues exhibit mutual relations of similarity that can 
be adequately modelled only in four dimensions corresponding to the unique hues, which 
for normal humans are red, yellow, green and blue.  Implicit in this multi-dimensionality of 
hue is the distinction, exploited in the argument for intersubjective variation in colour 
perception, between unique and mixed hues.  Although there are specific spectral hues that 
subjects will pick out as ‘pure’ or unique, there is nothing physically distinctive about the 
wavelengths of light that correspond to unique hues as compared with those that 
correspond to ‘impure’ or mixed hues.  Thus, while we can relate changes in spectral hues 
to changes in light wavelength, there is nothing in the nature of the latter that explains the 
nature of the former. 
 
What’s more, the relationship between phenomenal hue and the properties of emitted 
or reflected light is even more complicated than the example of spectral hues suggests.  
Objects that emit or reflect visible light of different wavelengths can nonetheless exhibit 
the same colour (hue, saturation and brightness) to a single subject, a phenomenon known 
as metamerism (see e.g. Hardin 1988: 28).  Metamerism does not occur between sources of 
spectral light, but only between objects (metamers) at least one of which reflects or emits 
light of various mixed wavelengths.  Such metamers will exhibit the same colour only 
under certain illuminations and not others (assuming they reflect rather than emit light).   
 
Taken together, the nature of spectral hues (including their similarity relations and the 
unique/mixed hue distinction) and the phenomenon of metamerism show that there is no 
clear correlation between phenomenal colour and the physical properties of the light that 
we take to mediate colour experience.73  In contrast, it has long been recognised that the 
                                                 
73  It is worth acknowledging that a focus on light risks misplacing the locus of perceived colour, at least in 
respect of those ordinary objects we see in virtue of their reflecting light.  Here, the colour is typically 
perceived as inhering in the object’s surface (or suffusing the object if translucent and transmitting as well 
as reflecting light); arguably, we do not take ourselves to be seeing the light at all in these cases, except 
where the object sports some specular highlights.  Leaving aside the fact that we do see sources of light as 
coloured, and that these exhibit the same colour properties including metamerism, shifting our attention to 
the physical surface properties of reflective objects only makes matters worse.  Identifying colours with 
intrinsic properties of objects’ surfaces, whether structural, chemical or microphysical, has proved even 
less satisfactory.  Physically diverse surfaces can appear to have the same colour, and these surfaces need 
not even be metamers – they might be isomers, possessing the same overall reflectance profile (Hardin 
1988: 28).  It is precisely to abstract over differences in intrinsic physical surface properties that some 
philosophers have claimed that colours are instead best identified with the propensity of those surfaces to 
reflect light with certain wavelength profiles and intensity; in other words, an object’s (‘objective’) colour 
is identified with its surface spectral reflectance (ibid.: 63-4).  This move, of course, leaves us with the 
same problems arising from our attempt to correlate perceived colour with the physical properties of light. 
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structure of phenomenal colour space is much better explained by the structure and 
functioning of the human visual system.  In other words, phenomenal colours are poorly 
correlated with the physical properties of the light stimulus but highly correlated with the 
way that we physiologically react to that stimulus.  One early theory – trichromatic colour 
theory – suggested that the structure of perceptual colour space arises because the human 
eye does not respond in a linear fashion to changes in light wavelength; instead, it was 
proposed that there were three different kinds of receptive component in the eye, each of 
which was sensitive to a different range of light wavelength and would yield in response a 
different pure colour experience of either blue, green or red.  It was the relative activation 
of these different receptors that was taken to determine the colour perceived by the subject.  
The mechanism would be additive: equal activation of the ‘blue’ and ‘green’ receptors 
would, for example, yield an experience of turquoise (Hardin 1988: 29).   
 
Although it was subsequently proved that the human eye does indeed contain three 
kinds of photoreceptor (retinal cone cells) sensitive to light of different wavelengths, the 
simple model proposed by trichromatic colour theory has proved inadequate to explain the 
structure of phenomenal colour space.  In particular, it was noted by early critics of 
trichromatic colour theory that certain colour combinations that we might expect from the 
model do not in fact occur.  For example, a mixture of lights that individually look red and 
green results in the appearance of yellow, and not a greenish-red as we would expect from 
the theory; indeed, certain expected colour combinations, notably greenish-red and blueish-
yellow simply do not occur in human colour space (Hardin 1988: 29).  Since there are 
indeed three kinds of ‘colour receptors’ in the eye, each responding maximally to different 
regions of the visible spectrum, the trichromatic theory would seem to hold at least as far 
as the retina.  As it turns out, however, the peak sensitivities of these colour receptors do 
not in fact perfectly match wavelengths of light that we see as pure green, red and blue, the 
mismatch being especially great for red.   
 
Thus, to account for the seemingly anomalous features of colour space we must to 
some other features of visual processing occurring downstream of the retina.  The 
impossibility of certain colour pairs (blue-yellow, red-green and black-white) suggested 
that these colour pairs correspond to processes in the visual system that stand in some form 
of opposition, i.e. activation of the ‘blue’ process in some way inhibits or rules out 
activation of the ‘yellow’ process.  This theory was therefore called the opponent process 
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theory, and it has received broad empirical support, even if it is not in its current form a 
perfect fit for the various lines of evidence from colour science (Hardin 1988: 35).  The 
appearance of the various colours thus corresponds to post-receptoral processes – those 
downstream of the retina – whose structure results from interactions between post-
receptoral neuron groups whose activity is not merely additive but also mutually 
inhibitory. 
 
It seems then that the best explanation of the correlation between the structure and 
function of the human visual system and the structure of perceptual colour space is that the 
former somehow determines the latter.  In other words, we might infer from the observed 
correlation the truth of subject relativity general: the nature of colour itself, including the full 
range of possible hues and their relations of mutual similarity, is determined in part by the 
nature of the perceiving subject. 
 
As Pautz puts it, “even under ideal conditions (no interfering factors), sensory 
character is much better correlated with neural patterns in the brain than with anything in 
the external world” (2014: 238).  If we present a subject with a range of objects of, say, 
different colours, their subjective reports of relative chromatic sameness and difference 
will prove to correlate more closely with differences in the neural goings-on in her brain 
than with physically describable properties of the objects themselves (their surface spectral 
reflectance perhaps).  This presents what Pautz calls a ‘problem of correlations’ for those, 
like naïve realists, who wish to identify phenomenal qualities with qualities inhering in 
worldly objects (ibid.).74   
 
Pautz marshals a good deal of compelling evidence to show that the problem of 
correlations arises not just in respect of visual qualities (colours) but also in respect of 
qualities accessible to other sense modalities, including taste, smell, sound and pain.75  
Here again, the apparent (phenomenal) relations of similarity and difference among 
                                                 
74  Pautz’s key target in his (2014) is what he calls ‘tracking intentionalism’, namely any phenomenally 
externalist form of representationalism which holds that phenomenology is determined by whatever one 
represents visually in having an experience, where a subject’s representing in this way involves some sort 
of ‘tracking’ or covariation relationship between some internal (neural) state of the subject and the 
property represented (Pautz 2014:: 240).  As he notes, however, the argument generalises to all forms of 
phenomenal externalism, including naïve realism (ibid.: 238). 
75  As Pautz points out, although there is ‘bad external correlation’ for qualities like colour and smell, there 
are (fewer) qualities for which there is better external correlation, including shape and size (Pautz 2014: 
242).  This functional difference among qualities is clearly aligned with the classic ‘primary/secondary 
quality’ distinction.  I will discuss this further in chapter 7. 
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qualities prove to be better correlated with patterns of neural activity in the perceiving 
subject than with physical properties of the external stimuli or the objects in which those 
qualities seem to inhere.  For example, some substances of closely similar chemical 
structure can smell quite markedly different, while other substances of very different 
chemical structure can smell more or less the same (Pautz 2014: 246-7 & 269-71).  And 
the explanation for this appears to lie in the extent to which the different chemicals elicit 
the same or different patterns of neural activity in a key part of the brain involved in 
olfactory perception (ibid.).   
 
Pautz takes these findings concerning the nature of perceived qualities to reveal what 
he calls their internal dependence (2014: 252 ff.; see also Pautz 2011: 402-5).  This is 
clearly in tension with the notion that colours are mind-independent features of the world – 
what Pautz calls their response independence (2014: 239; 2011: 388).  Given internal 
dependence, one might be tempted to conclude that colours, etc., are in some sense ‘in the 
mind’ or ‘in the head’, as in sense-datum theories or the sort of internalist identity theory 
which holds that types of phenomenal qualities are identical to types of brain states.  Pautz, 
meanwhile, opts for an ‘Edenic’ theory of the sort proposed by Chalmers, according to 
which phenomenal qualities are not real qualities at all truly to be located anywhere – they 
are instead “wholly chimerical” (Pautz 2014: 295; see also Chalmers 2006). 
 
Is there a way to resist such conclusions and defend the natural view?  One option 
might be to endorse primitivism about colour: the view that colours are primitive, sui 
generis properties of objects, i.e. properties not reducible to properties described in non-
chromatic terms, e.g. in terms of physical attributes of objects’ surfaces or reflected light, 
etc.  A primitivist about colour – in particular, one who is also a realist about colour – will 
admit that the nature of perceived colour does not correspond well to the microphysical 
properties of objects’ coloured surfaces or to the properties of coloured light, and so cannot 
be identified with those properties.  However, he will insist that colours are nonetheless 
‘out there’, inhering in worldly objects, in just the way that the natural view requires.   
 
Confronted with the correlation between perceived colour and the structure and 
functioning of the visual system, the primitivist might claim that the visual system has 
evolved precisely so that it responds to the real colour properties of objects.  In other 
words, the nature of colours has determined the nature of the visual system, and not vice 
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versa.  However, one problem for the primitivist is that light mediates colour experience in 
some sense – certainly, in physical terms it mediates between the ostensibly coloured 
object and the subject’s visual system.  As such, if primitivism is to appeal to a (causal) 
determination relation between real colours and the structure of the visual system it must 
show how a physical system can be determined by something – colour – that is not itself 
reducible to the physical.  If, on the other hand, the primitivist ignores the correlation 
between perceived colour and the structure of the visual system, his theory looks at best 
unexplanatory and at worst perverse.   
 
The problem is compounded by the observation that different organisms (and indeed 
colour-blind human subjects) have visual systems with different structures.  These 
differences are evident even at the retinal level, never mind any downstream processing: 
some colour-blind subjects have two kinds of colour photoreceptors (cones), while pigeons 
and goldfish have four (Thompson 1995: 152).  By analogy with normal (trichromatic) 
human vision, it has been suggested that creatures with a greater variety of colour 
photoreceptors will be aware of a correspondingly greater number of colours. 76  Crucially, 
it has been suggested that these ‘extra’ colours would not amount simply to finer 
distinctions within normal human colour space but would partly define a wholly different 
colour space with colours quite different from those accessible to normal humans.77  These 
‘spaces’ might indeed have a different number of dimensions: whereas the human colour 
space with its three dimensions of green-red, blue-yellow and black-white (brightness) is 
readily visualised by analogy to the three dimensions of space, the colour space for a 
tetrachromat like a pigeon might be defined along four-dimensions.  This would render the 
respective colour spaces incommensurable insofar as it would not be possible to obtain a 
one-to-one mapping of colours (or colour differences) between the spaces (Thompson 
1995: 145-152). 
 
It seems, then, that primitivism can accommodate these claims only by admitting that 
the colours of worldly objects might be different for different for different observers; that 
                                                 
76  Some animals have an even greater number of receptor types: an extreme example is the mantis shrimp, 
some species of which have 12 different photoreceptor types, although their apparent failure to make 
commensurately fine colour discriminations is attributed to likely differences in post-receptoral 
processing, and is taken to undermine the thought that they perceive a proportionately greater variety of 
basic colours than creatures with fewer receptor types (see Thoen et al. 2014). 
77  Note that, crucially, the different visual systems here might be sensitive to the same range of visual 
stimuli, so that differences in visual systems and/or colour experiences cannot be attributed merely to 
differences in what organisms are visually sensitive to. 
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what a human sees as red a pigeon might see as something different and possibly 
unfamiliar to humans.  This seems antithetical to the very purpose of primitivism as it is 
usually presented, namely as a way to defend from the failure of attempts at physicalist 
reduction the claim that colours are out there inhering in worldly objects. 
 
In this point about inter-species differences in visual processing we might find a 
bridge between claims for subject relativity general and subject relativity particular.  I have 
argued that subject relativity general is best supported by empirical evidence for what Pautz 
calls bad external correlation and, conversely, good internal correlation.  The appeal to 
interspecies differences now assumes good internal correlation and uses this to challenge 
primitivism with the resulting conclusion that the same objects can simultaneously possess 
different colours for different organisms.  As we saw earlier, there is good independent 
evidence for marked intraspecific but intersubjective variation in hue perception, and 
primitivism would seem similarly ill-placed to account for this.  Nor is it clear how 
primitivism can accommodate the colour contrast/adaptation phenomena which illustrate 
intrasubjective perceptual variation.  Primitivism would therefore seem unable to explain 
either subject relativity general or subject relativity particular.   
 
 
6.5   Subject-relativity and the simple metaphysical picture  
 
How are we to think about the nature of colour given the conjunction of the natural 
view and subject relativity, and the explanation offered in terms of the simple metaphysical 
picture?  Earlier I suggested that it presents us with two key questions: 
 
1. How can we make sense of qualities’ being out there in the environment and yet 
also determined in part by the subject? 
 
2. What does this entail for other qualities of objects that do not seem to be subject-
relative, and indeed for the objects themselves? 
 
I have already noted that one broad theory of colour is aimed precisely at answering 
the first question.  This is relationalism about colour, which holds that colours are 
“constituted in terms of some relation between (inter alia) objects and perceivers” (Cohen 
2004: 452).  The most widespread form of relationalism is dispositionalism, whereby an 
179 
 
 
 
object’s being red is identified with its disposition to look red.  The relevant disposition is 
typically explicated in causal terms, so that a disposition to look red is explained as a 
disposition to cause experiences as of redness.  Formulated in this way, the dispositional 
account clearly conflicts with my defence of the natural view via the simple metaphysical 
picture, since the latter denies that experiences are caused by their objects; indeed, it denies 
that there are experiences in any substantial sense.  
 
A non-causal account of an object’s being disposed to look red looks no more 
plausible: if it is not a disposition to cause an experience as of redness then it is hard to see 
what other options remain (surely not a disposition to change in such a way as to become 
red).  Intuitively, when we see an object’s colour, we do not see it as doing anything – 
rather we see it simply being coloured.  According to the natural view, the way an object 
looks is just a matter of how things are with the object and its surroundings (the conditions 
of lighting, its position within the perspective of the subject, etc.).78  From the discussion 
of physical illusions we can appreciate that there might be various ways for an object to 
look red – for us to see it in red light or through red-tinted spectacles, for example – but the 
paradigm kind of case would be one in which the viewing conditions are favourable and 
the object is red.  To look red in such a case is for the object seen to be red.   
 
A related worry about the application of the dispositional account in the context of the 
natural view is that the dispositional account of colour arguably fails to locate colour ‘out 
there’ in the right way.  As noted earlier, it is implicit in the natural view that the various 
perceptible qualities of worldly objects are ‘on a par’ in perceptual experience: it is the 
object itself and its various qualities that simply feature as the constituents of 
phenomenology.  The tomato’s redness is seen in the same way as its roundness – just by 
being there, qualifying the tomato itself.  Equating colours with dispositions, meanwhile, 
potentially opens up the primary/secondary quality or objective/subjective distinction 
alluded to in the second question above.  Certain ‘primary’ qualities of objects are 
accessible to vision, shape being the obvious example.  To see an object’s shape is 
presumably not to see an object’s disposition to look round, say; it is just to see its 
roundness.  We could assert this consistently with diverse theories of perception, including 
                                                 
78  We should note also that ‘looks’ is potentially ambiguous between phenomenal, comparative and 
epistemic readings so that, for example, the reflective surface of a wooden table in bright sunlight might 
look (phenomenally) almost white, but simultaneously look (epistemically) like it is brown (see Dretske 
2000).  In the current context, ‘looks’ is perhaps most appropriately taken to have its phenomenal sense. 
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those that postulate sense-data or qualia, but it is clearly essential to the natural view.  
After all, according to the natural view, it is the object itself and its qualities that constitute 
the experience’s phenomenology. 
 
Thus, one reason to reject the dispositional view of colour is that it would seem to 
leave colours ‘out there’ in a rather different sense from the sense in which so-called 
primary qualities are out there.  The latter are paradigmatic examples of ‘objective’ 
qualities of worldly object – qualities specifiable using methods available to any subject 
and without essential reference to how they appear perceptually to subjects.  According to 
the natural view it is just these qualities themselves that contribute constitutively to the 
phenomenology of experience.  Colours (and other ‘secondary’ qualities like taste and 
sound) are likewise supposed to contribute constitutively to phenomenology in the same 
way, as qualities inhering in the objects themselves.  Dispositional accounts, however, 
leave colour rather more on the ‘subject side’ than this suggests.   This may force them to 
admit two different uses of ‘colour’: on the one hand to denote the object’s disposition (or 
the categorical property underlying this disposition) and, on the other hand, to denote the 
phenomenal quality that the object is disposed to produce.  Trying to collapse the two into 
a single sense might seem doomed to failure.  
 
If dispositionalism seems unsuited to underpin the natural view, subject relativity 
nonetheless seems to entail some sort of relationalism about colour.  After all, it does 
indeed appear that an object’s colour is constituted by the relations between that object and 
the perceiving subject.  But if dispositionalism is not the way to flesh this out, how should 
we go about it?  Is there a way to reconcile subject relativity, and so relationalism, with the 
natural view’s insistence that colours, etc., are straightforwardly ‘out there’? 
 
I will argue that the answer is ‘yes’, but that doing so will extract a high price in terms 
of our commitment to realism and certain customary assumptions about the metaphysical 
structure of the world.  It will be obvious that an affirmative answer will necessitate some 
sort of claim for the ‘mind-dependence’ of worldly objects or qualities.  Nonetheless, I will 
show that we can recast such ‘mind-dependence’ in terms of a broadly physicalist ontology 
that eschews talk of ‘minds’ altogether.  The ontology will prove simple – indeed, monistic 
– and although it is controversial, it has some independent support both philosophically 
and empirically.  
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This metaphysical account will occupy the following chapter.  For now, in concluding 
this discussion of perceptual variation, I will sketch out how we get there by conjoining the 
natural view and subject relativity.  Again, the key bridge between the two theses is the 
simple metaphysical picture of experience.  Recall that what it is for an object or quality to 
be a constituent of an experience is explicated via the simple metaphysical picture in terms 
of its occupying a certain place in the causal process that is the object’s being perceived by 
the subject.  Now let us recast the claim that colours are subject-relative as the claim that 
they are experience-dependent, i.e. their nature is determined at least in part by the nature 
of the perceptual experience in which they are presented.  Since the simple metaphysical 
picture identifies the experience with the process, the experience-dependence of colours 
becomes the claim that colours are determined by the perceptual processes in which they 
participate (as qualities inhering in objects).   
 
This of course inverts our customary understanding of the relationship between objects 
and the processes in which they participate.  We would normally think of processes as 
being constituted by – built out of, to put it crudely – the various objects that participate in 
them.  Constitution here is supposed to be allied to a form of determination, so that a given 
object has its nature determined by the antecedent nature of its constituents.  There may be 
other forms of determination at play, such as causal determination, but the relevant 
determination relation here is precisely the constitutive one.  Central to the claim about 
constitutive determination is just this notion of metaphysical priority: given any object 
divisible into parts, the nature of those parts is metaphysically prior to, and thereby 
determines, the nature of the whole object. 
 
We might call this customary metaphysical assumption bottom-up determination.  By 
contrast, I am suggesting that applying the simple metaphysical picture of experience to 
cases of subject relativity or experience-dependence points to a converse picture we might 
call top-down determination.  The claim, then, is that objects’ colours are subject-relative 
or experience-dependent because their nature is dependent on, and determined by, the 
nature of the larger (perceptual) process of which the objects are constituents.  We could 
apply this theory to each of the three phenomena described above, namely simultaneous 
colour contrast, intersubjective variation in hue perception, and the structure of colour 
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space.  In each case it is the nature of the whole perceptual process or relation between 
subject and object that determines the nature of the colour perceived.   
 
Certainly, this view abandons the realism claim, i.e. that worldly objects exist and 
have their perceptible qualities independently of their being perceived.  Consequently, it 
also abandons the explanatory virtue of naïve realism, by which the experience-
independent qualities of the object determine the phenomenology of experience.  On the 
view I have presented the explanation goes at least partly in reverse; the properties of the 
scene are to be explained at least partly by reference to the whole perceptual process of 
which the scene is part.  At this point, the view might also seem to risk incoherence.  The 
simple metaphysical picture, after all, purports to explain experience in terms of a process 
that, implicitly, is defined over its (physical) constituents.  Now, instead, it is claimed that 
the nature of the constituents is at least partly to be explained in terms of the process of 
which they are parts.  So we seem to be seeking simultaneously to explain a process 
(experience) in terms of its constituents, and those constituents in terms of that same 
process.  This, however, is an inevitable consequence of the notion of top-down 
determination defended here. 
 
Some will further object that the view divests itself of its naivety as well as its realism, 
on the grounds that it is part of pre-philosophical common-sense that objects’ qualities are 
constitutively independent of our perceptions.  I think there is a common-sense insight in 
the vicinity here, but that it has more to do with a grasp of our causal powers and their 
limits.  So striking something affects things but merely looking at them does not.  What is 
in at stake in the case of colour perception is not, however, a matter of our causal relations 
to worldly things and properties but our constitutive relations.  And here I think there are 
no pre-philosophical intuitions to be had.  The ‘naïvety’ to which the view is faithful is the 
sense that, in perceiving, we are simply presented with the world as it is (whether or not 
‘how it is’ needs to be supplemented with ‘for us’). 
 
I should, however, note the limitations of the claim supported by the evidence of the 
colour phenomena described so far.  Taken by themselves, these phenomena entail only a 
limited rejection of the realism claim: they show at most that some qualities (specifically, 
the colours) of worldly objects are constituted partly by the perceptual processes in which 
they participate.  They do not tell us whether the same should be said of other qualities of 
183 
 
 
 
perceived objects, although they do suggest by analogy how we might look for the subject-
relativity of other qualities.  I will leave it to the next, and final, chapter to consider the 
fuller metaphysical implications of subject-relativity for our view of objects’ primary 
qualities and for the objects themselves.  Pressure to expand the scope of the top-down 
determination relation to objects and their primary qualities arises from the implicit 
requirement of the natural view that the various qualities of perceived objects, both 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’, have a certain parity as qualities genuinely out there, inhering 
in worldly objects.  Cashing out what this parity amounts to will prove challenging, but it 
will ultimately require that worldly objects and their primary qualities too are experience-
dependent insofar as they do not have their nature independently of the wider processes in 
which they participate.   
 
Note also that although I have rejected the realism claim, the realism ruled out is of a 
restricted kind, framed in terms of the constitutive independence of perceived properties 
from their being perceived (their participating in the perceptual process).  Set against this, 
the simple metaphysical picture presumes an ontology of physical processes of which 
objects with their properties are constituents.  Indeed, it needn’t presume anything else – 
no especially ‘mental’ entities or properties except those that are defined over physical 
processes.  As such, whereas the conjunction of the natural view and subject relativity (or 
experience-dependence) might seem to point to a sort of idealism in which objects and 
qualities are dependent on minds for their existence, the upshot will instead be a radical 
holism about the physical; one that results from reversing the normal assumption of 
ontological priority from parts to wholes.  Neither idealism nor a notion of realism framed 
around ‘mind-independence’ is straightforwardly applicable to the view sketched here.  I 
will say more about this in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 – METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATURAL VIEW 
 
7.1   Introduction  
 
In the first part of this thesis I have sought to defend the view that perception acquaints 
us directly with the world around us.  Key to that defence has been a simple metaphysical 
picture of perceptual experience, as nothing more or less than the state of affairs that is the 
object’s being perceived by the subject, or the subject’s perceiving the object.  I have 
further suggested that this state of affairs can be described in physical terms as a causal 
process involving, inter alia, the perceived object, the subject and relevant perceptual 
intermediaries.  I showed how the simple metaphysical picture can not only account for the 
sort of direct perceptual acquaintance with our environment that is expressed in the natural 
view, but can also explain other forms of sensory experience or phenomenal 
consciousness, perceptual or otherwise.  As such, the simple metaphysical picture 
possesses an explanatory scope beyond the straightforwardly perceptual cases that inspired 
it.   
In this chapter I will seek to broaden the scope further and consider what acceptance 
of the simple metaphysical picture might mean for our view of the world more generally, 
beyond a narrow concern with sensory experience.  This should be of general interest, but 
its importance to the current thesis stems from two main considerations.  First, the simple 
metaphysical picture, although proposed to account for sensory experience, is not about 
some special, restricted class of ‘sense experiences’, construed as peculiarly ‘mental’ states 
or events.  Indeed, it is a defining feature of the view that there are no such states or 
events.  The simple metaphysical picture precisely collapses claims about experiences into 
claims about the relations among subjects and their environment, all construed broadly in 
physical terms.  That is, it claims that sensory experiences can be understood as physical 
processes which are distinctive purely on account of their relating subjects and other 
worldly objects in certain sorts of ways (involving light, eyes, etc.).  Other more or less 
familiar physical processes may not be perceptual or experiential, but that is not because 
they lack some metaphysically special ingredient, but simply because they are not the right 
sort of processes relating subjects and objects.  Thus, if perception leads us towards any 
more or less fundamental metaphysical claims about the relationship between processes 
and their parts, we might expect those claims to bear directly on all manner of processes 
and not just the specifically perceptual ones.   
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That, then, is one reason to tease out the wider implications of the simple metaphysical 
picture.  The second reason is more specific, and has to do with the phenomenon of 
subject-relativity or experience-dependence described in chapter 6 above.  It is here, if 
anywhere, that a feature of sensory experience seems to drive our metaphysics into 
unfamiliar territory.  Taken at face value, it seems indeed to demand a fundamental 
reversal of our customary assumptions about the relationship between ourselves as subjects 
and the world that we encounter with our senses. 
 
I brought out experience-dependence using colour as perhaps the most striking 
example.  Colours’ experience-dependence was shown to manifest itself in broadly two 
ways.  Firstly, the very nature of the colours, including their mutual relations of similarity, 
cannot be explained solely by the nature of the coloured objects out in the world, but only 
by reference to some physiological properties of subjects.  And, second, perceived colour 
is not only dependent in this way on subjects in general, but also varies among different 
individual subjects. 
 
These findings force us to reject naïve realism as I have formulated it, in which case 
we must abandon at least one of its constituent theses, i.e. the natural view or the realism 
claim.  An obvious choice would be to reject the natural view and hold on to the realism 
claim, and this is the kind of move that has historically been favoured by philosophers 
when confronted with seeming problem cases for naïve realism.  This choice is by no 
means forced on us however – we can choose instead to retain the natural view, in which 
case we must reject instead the realism claim.  In other words, we might embrace the 
conclusion that perceptible worldly objects are, at least in some respects, dependent on 
their being perceived, or on the subjects that perceive them. 
 
This is likely to spark fears of incipient idealism.  However, my aim in this chapter is 
to show that we can in fact reconcile the subject-relativity or experience-dependence of 
worldly objects with a broadly physical ontology.  To that end, I will argue that the simple 
metaphysical picture allows us to understand the subject-relativity of worldly objects or 
qualities in a way that preserves our sparse, broadly physical ontology and avoids some of 
the more unappealing idealist consequences.  In order to do so, however, our metaphysical 
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picture will inevitably become less simple, and will incorporate some claims that are less 
than intuitive.   
 
Key amongst these metaphysical claims are the following: 
 
1. A fundamental metaphysical structuring principle of top-down determination 
in which the nature of individual objects or events is determined by the nature 
of the whole processes in which they participate. 
 
2. A process monism in which the whole universe from beginning to present is 
fundamental. 
 
The sceptical reader might be tempted to infer from these metaphysical conclusions 
that the thesis amounts to a reductio ad absurdum against the natural view.  A reductio is 
not my intent of course.  This chapter will certainly aim to show what bullets we may be 
forced to bite if we are to defend the natural view of perception via the simple 
metaphysical picture.  It is important to note, however, that some or all of these are bullets 
we may already have to bite as a consequence of our best physical theories.79  We therefore 
have reasons to accept some or all of our major conclusions besides the reasons provided 
straightforwardly by perception.  Whether these other reasons are wholly independent of 
the perceptual considerations, and how forceful they are in their own right, are questions 
beyond the scope of this thesis, although one might expect that two sources of evidence for 
the same or similar metaphysical picture share some underlying relationship.   
 
I should emphasise, then, that my aim is not to offer a detailed defence of the wider 
metaphysical picture proposed.  Some of its constituent claims – monism in particular – 
have been the subject of considerable debate.  However, those debates have been 
conducted largely without concern for the sorts of perceptual considerations that motivate 
the natural view and simple metaphysical picture.  Whether monism or top-down 
determination are plausible or defensible independently of these perceptual considerations 
is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  On the plus side, we might view the claims in this 
chapter as offering a novel argument – an extended inference to the best explanation – in 
                                                 
79  Most obviously, the majority of interpretations of quantum mechanics support a holistic view of physical 
reality, in which the states of what look like independent objects are actually determined by the wider 
states or processes in which those objects participate (see Esfeld 1999, Schaffer 2010: 51-5). 
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favour of monism, or specifically the form of process monism described.  Given, however, 
that it rests ultimately on a controversial account of perception, this might give limited 
succour to the monist approaching from a different direction.   
 
The metaphysical project that this chapter seeks to propose, if not complete, might be 
viewed as an attempt to answer the following question: What must the world be like for the 
natural view to be true?  Posing the question this way presents the natural view as a source 
of problems (problems arising from illusion, hallucination, cognition, etc.) whose solution 
requires some crafty metaphysics.  In other words, it makes it appear as though we must 
contrive our metaphysical picture of the world in order to fit the claim that perception 
acquaints us directly with the world.  While this is not inaccurate as a summary of the 
philosophical task, there is a more positive way to present it.  From this more positive 
perspective the guiding question becomes this: Assuming that the natural view is true, what 
can we learn from perception about the nature of the world?  This reframing of the 
question acknowledges the central virtue of the natural view that perception simply 
acquaints us with the world as it is.  That being so, we can treat perception as a source of 
data for our metaphysical picture rather than a source of problems to be fixed by our 
metaphysics.  In other words, the natural view licences us to take our perceptual 
experiences far more at face value, as revealing the true nature of the world. 
 
In this chapter I will therefore describe what appear to be the key aspects of the 
world’s nature as it is revealed to us in perception.  Given the various puzzling perceptual 
phenomena considered in the first part of this thesis, there would seem to be two such 
aspects.  Firstly, as already described, the world is (in at least some respects) subject-
relative.  Second, we can be acquainted with the past in much the same way as we are 
perceptually acquainted with the present.  This second aspect therefore gives us cause to 
consider what perception reveals about the temporal structure of the world, given my 
earlier claims that such perceptual phenomena as perceptual memory, hallucination and 
cognitive penetration involve direct awareness of objects previously perceived. 
 
The two main sections that follow will consider these aspects in turn, with sub-
sections that tease out the implications of these aspects for our metaphysical picture of the 
world and our perceptual relation to it. 
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7.2   Worldly objects are subject-relative 
 
Clearly, the most distinctive and surprising aspect of the world as revealed by 
perception is its subject-relativity.  Taking our experiences at face value we discover that 
colours, for example, are out there inhering in objects and yet are subject-relative or 
experience-dependent, in the ways described in the previous chapter.  A central challenge 
in this section will therefore be to explore further how this subject-relativity or experience-
dependence ought to be understood if we are to explain the nature of perception 
consistently with the natural view and the simple metaphysical picture.  In so doing I will 
seek to outline a broader metaphysical picture adequate to accommodate both the natural 
view and the subject-relativity of perceptible qualities such as colour.   
 
Crucially, I will suggest that the simple metaphysical picture offers a way to reframe 
subject-relativity in a way that spares us from idealism and opens up an interesting line of 
metaphysical inquiry into the nature of the physical.  In so doing, it holds the promise of a 
metaphysical picture that is not only adequate to explain how things appear perceptually 
but also possesses virtues we would aspire to find in any credible theory.  These will 
include not only empirical adequacy but also broad explanatory scope and 
simplicity/parsimony.   
 
 
7.2.1   From experience-dependence to top-down physical determination 
 
As I described in chapter 6, the subject-relativity of worldly objects manifests most 
obviously in respect of their colour.  We found that the subject-relativity of colour takes 
broadly three forms.  Firstly, there is intrasubjective variation – variation in the apparent 
colour of an object when seen by the same subject but under different viewing conditions 
(the Rubik’s cube illusion described in chapter 3.5 illustrates this).  Second, there is 
intersubjective variation in the apparent colour of objects perceived under the same 
conditions (variation in unique hue perception was cited here).  The third aspect of colour’s 
subject relativity is apparent in the nature of colour in general (as perceived by normal 
human subjects, notwithstanding the intersubjective variability already noted), whereby by 
the structure of colour ‘space’ – the pattern of resemblances among colours – proves to be 
better correlated with neural processing internal to the subject than with physically 
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describable features of the ostensibly coloured object.  The first two forms of subject 
relativity are therefore manifest in differences between particular colour experiences 
(exhibiting what I called subject relativity particular), while the third is apparent from the 
nature of colour in general (exhibiting what I called subject relativity general). 
 
I argued that subject relativity of either sort need not be taken to imply that it is 
something in the nature of the subject alone that determines the nature of the object or its 
colour qualities; crudely, that something in the subject ‘reaches out’ and fixes how the 
world is colour-wise.  Rather, we might usefully think of it as experience- or awareness-
dependence rather than subject-dependence, i.e. it is the nature of the experience and not 
merely the subject that determines the nature of the object or its colour qualities.  Such a 
suggestion remains apt to provoke accusations of idealism, as if worldly objects and/or 
their qualities were to be understood as mind-dependent.  However, in my exposition of the 
natural view I have eschewed talk of ‘minds’ or ‘mental states’ and explicitly rejected the 
notion of experiences as inner mental states or episodes, taking them instead to be nothing 
more than the states of affairs in which the subject and worldly objects are linked 
perceptually – the object’s being perceived by the subject, or the subject’s perceiving the 
object.   
 
Left in these terms, the account might still seem to present perceptual awareness as a 
mysterious, ‘world-constituting’ relation.  However, in setting out what I have called the 
simple metaphysical picture, I said that the notion of perceptual experience as nothing 
more or less than the perceptual relation between object and subject admits of a 
redescription in physical terms.  To redescribe the perceptual relation in this way is just to 
say what is going in perception and to say it in terms of the very sorts of things we can 
encounter perceptually.80  The upshot is that we describe a process in which, typically and 
amongst other things, the object affects the subject appropriately via her sense organs.81   
                                                 
80  Of course the physical redescription will include not just the things we encounter in the perception being 
described but will also make reference to things that we typically don’t see when we see (e.g. our neural 
states) and properties of things that are typically not apparent to us when perceive (wavelengths of light 
for example).  Nonetheless, these are all things that we know about ultimately through perception, 
whether or not our perceptual access to them is mediated by scientific apparatus.  And they all seem to 
share a similar ontological status as worldly things in some ordinary sense.  The contrast is with such 
things as ‘sense data’, ‘qualia’, ‘experiences’ etc., none of which seem to occupy the world in the same 
way, or indeed at all. 
81  Typically, because we can imagine contrived scenarios in which an object affects the subject’s brain in a 
way that bypasses the normal sense organs, but in so doing nonetheless elicits a kind of awareness of that 
object.  Amongst other things, because the relevant experience might be one whose phenomenology is 
fully explicable only by reference additionally to causal links between the subject and objects other than 
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This physical description of the perceptual relation opens up a way of thinking about 
experience-dependence that explicitly steers clear of idealist implications or any mystery 
about the awareness relation.  Specifically, it allows us to reframe experience-dependence 
as a dependence relation holding between part and whole – specifically, between the object 
and the wider perceptual process of which it is a constituent.  We could say that the nature 
of the object, or one or more of its properties, is dependent on the nature of the larger 
process or event in which it participates.  Conversely, the nature of the process determines, 
at least in part, the nature of the object.82  
 
This is, of course, quite the converse of our customary assumption about the 
determination relation between processes and their constituents, or parts and wholes more 
generally, namely the assumption that physical wholes and processes are ‘built out of’ their 
constituent parts and have their nature determined entirely by the nature of those parts (and 
perhaps some laws of nature governing the way those parts interact).  This customary view 
amounts to I will call an atomistic picture of the world, one in which the fundamental 
metaphysical structuring principle is a kind of bottom-up determination, i.e. the antecedent 
nature of the parts or atoms determines the nature of the wholes and processes that those 
parts combine to form.83   
 
Crucially, we can find the same structuring principle implicit in what I called the 
explanatory virtue of naïve realism; namely, the theory’s promise to explain what it’s like 
to perceive – the experiential state of affairs that is an object’s appearing some way to a 
                                                 
the one immediately perceived; I am thinking here of the kinds of perceptual learning and cognitive 
penetration described in chapter 5, in which the character of a subject’s experience is determined in part 
by remembered objects as well as by objects currently perceived. 
82  Determination is a stronger relation than dependence: for B to depend on A does not require that A 
necessitate B, whereas the latter is entailed is entailed if A determines B (Grimes 1991: 83).  
Determination is what I have in mind here, and a correspondingly strengthened notion of dependence is 
therefore implied in relevant contexts. 
83  I will make use of a fairly minimal notion of atomism as a foil for the alternative view that I will develop 
in this chapter.  To be an atomist on this conception it is sufficient to hold that, given the set of all worldly 
things that are discernibly composed of (smaller) parts, one should look among those parts to find the 
entities that are metaphysically prior or basic.  It is in this sense that metaphysical determination goes 
from the bottom up.  According to a formulation by Schaffer, atomism is the conjunction of three claims: 
(1) the universe as a whole is not basic (i.e. the denial of monism); (2) there is a plurality of basic entities; 
and (3) the basic entities do not have parts (Schaffer 2010: 43-4).  The first two claims together yield 
what Schaffer calls pluralism, while the third claim yields atomism as a more specific form of pluralism 
(ibid.).  It is atomism rather than pluralism that I will take as the foil for my form of monism, since it is 
more explicitly consistent with the claim that bottom-up determination is the fundamental metaphysical 
structuring principle.  One might otherwise be a pluralist and suppose that some of the metaphysically 
basic entities have parts whose nature is determined from the top down. 
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subject – by reference to the antecedent, experience-independent nature of the objects 
perceived.  I have argued that certain features of colour perception, when coupled with the 
natural view, show that the explanatory virtue does not obtain at least in relevant cases.  
The natural view insists that colours are ‘out there’, inhering in worldly objects, and that 
the character of our experience is simply the character of the object (as seen under certain 
ambient conditions and from a certain perspective).  Now, insofar as different ostensibly 
normal subjects perceive the same thing as having different colours, even under the same 
viewing conditions, it seems that how the object is (for a given subject) is a function of 
how it looks (for that same subject); effectively a reversal of the explanatory virtue, and so 
yielding what might seem to be a vice of the natural view.   
 
Recast in terms of physical processes, as per the simple metaphysical picture, the same 
observation yields the view that, at least in some respects (obviously, colour), the nature of 
objects is determined by the nature of the larger processes (here, perceptual) in which they 
participate.  At least in such cases atomism and its bottom-up determination claim do not 
seem to hold.  We appear instead to be committed to what we might call a relativist 
metaphysical picture, where by ‘relativism’ in this context I mean to signal the claim that, 
in at least some respects, objects have their nature only relative to the wider processes in 
which they participate. 84  In other words, the relevant aspects of an object’s nature are 
grounded in, or obtain in virtue of, the wider state of affairs in which that object is related 
to some other objects and their properties.85  Where the atomist view involves a structuring 
principle I have called bottom-up determination, the relativist metaphysics involves a 
structuring principle that we might call top-down determination.   
 
It is important to note that what is being proposed is not a relation of causal grounding 
or causal determination holding between whole processes and their constituent parts.  The 
determination in question is claimed to be at work wherever we find objects standing in 
certain causal relations to one another (i.e. as constituents of some process), but this is not 
to say that the process or physical state of affairs causes its constituents to be some way or 
                                                 
84  I use ‘relativism’ to avoid confusion with what I have earlier called ‘relationalism’, i.e. the claim that 
perceptual experience is a relation.  No connection with physical theories of relativity is implied. 
85  In using the notion of grounding to express some uses of the ‘in virtue of’ relation, and vice versa, I 
follow widespread current practice, as defended by e.g. Audi (2012).  Whether ‘grounding’ itself 
univocally denotes a distinctive metaphysical relation is disputed (see e.g. Daly 2012 for some sceptical 
arguments) but I will put it to use in explicating a specific metaphysical thesis, such that different uses of 
‘grounding’ or ‘in virtue of’ needn’t be thought of as denoting the same fundamental metaphysical 
relation. 
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other.  The grounding or determination relation is perhaps better thought of as constitutive 
rather than causal, although describing it this way is likely to lead to confusion, since we 
more customarily think of processes being constituted by their parts (causes and effects) 
rather than vice versa.  If we were to talk of the top-down determination relation as a form 
of constitutive (as opposed to causal) determination we would imply that the parts are 
constituted by the whole rather than vice versa.  That is not in itself an unreasonable way to 
frame the top-down determination claim, but it runs entirely counter to the ordinary talk of 
wholes as having constituents qua parts, a usage that I will preserve.86  Thus, I will settle 
for talking of top-down determination, while stressing that this is not a form of causal 
determination.   
 
 
7.2.2   Wholes, processes and objects 
 
Before exploring the further implications of the posited top-down determination, it 
will be useful to say a little more to justify the appeal to processes as the determining 
entities, and indeed to clarify just what a process is understood to be on this view.  
 
If we are wondering what a process is, a first thing to say is that the concern here is 
ontological rather than semantic – it has to do with what there is rather than with what our 
talk of processes (or, relatedly, causes) always means.  To do the metaphysical work 
required by top-down determination, processes, in the relevant sense, must be genuine 
features of the world.  This is not to say that all our ‘process’ talk picks out such genuine 
features, but conceptual analysis is not to the point here.87  That is, in positing an 
ontologically robust notion of processes I don’t seek to give an account adequate to the full 
scope of our causal concepts.  Our concept of causation is itself highly debated and 
certainly outstrips the kind of process with which we are concerned – for example, we are 
                                                 
86  One could perhaps defend the use of ‘constitution’ in both contexts on the grounds that material 
constitution is a symmetric relation, but this would lead to unnecessary confusion and is in any case 
arguably implausible (see Barker & Jago 2014: 190-1). 
87  See Dowe (2000: 1 ff.) for discussion of the distinction between conceptual analysis and what he calls 
‘empirical analysis’, where the latter concerns what there is more than what our words mean or our 
concepts pick out.  The distinction is unlikely to be a clean one, given that we use concepts to fix and 
express the domain of our interest.  As Dowe admits, his own account strays from a narrow concern with 
a robustly physical notion of processes to an attempt to use that notion as the basis of a theory of 
causation (2009: 224).  With the latter task he finds himself challenged by the familiar problem cases 
besetting any conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of causation (see especially Dowe 2000: chs. 6 
& 7).  It is no part of my project to develop a theory of causation or even processes that measures up to 
our ordinary concepts.   
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apt to admit acts of omission and prevention as causes even when they do not contribute to 
the flows of energy that we think constitutive of processes (see, e.g., Dowe 2000: 126 ff.).  
For that reason, we should avoid seeking to define ‘process’ in terms of causation, even 
though we might think of processes as essentially causal.  There is also a metaphysical 
reason to avoid this: if we treat processes as more fundamental than their constituents – as I 
am suggesting – then causes and effects, and the (causal) relations between them, turn out 
to be subordinate abstractions from the process itself. 
 
For my purposes, the following picture will suffice to capture a relevant notion of 
process at a level of precision (or otherwise) adequate to the metaphysical project under 
consideration.  The picture – which is hopefully reasonably intuitive – is of processes as 
more or less localised patterns of energy or matter evolving over time.  More precisely, 
given a single region of spacetime, any non-disjoint distribution or pattern of matter or 
energy, of whatever form, located within that region will be considered a process.  A 
process, on this view, is constituted by any continuous flow of energy occurring within a 
single, arbitrarily chosen region of spacetime.88 
 
Where we draw the boundaries on a given process will reflect our interests, although it 
will tend to reflect obvious discontinuities in form, as at the edges of those regions of 
relative stability we call ‘objects’.  Ultimately, such boundaries may be arbitrary, 
especially if, as cosmological theories involving a ‘Big Bang’ might hold, the whole 
universe from its origin to the present (and beyond) is a single process or evolving pattern 
of energy (this has monistic implications that I will consider in section 7.2.5 below).  In an 
ordinary, everyday setting, we will single out those processes (including objects) that are 
most salient perceptually; in a scientific setting we may single out processes on the basis of 
some property or quantity (mass, say, or charge) that we wish to track over time through 
some changes in physical structure.   
                                                 
88  The position I outline here is consistent with a ‘conserved quantity’ theory of causal processes, which 
appears to be the most defensible philosophical account of causation in terms of processes (e.g. Dowe 
2009: 219-221; Dowe 1992; Salmon 1994).  Conserved quantity theories offer a refinement of earlier 
theories that define causal processes in terms of transfers of energy-momentum (e.g. Fair 1979), 
amending the conserved quantities to those that, unlike energy or momentum, are conserved (energy-
mass, energy-momentum) and incorporating other physical quantities, such as charge, that are also 
conserved in interaction irrespective of the relativistic frames of reference (Dowe 2009: 219).  The 
resulting notion of process respects a key philosophical distinction drawn between genuine causal 
processes and ‘unreal sequences’ or ‘pseudo processes’, where the latter include such phenomena as 
shadows and moving spots of light (Salmon 1984: 141-143.).   
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I have suggested that processes, so understood, are metaphysically more basic or more 
fundamental than their constituent elements.  This allows us to make sense of the 
experience-dependence of objects’ colour properties, by way of identifying the perceptual 
experience itself with the perceptual process of which the coloured object is part, as per the 
simple metaphysical picture.  Adding experience-dependence to the simple metaphysical 
picture generates an account in which the key metaphysical structuring principle is what I 
have called top-down determination, i.e. determination of the parts by the whole.   
 
I was anxious in the introductory chapter to show that the link between the natural 
view and the simple metaphysical picture is itself a fairly natural one, even if it falls short 
of mutual entailment.  We might therefore recall that the appeal to processes falls out of 
the natural view allied to some familiar empirical facts about perception: in short, we 
discover by looking at the world (with the aid of scientific instruments in some cases) that 
the objects we perceive are perceived only in virtue of the fact that we stand in certain 
forms of physical relationship with those objects; relationships that can be described as 
processes.  When we investigate what is involved in perceiving, that is all we find – the 
objects, ourselves and certain intermediary entities.  (That we don’t necessarily perceive 
those intermediary entities while perceiving the object is, as I noted earlier, neither here 
nor there.)  It is these observations that lead to the simple metaphysical picture whereby 
perceptual experience is understood as just the state of affairs or process that is the 
subject’s perceiving the object or the object’s being perceived by the subject. 
 
By this route, I hoped to have allayed the fear that an appeal to processes is 
unmotivated or ad hoc.  However, a further worry might be felt to arise if we use the 
simple metaphysical picture to recast experience-dependence as a form of top-down 
determination.  We might now wonder whether processes are merely one species of whole 
amongst a larger number to which top-down determination might apply.  For instance, 
what about the more familiar whole/part relation holding between objects (at a time) and 
their spatial parts?   
 
This worry is easily resolved if we recognise – as hinted above – that objects, qua 
concrete entities existing at a time, can themselves be considered as a special kind of 
process.  While we might think typically of processes as dynamic and ever-changing, 
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concrete objects in a narrow sense – crudely speaking, lumps of matter – can be viewed as 
just those regions of processes that maintain a relative stability of form over time.89  Thus, 
although we can treat objects as parts of processes, we can also treat them more or less in 
isolation as processes in their own right.  Nonetheless, there appears to be no perfect 
discontinuity between objects and the wider processes in which they participate, or in 
which they appear; no discontinuity, that is, which would justify asserting some sharp 
ontological boundaries around them.90   
 
Allowing that objects, in the narrow sense, are themselves processes, or structurally 
stable parts of wider processes, offers a way to accommodate what is perhaps the more 
customary and intuitive way to frame questions of whole/part relations, i.e. in terms of 
objects and their parts.  Understanding objects as processes also helps to avoid a worry that 
might otherwise attend the claim that wholes metaphysically determine their parts.  If we 
were to treat any arbitrary mereological sum or fusion as a whole object we would be faced 
with claims of the following sort: that the colour of a leaf (for me) is determined by the 
perceptual process holding between the leaf and me, together with any arbitrarily chosen 
region of spacetime, such as a solar flare on Alpha Centauri 40 million years ago.  That 
would seem to follow if top-down determination holds between any mereological sum and 
its parts.  Of course, we might come up with some way of showing that the solar flare is 
merely a ‘silent partner’ in the determination relation.  But the appeal to processes – single 
regions of spacetime in which there is a continuous flow of energy, in whatever form – 
removes any niggling arbitrariness, beyond the delineation of the spacetime regions 
themselves. 
 
In fact, if we take the view that the universe is just one single process, any worries 
about disjointed mereological fusions and the like simply fall away.  Ultimately, the ‘top’ 
in all top-down determination would thus turn out to be the universe as a whole, history 
and all.  We could work our way to this conclusion from the bottom up, as it were.  Thus, if 
we take any set of worldly objects linked as constituents of some localised process, the top-
down determination claim demands that each of those objects is determined in some 
measure by all of the others.  If we further assume that the localised process under 
                                                 
89  Just which regions of a process are seen as possessing sufficient stability over time to merit being called 
‘objects’ will of course depend on the spatial and temporal scale at which the process is viewed. 
90  Schaffer finds, in the evident arbitrariness of the ‘joints’ at which we carve nature, not to mention the 
vagueness of the joints themselves, intuitive support for the monism that I will discuss in section 7.2.5 
below (Schaffer 2010: 48-9). 
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consideration is not causally isolated from the rest of the universe (as follows if the 
universe is itself a single process), then each of the objects in the localised set is dependent 
in some measure on every other object in the universe.91   
 
The upshot would be what we might call a process monism, in which there is just one 
fundamental entity, namely the whole universe from its beginning to the present.  I will 
indeed endorse process monism as the best way to accommodate experience-dependence to 
the natural view, and I will discuss the merits and implications of such a process monism 
in section 7.2.5 below.   
 
However, much more needs to be said to justify such a move.  We have reached 
process monism by way of the following key claims: 
 
1. The claim that in perceptual experience we are directly aware of our 
environment such that it is the environment itself that is the bearer of 
phenomenal character (the natural view). 
 
2. A simple metaphysical picture that underpins the natural view, namely the 
claim that what we call perceptual experience is nothing more or less than the 
state of affairs that is the object’s being perceived by the subject, or the 
subject’s perceiving the object; a state of affairs describable in physical terms 
as a causal process involving, inter alia, the perceived object, the subject and 
relevant perceptual intermediaries. 
 
3. The claim that we can account for the subject-relativity or experience-
dependence of certain (‘secondary’) qualities consistently with the simple 
metaphysical picture by postulating a top-down determination relation holding 
between whole processes and their parts. 
 
                                                 
91  One might be tempted here to restrict the object’s dependency to the set of objects that fall within its past 
light cone (and perhaps also its future light cone), since the past light cone circumscribes all possible 
historical causal influences on the object (and the future light cone its possible future causal influences).  
Such a restriction proves unenforceable, however.  For one thing, it proceeds from the assumption that we 
can isolate one object as the ‘focus’ of various processes, an assumption at odds with the hypothesised 
ontological priority of the whole universe.  Second, any constituent A of object B’s past light cone might 
contain in its future light cone an object C which lies outwith B’s past (or indeed future) light cone.  If A 
is part of the whole process involving B then there is no principled reason to exclude C either.   
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4. The assumption that everything in the universe has a single causal origin, such 
that the universe, from its beginning to the present, is a single process. 
 
We can arrive at process monism by conjoining the final assumption – that the 
universe is a single process – with the claim that top-down determination is the 
fundamental metaphysical structuring principle.  What I have not done, however, is offer 
any compelling reasons to suppose that top-down determination is the fundamental 
metaphysical structuring principle, or even a wholly general one.  As far as it goes, my 
discussion so far has shown only how we might invoke top-down determination to explain 
the (experience-dependent) nature of a narrow range of properties, including colours, an 
explanation that appears necessary only within the context of a narrow range of processes, 
namely perceptual ones.  If the appeal to top-down determination is to have any 
plausibility, and is not to seem as a wholly ad hoc response to some perceptual puzzles, it 
will be important to show that it can be applied more generally, and without contradicting 
what we know about the world, e.g. by the scientific method. 
 
What is missing from the account, then, are some arguments for the general (indeed, 
universal) scope of top-down determination, arguments that justify the move from 
experience-dependence to a more general top-down metaphysical priority, and perhaps 
ultimately to process monism.  In the next section I will address this question of scope in 
more detail, and highlight the explanatory benefits of holding that top-down determination 
should be true of all properties and objects if it is true of any.   
 
Even if it were possible to show that everything might be determined from the top-
down, we would still stand in need of an explanation for why top-down determination 
nonetheless only shows up in respect of certain properties (e.g. colour) and under certain 
conditions (e.g. of perception).  This is a further question I will consider in section 7.2.4 
when I address the familiar distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities.  
 
 
7.2.3   The scope of top-down determination: a dilemma 
 
We might frame the scope worry as a dilemma.  On the one hand, if top-down 
determination applies to only some objects and/or some of their properties and not others 
(for example, to objects’ colour but not their shape) then we lack a unified metaphysical 
198 
 
 
 
account of objects’ total nature and potentially undermine the central claim that an object’s 
colour (etc.) is ‘out there’ inhering in the object in the same way that its shape (etc.) is ‘out 
there’.  On the other hand, if top-down determination applies quite generally to all objects 
and all of their properties we need an explanation of why this does not appear to be so; for 
example, why colour appears subject-relative or experience-dependent, but shape does not.  
That is, while the evident experience-dependence of colour motivates the top-down 
metaphysical picture, we must account for the countervailing phenomenological data 
whereby many properties of objects appear to be experience-independent. 
 
My explicit concern has been the perceptual process and perceived objects, but the 
scope of the top-down determination claim is not only of general metaphysical interest but 
also important to the plausibility of the specifically perceptual application.  There are two 
ways we might question the scope and generality of the claim that objects might be 
dependent on the processes of which they are constituents: 
 
1. Does the claim concern only certain kinds of process? 
 
2. Does the claim concern only certain kinds of objects or properties? 
 
My purpose in introducing the claim is obviously to address questions concerning 
perception, so it is the perceptual process that is specifically at issue for this thesis.  And I 
have motivated the claim solely by appeal to observations concerning the experience-
dependence of certain perceptible qualities, namely colours.  All the same, independently 
of my immediate concerns vis-à-vis perception the two questions above remain in play: 
does the claim concern only the processes that constitute perceptual awareness, and does it 
concern only colour?  These more specific questions might appear independent.  It could 
be that perception is the only kind of process to which the dependency/determination claim 
applies, but that the dependency concerns many different kinds of perceptible objects or 
properties; conversely, it could be that the claim concerns only colour properties but that 
these are determined by all manner of processes involving colour.  This opens up a range 
of possible answers to the scope question, not all of which are mutually exclusive. 
 
Restricting the scope of the claim to only some processes and/or properties would be 
problematic for two reasons: 
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1. The restriction sits uneasily with the claim, central to the ‘naturalness’ of the 
natural view, that colours (odours, etc.) are out there inhering in worldly 
objects. 
 
2. The restriction, firstly to perceptual processes and, second, to a restricted class 
of qualities is metaphysically unexplained and therefore mysterious. 
 
The two problems are closely related.  To see how, consider why a scope restriction 
would sit uneasily with the claim that colours inhere in worldly objects.  This is not 
because a scope restriction would involve denying that colours are out there – indeed that 
colours are out there is the datum that the dependency/determination claim is intended to 
accommodate.  That colours are out there is therefore assumed, and any putative scope 
restriction on the dependency/determination claim might be posited to acknowledge that 
we have grounds for imposing the relevant metaphysical constraint only on some 
perceptible qualities and not others.  The problem is really that the natural view takes 
colours to be out there inhering in worldly objects in the same way that less obviously 
experience-dependent qualities like size and shape are out there inhering in worldly 
objects.  The worldly inherence of colour and shape are supposed intuitively to be ‘on a 
par’ in this respect, so that colours are out there if anything is.   
 
The problem therefore is that the scope restriction on the top-down determination 
claim seems to mark a deep metaphysical difference between, say, colours and shape; one 
that is unexplained and mysterious.  In other words, given that, ex hypothesi, colours are 
out there, the first problem enumerated above collapses into the second.  Let us therefore 
look more closely at this second problem.  We can usefully do this through the prism of the 
simple metaphysical picture of experience.  Thus, if perceptual experience is nothing more 
or less than the obtaining of a certain relation between worldly entities, a relationship 
describable exhaustively in physical terms, then what is it about the perceptual 
relation/process in particular that imbues it with this peculiar property of determining the 
nature of some of its relata/constituents?  Furthermore, why is this determining power 
exerted on only some qualities and not others?   
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Given the natural view, the crucial datum is this: whether we take objects to bear 
qualities or else to be constituted by them, the qualities all appear to be on a par inasmuch 
as they can inhabit the same regions of space and are accessible to us in the same way, i.e. 
via the senses.  It would therefore be less mysterious if what would appear to be a 
fundamental metaphysically structuring principle – top-down determination – applied to all 
objects and qualities and not just a restricted class.  In other words, we should hope, on 
grounds of explanatory simplicity and parsimony that top-down determination might prove 
to be a universal structuring principle applying to all objects and properties, or at least what 
we call natural properties, i.e. those ‘ordinary’ and broadly physical properties accessible 
to the senses and to scientific investigation.92   
 
Certainly, the universal scope of top-down determination is built into the process 
monism I described in the previous section (and which I will discuss further in section 
7.2.5 below).  On that account, there is really only one process, such that case if top-down 
determination applies to any process then it applies universally.93   
 
Nonetheless, claims for the universal scope of top-down determination, in whatever 
guise, will prove unpersuasive if we cannot explain why top-down determination reveals 
itself in respect of only some qualities and not others.  It is all very well to give an 
explanation of the experience-dependence of colour in terms of top-down determination, 
but it will be of equal or greater importance to show how universal top-down determination 
can be squared with the appearance of experience-independence manifested by such 
qualities as shape and size.  It is that task I will turn to in the following section.  
 
 
7.2.4   ‘Primary’ versus ‘secondary’ qualities 
 
Why, then, might top-down determination only show up (in the form of experience-
dependence) in respect of some properties and not others?  I have focused on colours, but 
there are grounds for applying the top-down determination claim also to qualities accessed 
by different senses.  For example, perceived olfactory qualities of taste and smell exhibit 
                                                 
92  There is some resemblance here to Lewis’s notion of natural properties (1986: 60-1), albeit that on my 
view the relevant properties are clearly not to be thought of as intrinsic in the sense of their being 
possessed independently of how things are with the rest of the world. 
93  Of course, the universal scope of top-down determination would be just as consistent with a pluralism in 
which there were many processes, all of which were metaphysically fundamental.  
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similarity relations that, like those applying to colours, are not well explained by (correlate 
poorly with) the physico-chemical properties of the objects tasted or smelled, but correlate 
well with patterns of brain activity in the perceiving subject (Howard et al. 2009; Pautz 
2011: 405-6).  In addition, analogous to the intersubjective variation in colour perception, 
different subjects in some instances perceive the same chemical as having different odours, 
and this is explained by inherited variation in odour receptors (Keller et al. 2007; for a 
discussion of the seeming subject-relativity of smell see Batty 2010: 1153-4).   
 
It is tempting to see these more or less obviously experience-dependent properties as 
comprising what have, following Locke, been called secondary qualities.  For Locke these 
qualities, unlike the primary qualities like shape and size, are subjective inasmuch as they 
are to be identified with the powers of (e.g. ostensibly coloured) objects to produce ideas 
(of e.g. colour) in our minds (Locke 1993: 71-3).  As such, secondary qualities are, for 
Locke, not really qualities inhering in objects, as they seem, but powers (ibid.).  Primary 
qualities, on the other hand, are qualities that can properly be held to inhere in objects 
independently of their being perceived; crucially for Locke, primary qualities resemble the 
ideas they produce while secondary qualities do not (ibid.: 73).   
 
Contrast the natural view – which holds all qualities to be straightforwardly ‘out there’ 
– with the Lockean account, in which all qualities are also out there, but in a different 
sense, namely as powers to produce certain ideas in the subject’s mind.  This leaves room 
for Locke to distinguish those (primary) qualities which resemble the resulting ideas from 
those (secondary) qualities which do not.  However, given the natural view and my 
repudiation of ‘experiences’ qua distinctively ‘mental’ states, I have left no room for such 
a distinction – there is nowhere else for ‘secondary’ qualities to go if we deny that they are 
full-bloodedly out there. 
 
It is in part this commitment to the co-location of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities 
that drives the pursuit of a unified metaphysics.  All the same, stipulating the universal 
scope of top-down determination purely in order to account for a limited range of 
perceptible qualities (the ‘secondary’ ones) is likely to seem a high price to pay, especially 
if we assume that other worldly properties (the ‘primary’ ones) are perfectly amenable to 
bottom-up, atomist explanation.  It would therefore make a top-down metaphysics more 
plausible if we could offer one or both of the following: (a) a demonstration that what we 
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think of as paradigmatic ‘primary qualities’ are in fact also subject to top-down 
determination; and (b) an explanation of why these ‘primary qualities’ lack the obvious 
subject-relativity afflicting colours and other ‘secondary qualities’. 
 
Satisfying the first desideratum seems likely to prove challenging at best, and I won’t 
attempt it here.94  In any case, satisfying the first desideratum will prove less crucial if we 
are able to show, as per the second desideratum, that we can explain the apparent subject-
independence of the ‘primary’ qualities within the framework provided by a top-down 
metaphysics.  I will shortly argue that we can do precisely this, so that the seeming 
primary/secondary quality distinction is demonstrably compatible with an all-
encompassing top-down determination relation.  Since we will thereby be accommodating 
the seeming experience-independence of ‘primary’ qualities, we will be able to make sense 
of our difficulty in satisfying the first desideratum – in showing that such qualities too are 
subject to top-down determination.  The seemingly subject-independent nature of the 
‘primary’ qualities thus becomes an observation to be explained rather than overturned.   
 
The problem is, of course, not that ‘secondary qualities’ often appear different to 
different subjects (or to the same subject in different circumstances) while ‘primary 
qualities’ always appear the same.  The appearance of ‘primary qualities’ also varies inter- 
and intrasubjectively.  The difference is that variation in the appearance of some object’s 
size or shape is typically attributable to differences in how things are out there in the 
environment, including the subject’s spatial perspective.  Thus, the round penny looks 
elliptical when viewed obliquely, and the tree looks smaller when viewed from afar.  
Unlike with certain colour phenomena, for example, we do not seem forced to explain 
differences in appearance by appeal to factors internal to the physical subject.  So, while 
the nature of colours and odours might best be explained by reference to subjects’ brain 
                                                 
94  The relativist might take succour from our current best physical theories, which undermine the notion that 
objects have properties such as size, shape and mass absolutely.  On the one hand, Einstein’s Special 
Theory of Relativity famously demonstrates that properties such as those mentioned have no absolute 
magnitude but vary depending on the inertial reference frame in which they are measured.  Objects will 
appear heavier or lighter, or larger or smaller, depending on whether, and how fast, they are moving 
relative to the measuring subject (e.g. Maudlin 2011: 45 ff.).  On the other hand, quantum mechanics 
reveals that at very small scales (especially at sub-atomic scales) objects do not possess determinate 
values of such properties as mass, position or energy (bizarrely, determinate values may appear when the 
objects are subject to measurement, despite their demonstrably lacking determinate values prior to 
measurement) (e.g. Albert 1992: 73 ff.).  While these theories in quite separate ways undermine the 
notion that objects have an absolute nature in respect of their ‘primary’ qualities, it is not obvious how, or 
indeed if, the underlying mechanisms bear directly on the top-down determination relation I am 
proposing. 
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states and might correspondingly vary from subject to subject, the same cannot be said of, 
say, shape or size.  A corollary of this is that ‘secondary’ qualities appear essentially tied to 
perception in a way that ‘primary’ qualities do not.  For example, colours seem essentially 
tied to (visual) perception: we have no way of getting at the nature of colour except 
through vision, a point reinforced by the failure, noted earlier, of attempts to identify 
colours with such physical properties as the wavelength distribution of light or the surface 
spectral reflectance of coloured objects.   
 
What is needed, then, is an explanation of precisely why ‘primary’ qualities lack the 
obvious subject-relativity afflicting colours, and how this can be squared with the 
universality of top-down determination.  If the latter is assumed then the question is why 
this determination shows up in respect of, say, colour and not shape.  We can look at this 
from two angles: firstly, what is distinctive about secondary properties to make their 
experience-dependence obvious; and, second, what is distinctive about primary qualities 
such that they do not appear to be experience-dependent?  
 
Take the first angle: why does the subject-relativity of secondary qualities show up?  
Continuing with colour as our example, we might note that it is a property that is 
essentially tied to vision – as Strawson puts it, “colours are visibilia or they are nothing” 
(2011: 142) – whereas shape, say, is accessible in various ways and via more than one 
sense modality.  We can assess an object’s shape using touch as well as vision, so that it 
does not seem tied essentially to how the object looks in the way that colour does.95   
 
But why should colour be essentially visual in this way?  We can answer this precisely 
by appeal to top-down determination – that is, we can explain the object’s colour nature by 
reference to the wider relation or process in which that colour appears.  A distinctive 
feature of colour perception noted earlier is that our physiological response to objects’ 
light-reflecting (/emitting/transmitting) properties exhibits a complexity or dimensionality 
exceeding that of the stimulus.  If we view a range of light sources, each of fixed intensity 
but of one unique fixed wavelength, we are confronted with stimuli that vary along a single 
dimension.  Nonetheless, our neurophysiological response in such a case is multi-
dimensional in virtue of the structure of our visual system, including our possession of 
                                                 
95  Recall from earlier discussion that colours resist identification with physical properties of objects’ 
surfaces, such as their spectral reflectance profiles. 
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light-responsive cells in the retina which have different but overlapping sensitivity to 
different wavelengths, feeding into an opponent process in the brain’s visual system.  The 
upshot is that a stimulus varying along a single dimension (wavelength) appears 
perceptually in a way that can only be represented adequately in multiple dimensions.96  
From a first-person perspective, exposure to a light source of gradually increasing 
wavelength across the whole visible spectrum does not appear as mere quantitative change 
in a single quality, but as qualitatively discontinuous passage through the four unique hues 
and their various binary combinations.  According to the natural view, the colour of the 
light itself passes through these qualitative ‘boundaries’ as its wavelength steadily 
increases or decreases. 
 
As noted above, our perceptual sensitivity to other ‘secondary’ qualities may be 
similarly idiosyncratic, giving rise to obvious subject-relativity in those cases too (see 
Pautz 2014 for discussion).  Smell and taste would be obvious examples, with genetic 
variation in olfactory and gustatory receptors taken to be responsible for intersubjective 
variation in smell and taste (Keller et al. 2007).  Sounds are less obviously subject-relative; 
by contrast with the colour case, a one-dimensional change in wavelength (or frequency) 
corresponds to a one-dimensional change in perceived pitch (as wavelength decreases, 
pitch rises), although the correlation between wavelength and pitch is not perfectly linear, 
especially as one approaches the upper and lower limits of perceptible pitch, and can be 
influenced by changes in loudness (see O’Callaghan 2014: s.3.2.5).97   
 
If the idiosyncrasies of our physiological responses to stimuli are responsible for the 
more or less obvious subject-relativity of the relevant ‘secondary’ qualities, we might look 
for a corresponding lack of idiosyncrasy in our responses to ‘primary’ qualities like shape 
and size.  To some extent this is likely to prove successful: we might reasonably anticipate 
                                                 
96  Colour of constant lightness (i.e. just the hue and saturation components together) is often represented as 
a two-dimensional chromaticity diagram, but this diagram uses (i.e. presents) colours to show how 
different wavelengths of light appear to normal subjects; it does not represent colours.  An adequate 
representation of spectral colour (as it appears to normal human perceivers) requires at least two 
dimensions to represent the range of similarity relations formed by the opponent pairs of blue-yellow and 
red-green, plus a third dimension to represent saturation.  One could represent this, say, mathematically, 
without the use of colours.  Note that the dimensions of hue, saturation and lightness are not wholly 
independent but interact in various ways (Thompson 1995: 50-1).   
97  Given that the subject-relativity of sound does not show up in everyday situations, it is interesting to 
reflect on why sounds have been so readily assimilated to colours as another kind of ‘secondary’ quality.  
Presumably the answer has to do with an intuition that sounds are essentially heard just as colours are 
essentially seen, coupled with a prejudice that anything heard or seen, qua ‘sensations’, must be in the 
mind rather than in the world. 
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a more or less linear and proportional relationship between changes in the actual size of an 
object and some magnitude of our physiological response to perceiving that object, all else 
being held fixed; certainly we have no reason to expect any radical discontinuities in our 
responsiveness to continuous changes in perceptible size.  However, a complicating factor 
here might be the vulnerability of our judgments of size and shape to contextual and 
perspectival effects, a feature which is in fact crucial for our veridical perception even 
though it can also give rise to illusory experience and misjudgment (good examples might 
include optical illusions such as the Müller-Lyer described in chapter 3.5).  As such, our 
responsiveness to shape and size is not quite as straightforward as all that.  Nonetheless, 
we remain disinclined to say that size or shape are subject-relative, and the question 
remains why this is so. 
 
We might appeal here to two further considerations.  Firstly, there is the observation, 
noted above, that properties like shape and size appear accessible to more than one sensory 
modality – we can feel shape as well as see it, for example.  Crucially, these senses do not 
seem to contradict one another, at least inasmuch as they exhibit the same dimensionality 
(felt changes of magnitude in X dimensions are matched by visible changes in X 
dimensions) and proportionality (felt increases in size are matched by relatively similar 
changes in visible size).    
 
The second, and perhaps more illuminating, consideration has to do with the 
possibility of standardisation in our interactions with quantitative properties like shape and 
size.  Objects can look of different size to different subjects or to the same subject under 
different conditions, but we can overcome these apparent differences through the shared 
use of some third thing – an object that serves as a standard by which we can measure the 
target object’s disputed properties.  What form this third object takes will depend on what 
property is to be measured – for size a measuring tape will often suffice.  In this way, we 
can enforce or affirm our intersubjective agreement about the object’s shape (or size, mass, 
etc.) through the use of intermediary objects that serve as measuring devices, so there are 
verifiable standards that guarantee consensus. 
 
206 
 
 
 
The standardising approach does not seem to work so well for ‘secondary’ qualities.98  
With ‘primary’ qualities like size and shape, the target of our standardisation – the object 
of our description relative to some mediating measuring instrument – still seems to be that 
same quality.  We do not seem to have passed from talking about one quality – shape as it 
looks, perhaps – to talking about another – shape as measured.  By contrast, when we 
standardise our description of an object’s colour, say, we seem to find ourselves describing 
something else altogether: chemical properties of the object’s surface, surface spectral 
reflectance, light wavelengths, etc.99   
 
We can help to make sense of this failure of ‘secondary’ qualities to submit neatly to 
measurement by viewing the perceptual relation from the top down, as it were.  From that 
perspective, when we examine the perceptual relation we find it is composed of (or 
decomposes into) various participating constituents or sub-processes, including the 
physico-chemical properties of the object, the passage of light from object to subject, the 
neuro-physiological response, and so on.  Of course, we also find the object’s colour.  Here 
is the crucial point: when we examine, on the one hand, the object’s colour and, on the 
other, its physico-chemical properties, we are relating – physically, perceptually – to the 
object in quite different ways.  In the first case we are simply looking at it; in the second 
we might also be looking at it, but now indirectly via various pieces of measuring 
apparatus (microscopes, spectrometers, etc.).  On the top-down approach, it is in virtue of 
the first relation/process of direct visual awareness that the object presents as having a 
certain colour, while it is in virtue of the more complicated, apparatus-mediated 
relation/process that it presents as having its physico-chemical structure.  The colour and 
the physico-chemical structure are not identical because they do not have their nature in 
virtue of all the same relation(s).   
 
Even if this top-down, relational perspective accounts for the failure to identify or 
even correlate perceived colours with physical properties of their bearers (like physico-
chemical structure or surface spectral reflectance), the conclusion might seem to form an 
                                                 
98  Note that we might agree standards for colour, say, in a slightly different sense: we might agree that the 
best way to guarantee that something which looks red is really red is to view it under optimal conditions, 
e.g. directly in broad daylight (see Allen 2010b).  As such, for ‘secondary’ qualities as much as ‘primary’ 
qualities, we can draw a distinction between how it appears and how it is, albeit that the distinction has a 
pragmatic rather than absolute status. 
99  We might worry that colour therefore appears to ‘float free’ of these measurable properties of objects and 
light.  I will return shortly to the question of whether colour is therefore compatible with a broadly 
physicalist ontology of the sort I have proposed.  
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inconsistent triad when placed next to two of my central claims.  The natural view takes it 
as axiomatic that colours are properties that often inhere in objects – covering their 
surfaces or suffusing them.  Meanwhile, I have explicitly committed myself to a broadly 
physicalist ontology, according to which everything belongs to the class of purely physical 
objects – the sorts of entities accessible to the senses and to the sciences and which, for 
example (and so far as we know), conform to mass-energy equivalence.   
 
It is these two commitments – to the ‘out-there-ness’ of colour and to a broadly 
physicalist ontology – that might seem to be at odds with the claim that colours are not 
identical to physical properties of their bearers.  I did say that the ontological picture 
suggested is only broadly physicalist to leave room for the existence of things and 
properties that might not themselves be considered to form part of any strictly scientific 
description of the world.  In particular, I want to leave room for disagreement about 
whether colours should or could be part of any scientific description of coloured objects.  
The reason is precisely the failure to identify colours with any of the surface properties of 
the objects as described scientifically.   
 
There is therefore a narrow sense of ‘physical’ in which we might deny that colours 
are physical properties of coloured objects.  This is a different sense of ‘physical’ from the 
one I have used to describe my favoured ontology, which means only to rule out explicitly 
non-physical or immaterial objects and properties.  In particular, I have denied the 
existence of distinctively ‘mental’ states or properties, unless ‘mental’ is taken merely to 
denote the sorts of (perfectly physical) relations among things that constitute awareness, 
thinking, and so on.  The narrow sense of ‘physical’ has less to do with picking out a 
certain type of stuff than with marking off a certain range of methods for accessing objects 
and properties and describing them.  These methods are what I have described as 
measurements, where these may involve the use of measuring tools as intermediaries 
between the objects and our senses.  Colours are not physical properties in the narrow 
sense of ‘physical’ because they are not measurable in the same way as narrowly physical 
properties like spectral reflectance; colours are (directly) seen rather than measured.  Of 
course, we could try to treat viewing subjects as measuring devices, ones which manifest 
certain brain states when confronted by appropriately coloured objects, or (assuming 
truthfulness and appropriate language use) make utterances like ‘red’ and ‘turquoise’.  
However, looking at subjects ‘from the outside’ in this way is apt to mislead us about 
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colours: it might lead us to suggest that colours are the properties of objects that cause 
subjects to exhibit those brain states or behaviours.  There is indeed a rather loose use of 
‘cause’ in which we might say that the redness of the tomato (or my seeing it) caused me to 
utter the word ‘red’.  However, if a physicist were invited to describe the relevant chain of 
events the colour per se would likely not feature at all in the description.  There would be 
reference to surface properties of the tomato all right, but these would be structural or 
chemical properties or relational physical properties (spectral reflectance).  It is this outside 
perspective on the process that yields what we might call a narrow notion of the physical, 
i.e. precisely the intersubjectively invariant aspects of the observed system. 
 
We could sum up the explanation of colour’s experience-dependence or subject-
relativity in this way: it is in virtue of our being affected by objects’ light-interactive 
properties in a certain way (or in virtue of the objects’ affecting us a certain way) that those 
objects have the colours that they do.  It is the idiosyncratic nature of our physiological 
response to light of different wavelengths that is responsible for much of the obvious 
subject-relativity of colour.   
 
We must be careful here, however.  The claim cannot be that our physiological 
response determines – or, worse still, causes – the object to be coloured.  After all, the 
view proposed has it that the whole experience determines the object’s colour.  Although 
the claim is that this experience is just the whole state of affairs that is my being affected by 
the object or the object’s affecting me, we need to avoid the impression that there is first 
the object, some physiological event in me, as well as some mediating events, and that 
these come together to determine or otherwise gives rise to the object’s colour.  This would 
be misleading for two reasons: firstly, the various discernible elements of the perceptual 
process are already together; and, second, the object’s colour is already there, inhering in 
the object – the colour is already a feature of the perceptual state of affairs.  So if we seek 
to explain an object’s colour by reference to how that object affects us physiologically, it is 
not because the colour is in any way an upshot of this physiological effect, or that the 
object and its physiological effect on us are metaphysically prior to the object’s being a 
certain colour.    
 
It is rather the other way round: what is metaphysically prior is the whole experience 
or perceptual relation, in which the object appears with its colour.  Here again we must 
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avoid making the converse mistake – that is, as much as we should avoid thinking of the 
physiological event in the subject causing the object’s colour, we should also avoid 
thinking of the colour as causing the physiological event.  The error in this line of thinking 
is perhaps less obvious.  After all, there are three claims here that make such a thought 
quite compelling.   First is the claim that the object causes the physiological event in the 
subject; second is the claim that the colour is out there, inhering in the subject; and third is 
the claim that the object’s causing the physiological event is the process in virtue of which 
the subject sees the object’s colour.  The natural thought, given these three claims, is that it 
is the object’s colour which causes the physiological event.  That would an inference 
appropriate to a bottom-up metaphysical explanation of the experience’s phenomenology, 
i.e. one compatible with naïve realism and its explanatory virtue of explaining the 
phenomenology by appeal to the antecedent nature of the object perceived.  But it cannot 
be correct in light of the top-down determination claim and the observations about colour 
that led to it.  These seem to show that the experience of colour is metaphysically prior to 
the colour itself, a claim cashed out via the simple metaphysical picture in terms of the 
metaphysical priority of the perceptual process over its parts. 
 
But if an object’s colour is supposed to be ‘out there’ just as much as its shape and 
physico-chemical properties (including those that we would certainly identify as causes of 
the subject’s brain state), why can we not claim it also as a cause of the same? 
 
This puzzle – like the converse mistake of treating colour as caused or determined by 
the physiological effect the coloured object has on the subject – arises if we are careless in 
conflating two different ways of reflecting on the perceptual experience: firstly, reflecting 
on it from the ‘inside’, i.e. the first-person perspective on how an object simply looks; and, 
second, reflecting on it from the ‘outside’, i.e. describing the experience as a physical 
process.  These reflective perspectives on the experience are of course what yield the 
natural view and simple metaphysical picture respectively. 
 
Conflating these two perspectives results in the following line of thought.  The claim I 
am defending holds that perceived colours are really out there and that they are nonetheless 
determined by the whole perceptual relation.  If we now (carelessly) recast that as the 
claim that colours are determined in part by their effects on the subject, then the same 
colours appear twice in the explanation of phenomenal qualities: first as the quality that 
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induces the physiological response, and again as the quality determined in part by that very 
response.  In other words, the colour induces that which is partly responsible for its very 
nature.  Behind the troubling implication of retrocausation, i.e. an effect determining one 
of its causes, is a blatant circularity.100   
 
The reason we should avoid conflating these ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives on 
the perceptual relation is precisely that our relation to the object is different in the two 
cases: when we are simply viewing it ourselves as subjects, and when we are viewing it as 
a physical object affecting some other subject.  In the second perspective, the object will 
still look (to us) coloured, but we now disregard that in favour of some other properties of 
the object – its surface spectral reflectance perhaps.  As we look at it ourselves, the object 
is simply playing the role of a perceptibly coloured object; as we look at as the object of 
someone else’s awareness, it is playing the role (for us) of a physical cause of that other 
subject’s brain state.  These are quite different relations between us and the object, and the 
object therefore manifests quite different properties in the context of each relation.  This is 
precisely the point I made in the previous section, and it helps us to understand why the 
different properties of the object – its surface spectral reflectance, say, and its colour – so 
radically fail to correlate. 
 
The puzzle we are left with, then, is not to explain how objects’ colours come about 
given some antecedent facts about those objects and their effect on us.  Rather, it is how to 
make sense of the relationships between the various things we find when we explore our 
experience. When we interrogate our experience – when, in other words, we look at the 
world – we find various objects, events, qualities and so on.  Most of these are obviously 
and straightforwardly out there residing in our environment.  Happily, there appear to be 
intelligible relations between the various things we find in the world (things we find by 
using our senses).  In many cases these various things are measurable against some 
common standards, as described above for the ‘primary’ qualities.  This allows us to 
maintain a certain ‘objectivity’, not just about those objects and their relevant qualities, but 
also about the (spatial, temporal) relations between them.  In virtue of these common 
standards for spatiality and temporality (chronological time), we are able to describe the 
objects and their relations without essential reference to how they appear to us 
                                                 
100  I consider the temporal aspect of this seeming circularity in section 7.3.2 below. 
211 
 
 
 
perceptually.  We are, in other words, able to render those aspects of the world intelligible 
while keeping them ‘at arm’s length’.    
 
We cannot, however, keep objects’ colours (odours, etc.) at arm’s length because of 
their distinctive dependence on the whole perceptual process in which our idiosyncratic 
physiological response is the upshot.  There is a glaring mismatch between the response of 
our visual system to objects’ surface properties (spectral reflectance) and the response of 
arm’s-length measuring devices (spectrometers, say).  Chiefly, the mismatch has to do with 
the peculiar dimensionality of our physiological response that we noted above, a 
dimensionality that seemingly results from the opponent processing occurring in our visual 
system.  One might object here that if arm’s-length measuring is all we are worried about 
we could surely construct some machine that recreates opponent processing of spectral 
light in the same way that the human visual cortex does.  This would, however, be 
problematic, for two reasons.  Firstly, calibrating a colour-measuring machine of this sort – 
setting it up to return values of pure green, red, etc. for given inputs – would be quite 
arbitrary, just as we cannot settle non-arbitrarily which human subjects perceive pure hues 
‘correctly’.  Second, and relatedly, the output values of the machine would remain 
unaligned with common standards for measuring spatiality and temporality.  As such, they 
would add nothing more to the intelligibility of colour than is provided by the colour talk 
of human subjects. 
 
 
7.2.5   Process monism: prospects and problems 
 
In section 7.2.3 I noted the explanatory advantages of taking top-down determination 
to have universal scope as the fundamental metaphysical structuring principle.  I noted that 
we might defend this universal scope by appealing to the claim that the entire universe, 
from its beginning to the present, can plausibly be considered a single all-embracing 
process.  Thus, if top-down determination applies to any processes (notably including the 
perceptual ones) then it applies universally, because there is only one process.  Let us call 
this the universe-process.101   
 
                                                 
101  I will address in section 7.3 below the question whether the universe-process should be thought to 
embrace the future as well as the past and present. 
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I have assumed throughout that everything that exists is broadly physical.  Adding this 
physicalist claim to the claims that (a) processes are metaphysically prior to their 
constituents (top-down determination) and (b) there is only a single process results in what 
I called process monism.  As Schaffer defines it, monism is “the conjunction of the 
numerical thesis that there is exactly one basic object with the holistic thesis that the 
cosmos is basic” (Schaffer 2010: 42).  Inasmuch as the priority ordering of what is more or 
less basic concerns what determines what, such monism implies that the nature of every 
individual thing in the universe (however we carve it up) is ultimately determined by the 
nature of the universe as a whole.  In other words, every part of the universe – every 
object, let’s say – has its nature in virtue of the position it occupies within the vast web of 
causal relations that is the entire universe.   
 
In his defence of monism, Schaffer is anxious to overcome historical objections which 
insist that the monist is committed, absurdly, to their being just one thing – the whole 
universe.  This motivates him to describe his thesis as what he calls ‘priority’ monism – 
namely the view that there are many different objects, but all are metaphysically 
subordinate or posterior to the one fundamental object, which is the universe as a whole 
(Schaffer 2010: 46).  Common sense demands some admission of this sort – after all, our 
very talk of existence is founded on its application to the plurality of more or less familiar 
objects that occupy our environment.  Certainly, we should allow that individual parts of 
the universe, however we carve it up, exist in some sense, even if we have cause to reject 
the notion that they exist absolutely (i.e. have a fixed nature at any given time).102  This has 
some implications for our notions of object identity which I will return to later in this 
section. 
 
First, though, there is a more immediate worry whether experience-dependence can in 
principle be squared with process monism, or at least squared in a way that preserves the 
                                                 
102  We might be tempted here to avail ourselves of some convenient etymology.  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, the origin of ‘exist’ is the Latin ‘existere’ or ‘exsistere’ meaning ‘to stand out, be 
perceptible, hence to exist’.  This is rather apt for our account of worldly objects, given that a 
metaphysics which treats processes as prior to their parts requires us to treat ‘objects’ as abstracted from 
the wider processes in which they participate.  Objects, in other words, exist insofar as they stand out for 
us in perception.  We must be wary, however, that this use of ‘exist’ does not sit entirely easily with our 
ordinary usage.  In particular, it would be peculiar to say in ordinary speech that objects cease to exist 
when unperceived, but that is what the special use implies.  A defender of the special sense of ‘exist’ 
would have to emphasise that the failure of objects to ‘stand out’ when unperceived does not mean that 
they, as it were, leave a hole in the universe.  Rather, what it is to be an object in first place is to stand out, 
or be picked out, perceptually from its place in the whole universe-process. 
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natural view that worldly things themselves are experience-dependent.  The worry is this: 
in treating the whole universe as fundamental in this way, it would be natural to assume 
that the universe as a whole has a fixed, absolute nature which fixes the nature of all of its 
constituents.  This cannot be correct, however, as it conflicts with the perceptual 
phenomenon that led us to top-down determination in the first place, namely the 
experience-dependence of colour.  This shows that objects’ colour cannot be fixed by the 
antecedent nature of the whole universe any more than it can by the antecedent nature of 
some microphysical ultimates (as an atomist might have it).103   
 
The experience-dependence of colour – and in particular intersubjective colour 
variation – therefore demands a different conception of metaphysical relativism: one in 
which an object at any given time does not have an absolute nature fixed by how that 
object sits within the whole process or relational structure that is the universe, but instead 
has a different and unique nature relative to every process in which it participates.  In the 
context of process P, object O has nature N; in the context of process P* o has nature N*, 
and so on.  In the perceptual case we might say that the colour swatch is simultaneously 
blue-to-me (blue-in-my-experience) and green-to-you. 
 
Again, I will suspend for now the obvious question of object identity raised by this 
proposal, namely the question of what justifies our saying that it is the same object in both 
cases if they have different natures.  I will offer some remarks on this towards the end of 
the section.  In the meantime we are sufficiently challenged to make sense of how this 
process-relativity could work in principle.   
 
It will help to note that the talk of an object having different natures relative to 
different processes is already misleading – specifically, we are misled by talk of different 
processes.  The claim that led us to monism is the claim that the universe as a whole, from 
                                                 
103  This avoids a further epistemological worry that would arise were this sort of holism true.  Imagine a 
world in which atomism was true and the nature of everything, including the whole universe, was 
determined by the antecedent nature of the microphysical atoms.  We could then conceive of a world with 
all the same observable structure but in which the direction of metaphysical determination was reversed, 
i.e. the nature of every finite thing was determined by the nature of the universe taken as a whole.  The 
two worlds would be empirically indistinguishable.  Both would exhibit the sort of systematic structure 
that renders it amenable to bottom-up physical explanation, whether or not this structure were 
metaphysically determined from the bottom-up.  The same set of empirically adequate bottom-up laws 
would apply to both worlds, but only in the atomist world would these laws carry any metaphysical 
significance. 
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its origin to the present, is a single process.104  This seems empirically plausible and also 
avoids potential puzzles about individuating distinct processes.  However, it there is only 
one process, then it cannot be correct to say that any object has different natures relative to 
different processes.   
 
When we return specifically to perception and perceptual processes, the tendency to 
talk of different processes has its counterpart in our tendency to talk of different 
experiences, whether enjoyed by different subjects or by the same subject at different 
times.  It is the different nature of these experiences that is supposed to account for the 
differences between colours as they are for different subjects.   
 
So the contradiction is this: on the one hand, the subject-relativity of colour, etc., 
concerns a contrast between different experiences, experiences that we identify with 
distinct processes; but, on the other hand, process monism says there is only one process.  
On that view, what appear to be distinct processes are really arbitrarily demarcated regions 
of the one universe-process. 
 
If process monism is correct, there must therefore be something wrong with claiming 
that distinct experiences are wholly distinct processes.  The problem might begin with the 
very notion of ‘distinct’ experiences, which stands in need of clarification.  With the 
simple metaphysical picture I have rejected the notion experiences as distinctively ‘mental’ 
entities, states or events that share the world with the more familiar objects, states and 
events that we know about and perceive.  Viewing experiences instead as relations among 
worldly things (including, inter alia, subjects and objects of awareness) places limits on 
what we can mean when we talk of experiences being ‘distinct’.  For one thing, given the 
simple metaphysical picture, different subjects’ experiences might ‘overlap’ in terms of 
sharing some constituents, as when the subjects are viewing the same objects at the same 
time.   
 
What sense, then, can we make of talk of ‘distinct experiences’ within the context of a 
process monism?  If there is fundamentally just one process, then my experience and 
yours, not to mention my experience at time t1 and my experience at a later time t2, belong 
                                                 
104  More precisely, what got us from the claimed universe-process to monism were the further claims of 
experience-dependence and top-down determination   On its own, the notion of a single universe-process 
is perfectly consistent with atomism.   
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to that same process (the universe-process).  ‘Belong to’ is of course too weak – if there is 
ultimately just one process then all these ‘different experiences’ are really one and the 
same.  To reinforce this conclusion, we might note that the open-endedness of processes 
makes it difficult or impossible to demarcate any finite portions of the universe-process 
that could comprise our different experiences.  It is therefore not obvious how we could 
non-arbitrarily place limits on the temporal and spatial extent of any perceptual process, 
assuming the causal interconnectedness of everything entailed by process monism.   
 
Hence, ontologically speaking, all experiences are states of the whole universe-
process.  Clearly, then, our ontological claim misses whatever it is that would allow us to 
make sense of our talk of distinct experiences.  What might distinguish experiences if not 
their ontology?  If my experience and yours do not differ in what they comprise (namely a 
whole state of the world) then they do self-evidently differ in respect of the perspective 
that they confer on the world.  ‘Perspective’ here doesn’t signal merely a spatial relation to 
the rest of the world (for even insentient things have that), but precisely the relation of 
awareness that constitutes experience.  Note that the perspective provided by the subject 
obviously comes from within the world itself, so is in that sense an ‘internal’ 
perspective.105  We might say that an experience is the world as it is from a certain 
perspective; or, better still, the world centred on the perspective provided by the physical 
subject.  Different experiences involve different perspectives of awareness on the same 
universe-process.  Put more prosaically, this amounts to the truism that different 
experiences involve different perspectives on the world.   
 
Recasting the claim in terms of processes, we might now reappraise our starting claim 
that object O has nature N relative to process P, while it has nature N* relative to process 
P*.  Granted that processes P and P* overlap and are therefore continuous (this being the 
sort of observation that has pointed us towards process monism), the distinction between P 
and P* is seen to amount to a more or less arbitrary difference in which portion of the 
whole universe-process we choose to demarcate as the context for determining O.  Object 
O therefore does not depend on which process it participates in, but on which perspective 
                                                 
105  We have no obvious reason to suppose there is an external perspective – a ‘God’s-eye view’ as it were.  
This perhaps bears on the question whether there is some overarching ‘way the world is’ that determines 
how it is from any particular perspective.  A positive answer here might leave us wondering again 
whether this way the world is – the nature of the universe-process as a whole – ought to fix the nature of 
every one of its constituents absolutely, a result which would be at odds with experience-dependence.  
Experience-dependence would seem to suggest that the world is as many ways as there are perspectives 
within it. 
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we adopt within the whole universe-process when assessing its nature.  This adoption of a 
perspective is of course precisely what we are doing when we perceive.   
 
The perspectival role that subjects (and presumably other sentient creatures) play is 
just the familiar one of seeing things, hearing things, and so on.  What remains puzzling, in 
light of the evident experience-dependence of colour, etc., is that shifting between different 
perspectives changes not only how things in the world appear but also how they are.  The 
world as it is for me (to my perspective) may be different to the world as it is for you.  
Given my monistic appeal to a single universe-process, we cannot allow that these are two 
different worlds.  Indeed, we can easily show that if there were ‘two worlds’ then they 
would at least overlap.  After all, you can feature in my experience as a physical subject, 
and vice versa.  What we have is not two worlds but one world, as perceived from different 
perspectives within that world.   
 
If worldly things are truly different to different perspectives (blue to me, green to you, 
and so on), where does this leave the status of our factual claims about the world?  Claims 
about objects’ colour, for example, are relativized to the subject, not because there is some 
inaccessible fact of the matter for which we must substitute a mere appearance, but 
because objects’ colours just are subject-relative.106  As explained in section 7.2.4, we are 
in a slightly different position in respect of so-called ‘primary’ qualities, but this is 
arguably not because there is an absolute fact of the matter about, e.g., shape and mass, in a 
way that there isn’t about colour.  For one thing, we can understand our claims about such 
properties to be already implicitly or explicitly relativized, not directly to the subject, but to 
measuring tools and standards which thereby act as a sort of intermediary between the 
objects and us.  This is enough to grant them a degree of independence from variation 
among individual subjects, enough to deliver an ordinary sort of objectivity.   
 
If the same object has different properties relative to different subjects, and yet these 
properties (as in the case of colour) are genuine qualities inhering in the object itself, what 
entitles us to say that we see the same object in such cases?  Here, the intersubjectivity that 
presents the puzzle also provides a solution: quite simply, we can see that we are both 
looking at the same object.  I can see the object and I can see you looking at the same 
                                                 
106  Plainly, not all of our claims about objects’ properties need to be relativized to the subject in this way, 
notably those concerning ‘primary’ qualities.  The reasons for this were discussed in section 7.2.4 above. 
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object.  Furthermore, and notwithstanding some potential disagreement about colour, 
enough of our respective descriptions of the object tally to affirm that we are indeed seeing 
the same thing. 
 
This rather pragmatic answer, however, might not overcome a related worry: if objects 
lack any absolute properties, how can we be confident that there are any real 
commonalities between the experiences of different subjects, even with respect to, say, size 
and shape?  The worry might be that there is nothing to ‘anchor’ such commonalities and 
so justify our assumption that different subjects’ experiences match in at least some key 
respects.  For example, we can imagine that the colours might not just vary a little but be 
wholly permuted (e.g. inverted) for different subjects, in a way that broadly preserves the 
structure of similarity relations between them and so supports use of a common colour 
language.   
 
Again, intersubjectivity is the key to a solution.  Ex hypothesi, the nature (e.g. colour) 
of an object is determined by the nature of the process in which it is perceived.  Now, the 
nature of the process by which you see an object O is (potentially) accessible to me.  I am, 
or can become, aware of the elements of that process – the surface structure of the object, 
the spectral profile of light reflected from it, the way your visual system responds, and so 
on.  That alone is no comfort: the same process might, after all, appear very different to 
you, in which case we are back where we started.  Crucially, however, it is open to me to 
inspect my own visual process ‘from the outside’.  From inspecting your perceptual 
process, I already know the relevant properties of the object and reflected light, and I can 
now investigate my own visual system’s response in the same way I investigated yours (the 
mechanics of which investigation I delegate to my neuropsychologist friend).  In the event 
that your physiological responses to the same worldly features (the object’s shape, colour, 
etc.) prove closely similar to mine, I will have some justification for taking the object to 
appear (indeed to be) much the same for you as it is for me.   
 
The puzzle of how we establish the identity of objects that might have different 
properties to different subjects potentially gives way to a deeper puzzle: what can we say 
about objects that are unperceived?  Are apples green when no-one is looking at them?  
Does an apple even exist unperceived?  It would be an offence to intuition to say ‘no’ to 
either question.  However, at least in respect of colour, the answer can’t quite be ‘yes’ 
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either if my metaphysical account is correct.  According to that account, an object’s colour 
is determined by the awareness relation or process of which that object is part.  To the 
perspective of a different subject the apple may therefore have a different colour.  In the 
absence of a perspective, there is no process in place that will determine what the apple’s 
colour is.  The colour is, in that sense, undetermined.  But this is not to say that the apple is 
positively colourless.   
 
We might think that the object’s existence is similarly undetermined, especially if we 
take the object to be nothing more or less than its qualities.  That being so, it would be 
similarly untrue to say that an unperceived object positively does not exist – that the 
relevant part of the universe-process positively lacks all the qualities we find when we 
have a perspective of awareness upon it.  Here, as with the question of object identity, we 
might look for a pragmatic basis for our ordinary talk of things existing when no-one is 
looking at them – one which acknowledges our ability to resume something like our 
previous perspectives on the world and so bring the same objects back into awareness. 
 
 
7.3   The presence of the past: the temporal structure of experience 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I explained that using the simple metaphysical picture 
in order to accommodate various puzzling perceptual phenomena to the natural view forces 
us to embrace two main metaphysical consequences.  The first of these was the subject-
relativity of certain perceived qualities, which I have discussed in section 7.2 above.  The 
second concerns the temporal structure of experience, and in particular the ‘presence of the 
past’ in perception.   
 
The proposed explanation of such phenomena as hallucination and cognitive 
penetration of perception drew on the simple metaphysical picture to claim that such 
experiences involve direct awareness of past objects, made possible by our memory of 
those objects.  The current experience, be it perceptual or hallucinatory, restores an 
appropriate causal link between the subject and some past object(s), where 
‘appropriateness’ might include amongst other things the fact that the causal link is 
(historically if not currently) mediated by the sense organs.  Such phenomena, and the 
proposed explanation, force us to make a striking claim about the temporal structure of 
experience, namely that we can be aware of objects and events that belong to the past.  Of 
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course, such a claim is already forced on us by the natural view of perfectly ordinary 
perception: given that my seeing an object in my environment is always mediated by a 
causal process, it follows that every perceptual experience is awareness of something as it 
was rather than as it is.  As noted earlier, the time gap involved is most often negligible, 
but obviously increases with distance, so that I see the moon as it was eight seconds ago, 
and the Andromeda galaxy as it was 2.5 million years ago.   
 
If it is tempting to talk here of ‘the presence of the past’, that is because we can exploit 
an ambiguity in ‘present’ and ‘presence’, as we use these words to describe our awareness 
and the things we are aware of.  On the one hand, we talk about things in our environment 
being present to us in awareness, despite the fact that what is thus presented is inevitably 
past.  On the other hand, those events in our environment that occur in the present – which, 
for the sake of argument, we might specify in terms of simultaneity with some current state 
of our brain – are themselves not (or not yet) present in our awareness.   
 
We might therefore distinguish two senses of ‘presence’: an experiential presence and 
a chronological presence.  An object is present in the experiential sense if the subject is 
directly aware of it (where by ‘direct’ here I mean that the subject is not aware of the 
object only via awareness of something else, like an image of the object).  An object – an 
event, say – is present in the chronological sense if it is simultaneous with the current state 
of the subject.  More generally, we might think of chronological co-presence as a relation 
of simultaneity holding between two or more objects, where one may or may not be a 
physical subject.  We have ways of measuring chronological co-presence or simultaneity in 
terms of causal separation and using certain standards to calibrate this separation (being a 
constant and, so far as we know, a physical limit, the most useful standard here is the speed 
of light).107  Crucially, the causal separation between perceived worldly objects and the 
physical perceiver is such that nothing is, as perceived, ever quite present in the 
chronological sense.  The upshot is that worldly objects are, as perceived, always 
experientially present but never chronologically present.108 
                                                 
107  Given Einsteinian relativity, we can specify temporal separation by reference to causation only within a 
given inertial reference frame, so that chronological measures of simultaneity and non-simultaneity admit 
of no absolute values. 
108  Of course, many objects that are experientially present will continue to exist through whatever period is 
required for the object to perceptually affect the subject, in which case they will still be chronologically 
present, just not as perceived, i.e. the chronological location of the object at the moment it is perceived is 
always earlier than the chronological location of the subject at the moment she perceives (assuming some 
spatial separation between object and subject). 
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This inevitable time-lag in perception has often been seen as ruling out direct 
awareness, although this only follows from an antecedent commitment to the effect view of 
perceptual experience, i.e. the notion that perceptual awareness involves the having of an 
‘experience’ understood as a state or event that exists only in the present (see Power 2010: 
97-8; for a statement of the ‘time-lag argument’ against naïve realism, see Robinson 1994: 
80-1).  The natural view and simple metaphysical picture simply reject this notion of 
experience: instead, they claim that the ‘experience’, as such, is nothing more or less than 
the temporally extended perceptual relation or process itself.   
 
Awareness of the past is thus effectively built into the natural view and simple 
metaphysical picture from the outset.  My concern in the following two sections is 
therefore not to defend the claim that we can be directly aware of the past, but to tease out 
the likely consequences of accepting this claim.  Here again, we can see our task as a 
positive one: rather than seeing the natural view as generating a problem around 
temporality, we can choose to see it as licensing our use of perception as a straightforward 
source of data about the nature of time.  To that end, I will outline what we might learn 
about the temporal structure of the world by taking experience at face value. 
 
In the next section I will consider the extent to which the natural view and its 
insistence on the ‘presence of the past’ can be squared with the main metaphysical views 
of time, namely presentism and four-dimensionalism.  Then, in section 7.3.2, I will 
examine the consequences of combining the presence of the past with the experience-
dependence of worldly things and their qualities. 
 
 
7.3.1   What does experience tell us about time? 
 
It will help us tease out the implications of the natural view for our picture of time if 
we assess its fit with three main metaphysical theories of time, named presentism, 
eternalism, and the growing universe theory (see Markosian 2014: s.6).  These differ 
according to the status they grant to the past, present and future.  According to presentism, 
only the (chronological) present exists.  Eternalists, meanwhile, claim that everything – 
past, present and future – exists equally.  Eternalism is a form of what is known as four-
dimensionalism, since it treats objects as fundamentally extended in time as well as 
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through the three dimensions of space (Rea 2005).  It also appears in the guise of the block 
universe theory, according to which the whole history of the universe (what appears to us 
as past, present and future) is an eternally-existing ‘block’ with no privileged ‘now’ 
(Dowden 2013: s.8a).  Besides eternalism, there is a further version of four-
dimensionalism which provides our third main theory of time. This is the growing block or 
growing universe theory, which holds that only the past and present exist, but not the 
future.  Since the present is forever changing, to become the past, the theory entails that the 
universe is constantly ‘growing’.   
 
Now, of presentism, eternalism and the growing universe theory, we can quickly see 
that presentism is at odds with the natural view.  The natural view allows that we can see 
the past, so presentism is ruled out straight away since it requires that only what is 
chronologically present exists (Power 2010: 112).109  This move effectively reverses the 
traditional time-lag argument against direct perception.  The time-lag argument assumes 
the effect view of perceptual experience, namely the view that perceptual awareness is a 
state or event caused by, and so temporally later than, the object perceived.  Granted the 
effect view, it follows from the time-lag inevitably involved in perceiving our environment 
that the experience occurs after the causative state of its object has ceased to exist.  The 
conclusion of the time-lag argument is therefore that the object is no part of the experience 
and direct perception of the sort proposed in the natural view must be false (Robinson 
1994: 80-1).  However, with the rejection of the effect view in favour of the simple 
metaphysical picture (see chapter 2 above), the time-lag argument fails and we are 
furthermore moved to reject presentism since we can perfectly well see the past (see Power 
2010: 97-8). 
 
We might therefore think that we are thereby committed explicitly to a four-
dimensionalism of either the eternalist or growing universe varieties.  After all, I have 
already suggested that accounting for the experience-dependence of certain perceptible 
qualities, in light of the natural view and simple metaphysical picture, leads us to a 
conception of processes as fundamental, rather than the more or less momentary parts that 
                                                 
109  Presentism is in any case challenged by special relativity, according to which there is no absolute 
simultaneity but only simultaneity relative to an arbitrarily-chosen inertial reference frame (see Sider 
2001: 42 ff.).  This has implications also for the growing universe theory since it privileges a certain set 
of simultaneous events (the present ones) as the ‘leading edge’ of the growing universe (Miller 2013: 352 
ff.).  For a defence of the ‘moving spotlight’ form of eternalism from objections appealing to relativity, 
see Skow (2009). 
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they comprise.  Indeed, I further suggested that this top-down metaphysical picture lends 
itself to a monistic ontology in which the whole universe-process is fundamental.  Earlier I 
hedged my bets around the question whether this whole universe-process should be 
considered to comprise the whole history of the universe up to the present, or whether this 
should be extended to include the future as well.  The difference would of course be 
precisely that between eternalism and a growing universe theory. 
 
As it is, neither view appears to fit our metaphysical account terribly well.  Eternalism 
in particular fails to acknowledge the central phenomenological datum that we might 
describe as the evident passage of time (Miller 2013: 353).  Its insistence that past, present 
and future are equally real is glaringly at odds with our intuitive sense of change – the 
sense of a now that gives meaning to the notion that things (events, say) which are 
chronologically present become chronologically past (rather than things’ merely occupying 
earlier and later stages of an eternal, four-dimensional universe).110 
 
This might seem a good reason to favour the growing universe theory, for that at least 
seeks to capture our sense of a changing present through the notion of history’s ever-
expanding ‘edge’.  Here too there are problems, however.  The growing universe theory, 
like any form of four-dimensionalism, takes every moment of the world’s history to be 
equally real, but this sits almost as uncomfortably with intuition as eternalism’s insistence 
that such reality extends also to the future.  Some moments in the past include my five-
year-old self’s coming to be aware of things.  But this no longer seems as real as my 
coming to be aware of things now.  While eschewing the reality of things yet to happen, 
the growing universe theory seems unable to express this intuitive difference between my 
current experience and that of my five-year-old self.   
 
How, then, to square the following claims I have proposed on the back of the natural 
view and the simple metaphysical picture? 
 
a) Experience (one’s perceiving X) is a perspectivally-centred state of the whole 
universe-process (the whole world) from its beginning to the present. 
                                                 
110  The difference is that famously captured by McTaggart’s distinction between dynamic and static 
conceptions of time that he refers to as the ‘A series’ and ‘B series’ respectively (McTaggart 1908).  
Eternalists may try to recapture this sense of time’s dynamism by appeal to some special role of the 
present as a ‘moving spotlight’ roving over successive parts of the four-dimensional block universe (see 
Skow 2009). 
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b) The universe-process is all there is and it is fundamental. 
 
c) A subject’s current experience is in some sense more real than her past 
experience. 
 
There is no logical inconsistency here, but the apparent contradiction arises because 
(a) and (b) seem to assert the equal reality of everything past and present, while (c) seems 
to demand some special reality for current over past experience.  The seeming 
contradiction is overcome once we recognise that past and present experiences of the same 
subject are not two separate ‘things’ but different relations of awareness holding between 
the subject and the rest of the world.  Although my five-year-old self’s experience was, at 
the time I was enjoying it, a perspectival state of the whole world, it is no longer that, as I 
recall it now from a vantage point decades later.  Now it is my very experience of 
recollection that constitutes the world as it is from my perspective.  As such, my five-year-
old self’s experience is really no longer an experience at all.  Understood as a process or 
physical relation, it has now become part of the larger process that is my act of 
recollection.   
 
It is important to note that my past experience has not, as it were, ‘disappeared’ or 
ceased to exist, leaving only a (memory) trace.  That is a view we might attribute to a 
presentist, but it is not one that fits with the simple metaphysical picture of what is going 
on when we recall a past experience (or, more accurately, recall an object previously 
perceived).  According to the simple metaphysical picture, the perceptual relation in which 
my five-year-old self stood to that past object is still ‘there’, insofar as it is an essential part 
of my current recollection of that act of perceiving.  In other words, that historical 
perceptual process is now part of the larger process of recollection in which I am currently 
engaged.  This process of recollection, as I described it earlier, amounts to a sort of 
‘delayed’ awareness of the recollected objects.  Given top-down determination, it follows 
that the earlier perceptual process is now subordinated to the larger process that is my 
experience of recollection.  It is in this sense that (c) is true – that my current experience is 
more ‘real’ than my past experience.  That is, my current experience is constituted by a 
larger process (indeed, the whole universe-process if process monism is true) of which the 
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earlier perception is but a part.  My current experience is therefore the more fundamental 
process. 
 
We therefore have a way to make sense of the difference between current and past 
experience: current experience is, granted process monism, the complete and therefore 
fundamental universe-process.  Current experience is, in this sense, what there is.  When I 
think of one of my past experiences, that past experience – as a process culminating in 
some historical state of my brain – is no longer the complete, fundamental universe-
process.  The process has continued subsequently, and indeed is now what we might 
consider a new, current experience – namely the experience of recollecting that earlier, 
perceptual experience.   
 
Note that, although there is a sense in which a current experience becomes past and so 
less ‘real’, the same is not necessarily true of the objects of our experiences.  As we go 
from seeing an object to visually recalling it – as the object recedes into the chronological 
past – it nonetheless remains experientially present.  Of course, the subject’s perspective 
on the objects has changed between seeing them way back when and recalling them now.  
The shift in perspective is precisely that from seeing X to recalling X.   
 
It remains unclear whether the experiential presence of the past lends support to, or is 
even compatible with, the growing universe theory.  The growing universe theory grants a 
special role to the ever-advancing present, each moment of which continues to exist even 
as it is superseded.  Meanwhile, the picture that seems to fall out of the natural view is one 
in which the chronological present plays only the slenderest role.  Everything that features 
in our perceptual experience is already chronologically past, if only by the tiniest margin in 
most cases, so the chronologically present is not something we ever actually encounter.  
Reality, so far as we perceive it, is all in the past.   
 
Although perception makes us aware of changes in worldly objects and so enables us 
to form the notion of chronological change, it also weakens any deep metaphysical 
distinction between past and present, since both are equally present in the experiential 
sense.  What changes over time, for us as subjects, is not that our awareness inhabits a 
different time-slice of the universe, but that our awareness amounts to a different 
perspective on – or within – the universe. 
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7.3.2   The experience-dependence of the past 
 
A more obvious conflict with the growing universe theory, and four-dimensionalism in 
general, comes once we ally the presence of the past with a top-down metaphysics.  Four-
dimensionalism assumes that the past, once past, has a fixed nature for all time.  If, 
however, top-down determination is the fundamental structuring principle then the past 
becomes metaphysically dependent on its relation to the present, as processes leading up to 
time t1 give way to, and so become absorbed within, wider processes leading up to time t2.  
This leaves open the possibility that the past is not, after all, fixed for ever, because, once 
past, its nature becomes metaphysically dependent on its place with the larger processes in 
which it is subsequently embedded (indeed, the one evolving universe-process, if process 
monism is true). 
 
To see how this works, and to emphasise the temporal dimension, let us consider the 
perception of an event.  The upshot of applying our top-down metaphysics is that the 
nature of that perceived event for the perceiving subject is determined only once that event 
has participated in the perceptual process whose ‘conclusion’ comes later, chronologically 
speaking (the ‘conclusion’ here we might stipulate to be the neural state of the subject that 
issues most immediately in acts of recognition etc., even though the process carries on 
indefinitely).  So, although the subject might see an event that happens at time t1, its nature 
(to the given subject) at time t1 is only determined upon the ‘completion’ of the perceptual 
process at time t2.  This yields the seemingly paradoxical result that the event is, as 
veridically perceived, F at t1 but only comes to possess that quality F in virtue of its 
participation in a process that is not complete until t2.  The seeming paradox is this: we see 
the object as it was at t1, namely F, but it didn’t come to be F until the experiential relation 
came to fruition at t2.  So it couldn’t have been F at t1 at all. 
 
We might be tempted to say that what is involved here is the determination of the past 
by the present.  But, once again, we must be wary of the latent ambiguity in our use of 
‘present’.  What is fundamental, according to the top-down metaphysics, is the whole 
experiential relation or process.  The determining role is therefore played not by what is 
chronologically present (e.g. the current state of the subject’s brain) but by the whole 
experience, including everything that is experientially present.  And that, most obviously, 
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includes the (chronologically past) object of awareness.  The perceived event is 
experientially present to me, even although it is chronologically not simultaneous with me 
at the moment I become aware of it.  The crucial point is this: although we might correctly 
say that I become aware of the event at time t2, even though the event itself occurred at 
time t1, it does not follow that the experience happens at time t2.  The experience, 
according to the simple metaphysical picture, is itself a temporally extended process 
incorporating, inter alia, both the event at t1 and my perceptual brain state at t2.
111  Granted 
this, it is not the case that the event has its nature determined specifically by some later 
event (i.e., whichever event might be said to ‘complete’ the perceptual process).  Rather it 
has its nature determined by the whole process of which those (chronologically) earlier and 
later events are discernible parts. 
 
The seeming paradox can thus be resolved.  It is not the case that the object only 
became F at t2.  It was already F at t1, just as it appeared perceptually.  What it is for the 
object to be F at t1 is precisely for it to stand in a certain relation to the subject in her 
current state at t2.   
 
Of course, even if we can strip it of the charge of contradiction or paradox, we should 
acknowledge that this picture of past events being determined by their involvement in 
processes that extend to the present remains highly counter-intuitive, if not downright 
perplexing.  Any residual puzzlement stems not just from the claim that objects have their 
nature determined ‘retrospectively’, as it were, but that this nature could be different, not 
only for different subjects, but also for any given subject at different times.  This suggests 
that an object’s nature at a certain time t – even its nature relativised to a given subject – is 
not fixed but might change as it goes from being perceived to being recollected.   
 
One thing to say is that this is not obviously a problem in practice – we seem capable 
enough of recalling objects accurately in respect of their perceptible qualities.  Of course, 
we frequently recall things poorly or inaccurately, but the inadequacy here might typically 
be attributable to one or both of two factors: firstly, the disruption of the causal link 
                                                 
111  As noted previously, this means that ‘experience’, in the sense I have used it, i.e. to denote the relation of 
awareness involving subject and object, is not to be understood as synonymous with ‘act of awareness’.  
Consider glancing at the sun: here the relation of awareness is describable as a process whose most 
relevant part – in which light emitted from the sun reaches the subject’s retina – lasts some eight minutes.  
To say that the experience lasts eight minutes would be quite misleading if we were using ‘experience’ 
synonymously with ‘act of awareness’, for the latter in this case amounts to a mere glance. 
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between the subject and remembered object that underwrites the memory awareness; and, 
second, confusion of the target object of memory with one or more other objects 
previously perceived, such that these latter objects are in fact the actual objects of 
awareness.  It is therefore not obvious that, taking our experiences at face value, we have 
grounds for thinking that objects change in respect of their perceptible qualities as they go 
from being perceived to being recalled. 
 
Nonetheless, top-down determination would seem to leave open the possibility that, 
for example, the green flash I saw in 1979 is now blue for me as I recall it in 2014, perhaps 
because my visual system has been altered in the interim, and not because my memory 
awareness is confused or otherwise inaccurate.  In truth, this possibility presents no 
principled challenge beyond that already posed by inter- and intrasubjective variation in 
colour perception.  In all these cases, the object of awareness can possess different qualities 
according to the perspective from which the subject is aware of it.  In cases we considered 
in chapter 6 the perspectival differences had to do variously with differences in the 
physiology of different subjects, or changes in the background conditions of perception for 
any individual subject.  In the current hypothetical case, in which the 1979 flash of light 
was green for me in 1979 but blue for me in 2014, the perspectival change is a temporal 
one, and the change in the flash’s colour might, for the sake of argument, reflect (but not 
be caused by) a change in how my visual system processes visual memory traces.112 
 
Where does all this leave our debate, discussed in the previous section, concerning the 
various competing metaphysical views on time?  I noted there that the metaphysical 
subordination of past objects and events to the wider processes they give way to (and 
perhaps ultimately to the universe-process as a whole) means that the top-down 
metaphysics is not likely to prove consistent with the growing block theory any more than 
it is with eternalism, since both require that all objects or events at all stages of history are 
equally real and retain their nature through the passage of time.  The alternative picture 
presented here is one in which the past may be very much present in the experiential sense, 
but in which past objects have their nature in virtue of the (perceptual or memory) relation 
they stand in to current subjects.  As no object has, on this view, an absolute nature 
independently of how it exists to one or more perceivers, there is no such absolute nature 
                                                 
112  Any dispute about the ‘actual’ colour of the object (the flash, in this case) might be settled on pragmatic 
grounds, in much the same way as we might settle competing colour claims between subjects (see section 
7.2.5 above). 
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to remain fixed through the world’s evolution.  Rather, as the world evolves, the status of 
that object (that moment in history) within the world evolves correspondingly.  It exists to 
the same or different subjects in diverse and different ways, being perceived from diverse 
perspectives and remembered from others. 
 
Top-down determination therefore yields neither presentism, eternalism nor the 
growing universe theory.  How, then, does it leave our understanding of the temporal 
nature of the world?  If it is tied to a process monism as I have suggested, it holds that what 
there is at any (experiential) moment is the universe-process as a whole, from its beginning 
to the present.  Within that whole universe-process, certain features (objects, events, 
qualities) stand out according to the perspective that is provided within the universe-
process by a physical subject.  There is some sense, then, in which all of the past is 
potentially ‘there’ awaiting an opportunity to stand out to some perspective.  Having said 
that, there is little or nothing we can say about the past unless it does stand out, and if the 
view offered here is correct this is not merely an epistemic problem but a metaphysical one 
– it is only by standing out in the perspective of a subject that objects come to have any 
determinate (if not absolute) qualities; qualities, indeed, by which we might mark out those 
objects’ very existence. 
 
Not only is the nature of the past not fixed, but much of what is past is presumably lost 
to us forever and will never stand out again for any subject.  This will be so if causal 
linkages between then and now fail to preserve information about certain states of the past.  
In that case, we will no longer be able either to perceive those elements of the past in the 
way that, for example, we perceive the Andromeda galaxy as it was 2.5 million years ago.  
Nor will we be able to remember them.  Such ‘lost’ elements of the past will no longer 
stand out for our awareness, although they leave no ‘hole’ in the universe. 
 
 
7.4   Conclusion – metaphysical implications of the natural view 
 
My purpose in this chapter was to outline the likely metaphysical and ontological 
implications of the natural view.  In assuming the truth of the natural view I was able to 
treat experience as a straightforward source of data or evidence about the nature of the 
world.  Some of the claimed implications of the natural view are bound to be highly 
controversial – not only experience-dependence of worldly objects and qualities, but also 
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the process monism that I suggested might follow.  I sought, however, to cash out 
experience-dependence via a broadly physicalist ontology, resulting in what I called a top-
down metaphysics in which wholes determine their parts rather than vice versa.  This 
allows us to account for experience-dependence in a way that avoids idealism, as befits a 
theory that eschews talk of ‘minds’ and ‘mental states’ from the outset. 
 
Key features of the resulting view are as follows: 
 
 The universe is governed by a basic metaphysical structuring principle of top-
down determination, by which the nature of whole processes determines the 
nature of their parts. 
 
 Assuming that the universe is a single process, top-down determination entails 
a process monism in which the whole world from its beginning to the present is 
fundamental. 
 
 A top-down metaphysics points to a conception of time that admits the 
experiential presence of what is chronologically past, but which (contra four-
dimensionalism) does not support the notion that past and present experiences 
are all equally ‘real’.  
 
 None of presentism, eternalism or the growing universe theory fits the picture 
of time bequeathed by a top-down metaphysics.  In particular, the requirement 
of eternalism and the growing universe theory that a given object’s nature at 
time t is settled once and for all time is inconsistent with the observed 
experience-dependence of worldly objects and qualities, and with the claim 
that the past is determined by its role within processes extending to the present. 
 
Plainly, the resulting picture is, in at least some respects, highly counterintuitive.  In 
particular, the notion that the past is not fixed, but remains dependent on its participation 
within the ever-evolving universe-process, is decidedly hard to fathom, even if we can rid 
it of contradiction.  All the same, the core insight that the past is (experientially) present is 
arguably quite intuitive.  Our recollections do seem to ‘reach into the past’, while an 
understanding of the time gaps involved in perception doesn’t necessarily override our 
sense that we really do see distant celestial objects.  The most puzzling aspect of 
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temporality, as revealed in perception, therefore results from the claim of top-down 
determination rather than the presence of the past.  
231 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS  
 
The aim of this thesis was to defend what I have called a natural view of perceptual 
experience, according to which perception is just what it seems to be: a straightforward 
encounter with worldly objects and their qualities.  In seeking to flesh out what such a 
‘straightforward encounter’ is meant to entail, I explicitly disavowed all talk of 
distinctively ‘mental’ states or events, believing there to be nothing of the sort, or at least 
nothing substantial deserving the name.  Instead I offered a metaphysically simple, if not 
austere, account of perception in which the ‘experience’, if we must use that potentially 
misleading term, is nothing more or less than a certain sort of relationship among familiar, 
physical things – human organisms and the various things that make up their environment.   
 
According to this simple metaphysical picture, perception involves nothing besides 
these familiar, physical things, as they are bound together in certain states of affairs that we 
can describe in physical terms as perceptual processes.  These are the sort of processes 
long familiar from empirical research into the workings of the senses.  Crucially, 
perception involves no distinctively mental state – ‘experience’ in a more substantial sense 
– as the final upshot of the perceptual process.  This sets the simple metaphysical picture 
against what I called the effect view of perceptual experience.  It also inoculates the view 
against the weirdness that attends the sort of claims often made by naïve realists, to the 
effect that worldly objects are constituents or ingredients of our perceptual experiences. 
 
Having established that neither conceptual nor empirical considerations decide in 
favour of the effect view over the natural view, I went on to address some of the more 
puzzling features of sensory awareness, features that have widely been thought to 
undermine the natural view.  Chief among these are perceptual illusion and hallucination.  I 
described how proponents of contemporary naïve realism have sought to defend something 
like the natural view from a certain kind of argument that trades on the possibility of such 
seemingly aberrant sensory phenomena.  This kind of argument seeks to generalise from 
some alleged failure of sensory engagement with the world in the ‘bad’ case (illusion or 
hallucination) to the conclusion that veridical perceptual experience must also fail to 
engage us with the world in quite the direct way claimed by the natural view.  Naïve 
realists have shown that we can readily dismiss this argument in respect of many illusions, 
essentially by pointing out that we can be misled by how things appear even though we are 
directly aware of them in the way the natural view requires. 
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Hallucinations prove, as a class, less easily accommodated to the natural view.  The 
standard naïve realist defence to the argument from hallucination has invoked the 
disjunctive analysis of appearance statements, whereby a given statement about how things 
appear might be made true by quite different states of affairs – one a genuinely perceptual 
encounter with worldly things, and the other a relation of awareness to something 
unworldly or uninstantiated, or else not really a relation of awareness at all.  I noted that 
such disjunctivism renounces the virtues of a unified explanation of what appears to be 
potentially shared phenomenology across perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.  This 
is the unified explanation offered by conjunctivist or common-factor theories, which 
ascribe the potentially similar phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
to the occurrence of a single kind of state or event – the experience itself – in both cases.  
However, it was with hallucination that I was first able to trumpet the explanatory power of 
the simple metaphysical picture, as a means of giving a unified explanation of perceptual 
and hallucinatory phenomenology that nonetheless kept all that phenomenology ‘out 
there’.  In other words, the phenomenology even in hallucination is attributable to worldly 
objects – not necessarily objects currently before the subject, but objects previously 
perceived and still potentially available to the subject’s awareness by virtue of a causal-
informational link to some persistent effects on her brain (‘memory traces’). 
 
I went on to show that this memory-based explanation of hallucination can act as a 
launch pad for similar claims about other features of perception that might otherwise 
appear to make trouble for the natural view.  Most notably, this includes those states of 
awareness in which past experience, beliefs or expectations evidently play a role in 
determining the way things appear in a robust, phenomenal sense.  Here, the role of such 
cognitive factors was explained as a kind of partial, simultaneous awareness of one or 
more previously perceived objects while genuinely perceiving some current object.  So, 
when I see a familiar face, what contributes to how it looks is not just awareness of that 
face before me now, but also some or perhaps every previous moment of awareness of that 
same face, in a sort of ‘layering’ of the past upon the present in a way that is seamless and 
so not obvious.  I showed that this allows the simple metaphysical picture to accommodate 
the generality of perception as well as its immediacy. 
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As far as this step in the thesis, I was able to put the simple metaphysical picture in the 
service of naïve realism, that is the conjunction of the natural view with the realism claim, 
namely the claim that the objects and qualities of which we are aware exist and have their 
nature independently of their being perceived.  The decisive twist in the overall project 
then came with consideration of certain features of perception – veridical perception, no 
less – which prove incompatible with either the natural view, the realism claim, or both.  
These features of perception are ones which reveal some subject relativity or experience 
dependence of perceptible qualities, and I described aspects of colour perception and 
indeed colour itself which exhibit this experience dependence in various ways. 
 
This experience-dependence of at least some of the phenomenal qualities which seem 
to inhere in worldly objects plainly rules out naïve realism if that theory is understood as 
the conjunction of the natural view and the realism claim.  At this point, we might be 
tempted to cut our losses and retreat from the natural view, rueing the futile effort 
expended in trying to square it with hallucination and so on, but glad enough to walk away 
with realism intact.  However, I noted that one could coherently preserve the natural view 
if one were willing to dispense with the realism claim.  Crucially, I argued that simple 
metaphysical picture offers a way to make this gambit more than merely logically possible, 
but perhaps even metaphysically intelligible.  The suggested solution involved viewing 
‘experience-dependence’ through the prism of the simple metaphysical picture, the upshot 
being the claim that objects are dependent in respect of at least some of their properties 
(e.g. their colour) on the nature of the wider (perceptual) processes in which they 
participate. 
 
At this point I suggested that this dependence relation between objects and the 
processes in which they participate – a relation I called top-down determination – might in 
fact not be a feature peculiar to some or all perceptual relations, but instead a wholly 
general feature of the world.  The universal scope of top-down determination was defended 
chiefly on the grounds that it offered the virtue of a unified explanatory and metaphysical 
principle.  At the same time, it was intended as speculative in the most positive and 
constructive sense, namely as the floating of an idea in order to test its explanatory power.   
 
My task in chapter 7 was therefore twofold: firstly, to draw out the likely metaphysical 
implications of treating top-down determination as a universal metaphysical structuring 
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principle; and, second, to assess whether it might be consistent with, or able to explain, the 
way the world appears to us perceptually.  As regards this second concern, it might seem 
that much of the work had already been done in chapters 3 to 5, and that I had in fact 
managed in that chapter to show that the natural view and simple metaphysical picture 
could explain various sensory experiences quite satisfactorily without recourse to top-down 
determination.  This in fact presented a further challenge to the proposed metaphysical 
thesis based on top-down determination: not only to explain those phenomena which don’t 
submit to naïve realism and its explanatory virtue (a virtue which we saw implies bottom-
up rather than top-down determination, i.e. atomism rather than holism), but to explain 
why some properties of worldly objects do appear consistent with naïve realism (and the 
realism claim in particular) in spite of its claimed falsity.  To that end, I sought to explain 
the apparent experience-independence of certain qualities – the so-called ‘primary’ 
qualities of size, shape and so on – as a consequence of the distinctive way in which 
subjects are related perceptually to those qualities.   
 
The claims in chapter 7 were therefore intended to uphold the natural view of 
perception as acquainting us straightforwardly with the world around us, by showing that it 
could be defended not only in light of some seemingly puzzling sensory phenomena but 
also within the ambit of a wider metaphysical picture of the world that shares the natural 
view’s virtues of simplicity and parsimony.  While that might seem to present the 
challenge as one of fitting our wider metaphysics about a certain view of perception, I 
argued that the natural view itself, in eschewing talk of distinctively ‘mental’ states or 
events, implies something different and perhaps more positive about the metaphysical task.  
Instead of treating perception as a peculiar, local phenomenon – something tied to the 
sentient beings scattered around one or more corners of the universe – that makes 
disproportionately large metaphysical demands, we should see perception as a peculiar, 
local phenomenon that reveals the world as it is.  In other words, it is not that we fashion 
our metaphysics in order to explain perception, and then apply that metaphysics to the 
world in general.  Rather, if we take the world at face value, as the natural view 
recommends, it is the nature of the world itself, as revealed in perception, that guides our 
metaphysics.   
 
Having said all that, one lesson we can learn from experience is that the world does 
not always reveal itself straightforwardly.  Indeed, it is perhaps never revealed quite as 
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straightforwardly as we might think, and indeed as the natural view might suggest.  
Sometimes we need to look very closely to work out what is going on.  As cognitive 
penetration and perceptual learning reveal, even the most seemingly straightforward 
experiences prove to involve more than simple awareness of what is perceptibly before us.   
 
One implication of this is that we are rarely, if ever, wholly present, in the sense that 
our awareness at any moment encompasses not only what is before us now, but also what 
was once before us but is now absent.  To put it metaphorically, we perceive the present 
through the lens of the past, perhaps inescapably so.  As I explained in chapter 7.3, 
combining this chronological ‘depth’ of awareness with the notion that we should take 
experience at face value has surprising implications for our understanding of time, 
implications brought out in the distinction between chronological presence and experiential 
presence. 
 
What, finally, should we say about the mind?  The view proposed here started from a 
narrow concern to explain the nature of perceptual experience, but proved capable of 
accounting for perhaps the full diversity of what we might call phenomenal consciousness 
more generally.  Inasmuch as phenomenal consciousness is paradigmatic of our mental 
life, we might extend our conclusions about the nature of awareness to the mind more 
generally.  I have said that our having an experience does not involve some internal and 
peculiarly ‘mental’ state or event, but is simply our being related to the world through 
awareness in a more or less straightforward way.  By extension, one’s having a mind, so to 
speak, does not signal one’s possession of some repository or medium of ‘experiences’, but 
rather that one can and does stand in certain relations to the world.  Those ‘mental’ 
relations would typically be described as ones of awareness and thought.  My chief 
concern has been awareness, although I hinted in my account of cognitive penetration and 
perceptual learning that we might go a long way to explaining the nature of thought in 
terms of the simultaneous, ‘folded’ awareness of worldly things both past and present.  
Making good that suggestion is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it should be obvious at 
least how we might hope to cash out the notion of thinking in terms of one’s standing in 
certain sorts of relations to worldly things, and without recourse to talk of ‘thoughts’ 
construed as inner states or events. 
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Since the simple metaphysical picture has no place for peculiarly mental states or 
events, all the onus for explaining the nature of phenomenal consciousness is placed on the 
world.  Happily, those seemingly anomalous features of our subjective lives that did so 
much to motivate talk of ‘minds’ and ‘experiences’ in the first place – features like 
illusion, hallucination, dreams, and so on – prove to be explicable without our taking such 
talk literally as picking out metaphysically peculiar entities.  However, passing the 
explanatory responsibility back to the world forces us to revise some well-entrenched 
assumptions about the nature of the world and our place within it.  In particular, the failure 
to uphold the explanatory virtue of naïve realism – its promise to explain the nature of 
experience by reference to the antecedent nature of the worldly thins perceived – may be 
attributable ultimately to a mistaken adherence to an atomistic conception of the world in 
which big things and processes are ‘built out of’, and so determined by, littler things.  I 
have suggested that adopting a holistic, and indeed monistic, conception instead might 
allow us to accommodate the seeming experience-dependence of certain qualities within a 
broadly physicalist framework.  
 
To many, such a radical and wholesale change to our picture of the world will seem an 
unacceptably high price to pay for a unified account of phenomenal consciousness – an 
unreasonable shifting of the explanatory burden from the local matter of mind to the world 
in general.  However, the natural view precisely offers no reason to think that perception 
reveals something merely local about ourselves – rather, it ostensibly reveals the nature of 
the world, as befits its purpose.  Taking the world more at face value therefore allows us to 
treat it, not as something that lies behind our experiences, but as laid out before us in our 
experiences.  This, if you like, is our ‘phenomenological’ reason for basing our 
metaphysical view of the world on the nature of awareness. 
 
Still, it leaves the natural view to stand or fall according to the viability of some 
metaphysical scheme that can support it.  I have suggested one such scheme here, and 
justified it on the grounds that it seems to fall quite ‘naturally’, as it were, out of the natural 
view, and that it appears both simple and parsimonious.  However, further work will be 
needed to determine whether it is viable on independent grounds.   
 
If its viability can be established, the metaphysical view proposed offers its own 
advantages beyond merely explaining the various features of phenomenal consciousness.  
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Specifically, it straightforwardly avoids any metaphysical or ontological puzzles about the 
relationship between mind and world, puzzles which drive so much of philosophy past and 
present.  Relatedly, it promises to avoid at least some of the epistemological worries that 
arise from viewing mind and world as in some way distinct, or from taking perception to 
be in some way less than ‘direct’.  I have said little explicitly about how the natural view 
and simple metaphysical picture impinge on some of these philosophical debates, but it is 
here that it is likely to have some of its greatest advantages. 
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